focused analysis in Connecticut

2025He further claims that, even if the trial court had applied the proper legal standard, the Connecticut constitution bars a new trial because it offers broader double jeopardy protec- tions than its federal counterpart and that this court should accordingly overrule State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321 , 360–61, 875 A.2d 510 (2005), which held oth- erwise.

2025He further claims that, even if the trial court had applied the proper legal standard, the Connecticut constitution bars a new trial because it offers broader double jeopardy protec- tions than its federal counterpart and that this court should accordingly overrule State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321 , 360–61, 875 A.2d 510 (2005), which held oth- erwise.

2021The present case, on the other hand, concerns whether the department has the discretion to preclude someone from intervening at all. 8 To reiterate, ‘‘the second exception [to sovereign immunity] occurs when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitu- tional rights; and the third exception occurs when an action seeks declara- tory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory

2021The present case, on the other hand, concerns whether the department has the discretion to preclude someone from intervening at all. 8 To reiterate, ‘‘the second exception [to sovereign immunity] occurs when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitu- tional rights; and the third exception occurs when an action seeks declara- tory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory

2016Id., at 432, 922 A.2d 1056 .

2001Further, the court reaffirmed its earlier holding, under both Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247 , 363 A.2d 121 CT Page 16360 (1975), and Breen v. Warden, 173 Conn. 312 , 377 A.2d 335 (1977), that "our legislature has not intended to authorize the transfer of jail time credits accrued while in pretrial confinement under one offense to the sentence thereafter imposed upon conviction for another offense." Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 31 -32.

2001Further, the court reaffirmed its earlier holding, under both Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247 , 363 A.2d 121 CT Page 16360 (1975), and Breen v. Warden, 173 Conn. 312 , 377 A.2d 335 (1977), that "our legislature has not intended to authorize the transfer of jail time credits accrued while in pretrial confinement under one offense to the sentence thereafter imposed upon conviction for another offense." Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 31 -32.

2001Further, the court reaffirmed its earlier holding, under both Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247 , 363 A.2d 121 CT Page 16360 (1975), and Breen v. Warden, 173 Conn. 312 , 377 A.2d 335 (1977), that "our legislature has not intended to authorize the transfer of jail time credits accrued while in pretrial confinement under one offense to the sentence thereafter imposed upon conviction for another offense." Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 31 -32.

2001Further, the court reaffirmed its earlier holding, under both Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247 , 363 A.2d 121 CT Page 16360 (1975), and Breen v. Warden, 173 Conn. 312 , 377 A.2d 335 (1977), that "our legislature has not intended to authorize the transfer of jail time credits accrued while in pretrial confinement under one offense to the sentence thereafter imposed upon conviction for another offense." Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. 31 -32.