6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Kevin R. Smith, Dalian C. Stewart, and Steve Taylorgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., id. at 1465 (holding that although police actions did not constitute an arrest within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was nonetheless custodial for Miranda purposes); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that although the encounter stayed within the scope of a Terry stop, it was custodial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982) (" Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place 2005See, e.g., id. at 1465 (holding that although police actions did not constitute an arrest within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was nonetheless custodial for Miranda purposes); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that although the encounter stayed within the scope of a Terry stop, it was custodial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982) (“Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Juan Manuel Bautista, United States of America v. Javier Cabrera-Martinezgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., id. at 1465 (holding that although police actions did not constitute an arrest within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was nonetheless custodial for Miranda purposes); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that although the encounter stayed within the scope of a Terry stop, it was custodial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982) (" Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place 2005See, e.g., id. at 1465 (holding that although police actions did not constitute an arrest within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was nonetheless custodial for Miranda purposes); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that although the encounter stayed within the scope of a Terry stop, it was custodial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982) (“Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place | 4 | 4 |
Whittaker v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence1999Although the agency recognized the presumption of compensability in the compensation order, it never explicitly applied this presumption to Olson’s SI radiculopa-thy claim. 26 *1041 On remand, the agency should give Olson the benefit of the presumption of compensability for her SI radiculopathy claim and conduct a more focused inquiry as to whether Georgetown offered evidence “specific and comprehensive” enough to rebut the presumption. 27 Whit-taker, supra, 668 A.2d at 845 (“ ‘Absent employer evidence specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential connection between a particular inj | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hobsongreen2 sentences1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor 1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lesnickgreen2 sentences1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor 1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Teal v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
green
2 sentences1999In the compensation order, the examiner discredits Olson’s testimony regarding “the causal relationship Of her present disability to the original work injury ...” because he finds that Olson failed to fully inform Dr. Spiegel or Dr. Ammerman 28 of her past medical history and concealed this past history in her prehearing deposition. 29 See Teal, supra, 580 A.2d at 651 n. 7 (explaining that “Credibility determinations of a hearing examiner are accorded special deference by this court”); George Hyman Constr. 1999In the compensation order, the examiner discredits Olson’s testimony regarding “the causal relationship Of her present disability to the original work injury ...” because he finds that Olson failed to fully inform Dr. Spiegel or Dr. Ammerman 28 of her past medical history and concealed this past history in her prehearing deposition. 29 See Teal, supra, 580 A.2d at 651 n. 7 (explaining that “Credibility determinations of a hearing examiner are accorded special deference by this court”); George Hyman Constr. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Parodi v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
green
1 sentence1999Although the agency recognized the presumption of compensability in the compensation order, it never explicitly applied this presumption to Olson’s SI radiculopa-thy claim. 26 *1041 On remand, the agency should give Olson the benefit of the presumption of compensability for her SI radiculopathy claim and conduct a more focused inquiry as to whether Georgetown offered evidence “specific and comprehensive” enough to rebut the presumption. 27 Whit-taker, supra, 668 A.2d at 845 (“ ‘Absent employer evidence specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential connection between a particular inj | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Temple
green
2 sentences1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor 1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Lachs v. State
green
1 sentence1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Adams v. Williams
green
2 sentences1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articula-ble suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that.” . 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). . 1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articula-ble suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that.” . 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor 1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. De Bour
green
2 sentences1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor 1988The court noted: "[w]hat I am saying is that there was not even articulable suspicion under Terry to approach the car, because even though the government was relying on probable cause, if I had found articulable suspicion, it could have been upheld under that." [4] 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). [5] It is an exaggeration for the majority to characterize the "burglary casing" activity observed by the experienced officers in Terry as "innocent." [6] LaFave cites numerous cases which illustrate the tendency of the state courts to hold unreasonable, because of inadequate cor | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.