focused analysis in Georgia

2020Beginning with the first critical question, although the trial court did not expressly find that Hinton asserted his right to remain silent, its order makes clear that it implicitly found that he did, because the trial court focused its analysis on whether, after Hinton invoked his right to remain silent, his subsequent statements were admissible.2 See Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 244 (2) ( 765 SE2d 896 ) (2014) (“If, after invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, a defendant is found to have initiated contact with authorities and then knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, his ensuing stat

2020Beginning with the first critical question, although the trial court did not expressly find that Hinton asserted his right to remain silent, its order makes clear that it implicitly found that he did, because the trial court focused its analysis on whether, after Hinton invoked his right to remain silent, his subsequent statements were admissible.2 See Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 244 (2) ( 765 SE2d 896 ) (2014) (“If, after invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, a defendant is found to have initiated contact with authorities and then knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, his ensuing stat

2019In its ruling below, the trial court focused its analysis on whether the back door was a public entrance for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. “[A]partment residents have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding their apartment.” Espinoza v. State, 265 Ga. 171, 173 (2) ( 454 SE2d 765 ) (1995).

2019In its ruling below, the trial court focused its analysis on whether the back door was a public entrance for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. “[A]partment residents have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding their apartment.” Espinoza v. State, 265 Ga. 171, 173 (2) ( 454 SE2d 765 ) (1995).

2016Therefore, the court focused its analysis on whether the other acts evidence (assuming that it was relevant) should be excluded pursuant to OCGA § 24- acts, United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), and the State has failed to make this showing. 6 It is a fundamental that “[e]vidence which is not relevant shall not be admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-402.

2016Indeed, the first part of the three-part test to determine admissibility of evidence of other crimes and acts under Rule 404 (b) is that “the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character[.]” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656 (3) ( 769 SE2d 892 ) (2015).

2016Indeed, the first part of the three-part test to determine admissibility of evidence of other crimes and acts under Rule 404 (b) is that “the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character[.]” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656 (3) ( 769 SE2d 892 ) (2015).

2016See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 163 (3) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015) (Evidence of other acts is not necessarily admissible in every criminal prosecution even when it is relevant to prove intent and knowledge, because such evidence may be deemed inadmissible on the basis of those considerations set out in OCGA § 24-4-403.); State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. at 653 (3) (“Even when a trial court determines that all three prongs of the test for admissibility under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) are satisfied, the trial court may still exclude the evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-403.”); United States v. Brimm, 608 Fe

2016See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 163 (3) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015) (Evidence of other acts is not necessarily admissible in every criminal prosecution even when it is relevant to prove intent and knowledge, because such evidence may be deemed inadmissible on the basis of those considerations set out in OCGA § 24-4-403.); State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. at 653 (3) (“Even when a trial court determines that all three prongs of the test for admissibility under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) are satisfied, the trial court may still exclude the evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-403.”); United States v. Brimm, 608 Fe

2016See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 163 (3) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015) (Evidence of other acts is not necessarily admissible in every criminal prosecution even when it is relevant to prove intent and knowledge, because such evidence may be deemed inadmissible on the basis of those considerations set out in OCGA § 24-4-403.); State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. at 653 (3) (“Even when a trial court determines that all three prongs of the test for admissibility under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) are satisfied, the trial court may still exclude the evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-403.”); United States v. Brimm, 608 Fe

2016See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 163 (3) ( 773 SE2d 170 ) (2015) (Evidence of other acts is not necessarily admissible in every criminal prosecution even when it is relevant to prove intent and knowledge, because such evidence may be deemed inadmissible on the basis of those considerations set out in OCGA § 24-4-403.); State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. at 653 (3) (“Even when a trial court determines that all three prongs of the test for admissibility under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) are satisfied, the trial court may still exclude the evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-403.”); United States v. Brimm, 608 Fe

2006See Florescu v. State, supra. Relying on James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1992), a case dealing with a federal habeas petitioner, the trial court focused its inquiry on whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant a further hearing on the question of competency, and therefore, held Traylor to the standard of offering clear and convincing evidence outlined in James v. Singletary.

2006Id. at 1572, n. 15 .

2002This language closely parallels that discussed in Allen v. Lefkoff Duncan, Grimes &c., 212 Ga. App. 560, 562 (4) ( 442 SE2d 466 ) (1994) (“ ‘any and all claims asserted’ ” against the indemnitee), rev’d on other grounds, 265 Ga. 374 ( 453 SE2d 719 ) (1995), where we held that “the scope of the indemnity did not extend to attorney fees and expenses of litigation. . . .” Indeed, a focused analysis of the specific liabilities indemnified confirms this conclusion.

2002This language closely parallels that discussed in Allen v. Lefkoff Duncan, Grimes &c., 212 Ga. App. 560, 562 (4) ( 442 SE2d 466 ) (1994) (“ ‘any and all claims asserted’ ” against the indemnitee), rev’d on other grounds, 265 Ga. 374 ( 453 SE2d 719 ) (1995), where we held that “the scope of the indemnity did not extend to attorney fees and expenses of litigation. . . .” Indeed, a focused analysis of the specific liabilities indemnified confirms this conclusion.