statutory notice claim in New York

2024The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the City adequate opportunity to promptly investigate, collect and preserve evidence, and evaluate the merit of a claim while information is still readily available ( Brown v. City of New York , 95 NY2d 389, 392 [2000]; Bowers v City of New York , 147 AD3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2017]).

2023The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the municipality the opportunity to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding an alleged occurrence and explore the merits of the claim while relevant information is readily available ( see Bowers v City of New York , 147 AD3d 894, 895 ; Avery v New York City Tr.

2025The statutory notice of claim requirement is intended to provide municipal corporations with "adequate opportunity . . . to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available" without "frustrat[ing] the rights of individuals with legitimate claims" ( Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440 [1952]; Ramos v New York City Housing Authority, 162 AD3d 884 , 885 [2d Dept 2018]).

2025The statutory notice of claim requirement is intended to provide municipal corporations with “adequate opportunity . . . to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available” without “frustrat[ing] the rights of individuals with legitimate claims” (Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440 [1952]; Ramos v New York City Housing Authority, 162 AD3d 884 , 885 [2d Dept 2018]).

2024The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the City adequate opportunity to promptly investigate, collect and preserve evidence, and evaluate the merit of a claim while information is still readily available ( Brown v. City of New York , 95 NY2d 389, 392 [2000]; Bowers v City of New York , 147 AD3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2017]).

2016Plaintiff’s amended notice of claim satisfied the statutory notice of claim requirement by providing the City “information sufficient to enable [it] to investigate” her claim, within 90 days after the claim arose (Brown v City of New York, 95 NY2d 389, 393 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; General Municipal Law § 50-e [1] [a]; [2]).

2011Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the defendants were under no obligation to plead, as an affirmative defense, the plaintiffs failure to comply with the statutory notice of claim requirement (see Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760, 761 [2007]; Maxwell v City of New York, 29 AD3d 540, 541 [2006]; Lynch v New York City Tr.

2010In Laroc v City of New York ( 46 AD3d 760 [2007]), this Court held that, municipal defendants were under no obligation to plead, as an affirmative defense in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs failure to comply with the statutory notice of claim requirement.

2026And we have "repeatedly rejected . . . proposals to compromise the strict statutory notice of claim requirement" to avoid "uncertainty and vexatious disputes" ( Varsity Tr., Inc. , 5 NY3d at 536 [Rosenblatt, J.]), even where such requirements yield harsh results ( see e.g.

2026And we have "repeatedly rejected . . . proposals to compromise the strict statutory notice of claim requirement" to avoid "uncertainty and vexatious disputes" ( Varsity Tr., Inc. , 5 NY3d at 536 [Rosenblatt, J.]), even where such requirements yield harsh results ( see e.g.

2013The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the public corporation an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available (see Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440, 443 [1952]; Palmer v Society for Seamen’s Children, 88 AD3d 970, 971 [2011]). “[I]n determining compliance with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, courts should focus on the purpose served by a Notice of Claim: whether based on the claimant’s description [the public corporation] c

2013The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the public corporation an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available (see Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440, 443 [1952]; Palmer v Society for Seamen’s Children, 88 AD3d 970, 971 [2011]). “[I]n determining compliance with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, courts should focus on the purpose served by a Notice of Claim: whether based on the claimant’s description [the public corporation] c

2011The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement (General Municipal Law § 50-e) is to afford the public corporation “an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available” (Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440, 443 [1952]; see O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 358 [1981]; Salesian Socy. v Village of Ellenville, 41 NY2d 521 , 524 [1977]).

1985However, the purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement (General Municipal Law § 50-e) is to provide a public corporation with "an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available” (Teresta v City of New York, 304 NY 440, 443 ; see also, O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 358 ; Salesian Socy. v Village of Ellenville, 41 NY2d 521 , 524; Levine v City of New York, 111 AD2d 785 ; Caselli v City of New York, supra, at p 252).

2026Given that the "[e]xclusion of relevant and probative testimony as a sanction for a defendant's failure to comply with a statutory notice requirement implicates a defendant's constitutional right to present witnesses in his own defense" ( People v Berk , 88 NY2d 257, 266 [1996]), to aid in this discretionary determination, "the trial court must 'weigh [the defendant's constitutional] right against the resultant prejudice to the People from the belated notice' " ( Sidbury , 42 NY3d at 507, quoting Berk , 88 NY2d at 266).

2026Given that the "[e]xclusion of relevant and probative testimony as a sanction for a defendant's failure to comply with a statutory notice requirement implicates a defendant's constitutional right to present witnesses in his own defense" ( People v Berk , 88 NY2d 257, 266 [1996]), to aid in this discretionary determination, "the trial court must 'weigh [the defendant's constitutional] right against the resultant prejudice to the People from the belated notice' " ( Sidbury , 42 NY3d at 507, quoting Berk , 88 NY2d at 266).

2023Auth. , 138 AD3d 770, 771 ).

2021Auth. , 138 AD3d 770, 771 ).

2010Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, there was no express agreement to waive the statutory notice of claim provision (see Davis-Wallbridge, Inc. v City of Syracuse, 71 NY2d 842, 843-844 [1988]), and a waiver cannot be implied from the parties’ stipulation dated December 11, 2007, vacating an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Ruditzky, J.), dated March 9, 2007, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Cowen Denochy, since the stipulation made no reference to the notice of claim, and only the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction w

2009Corp., 227 AD2d 127, 128 [1996]; Reaves v City of New York, 177 AD2d 437 [1991]), even by participation in the litigation (see Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760, 761 [2007]), unless there is an express agreement that the statutory notice of claim requirement is inapplicable, “the parties have set out detailed procedures which are plainly inconsistent with” the requirement (Davis-Wallbridge, Inc. v City of Syracuse, 71 NY2d 842, 844 [1988] [internal quotation marks omitted]), or the defense was not raised before the Supreme Court (see Smith v Sagistano, 186 AD2d 180, 182 [1992]).

2017Unlike the buy-and-bust scenario, where the police participant is focused on .the face-to-face contact with defendant with the goal of identifying him or her when he or she is picked up by a back up unit (see People v Wharton, 74 NY2d 921, 922-923 [1989]), here, the officer was standing by the vehicle for approximately three minutes while he was engaged with all of the occupants of the vehicle.

2017Unlike the buy-and-bust scenario, where the police participant is focused on .the face-to-face contact with defendant with the goal of identifying him or her when he or she is picked up by a back up unit (see People v Wharton, 74 NY2d 921, 922-923 [1989]), here, the officer was standing by the vehicle for approximately three minutes while he was engaged with all of the occupants of the vehicle.

2017The exception to the requirement to provide notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 “carries significant consequences” (People v Boyer, 6 NY3d 427, 431 [2006]), and the Court of Appeals has “consistently held that police identifications do not enjoy any exemption from the statutory notice and hearing requirements” (id. at 433).

2017The exception to the requirement to provide notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 “carries significant consequences” (People v Boyer, 6 NY3d 427, 431 [2006]), and the Court of Appeals has “consistently held that police identifications do not enjoy any exemption from the statutory notice and hearing requirements” (id. at 433).

2014Significantly, any indictment obtained in violation of the statutory notice and waiver provisions ‘is invalid’ and ‘must be dismissed’ upon timely motion (CPL 190.50 [5] [c]; see also, CPL 210.20, 210.35 [4]).” As the Court explained in People v Evans ( 79 NY2d at 413-414 ), CPL 190.50 (5) “protect[s] defendants’ valued statutory option to appear at this critical accusatory stage to offer testimony that may affect the Grand Jury’s consideration of the otherwise exclusive, ex parte presentment of evidence by the prosecution.” To guard against abridgement of this “ ‘valued’ ” right, the Court of

2007The right of a defendant to appear and testify before a grand jury is a “valued” right that must be “scrupulously protected” (People v Corrigan, 80 NY2d 326, 332 [1992]) to allow a defendant “to offer testimony that may affect the Grand Jury’s consideration of the otherwise exclusive, ex parte presentment of evidence by the prosecution” (People v Evans at 414 ). “[A]ny indictment obtained in violation of the statutory notice and waiver provisions ‘is invalid’ and ‘must be dismissed’ upon timely motion” (People v Smith, 87 NY2d 715, 720 , quoting CPL 190.50 [5] [c]; see also People v Degnan, 24

2026"The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the public corporation an [*2]adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the [claim] and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available" ( Carroll v City of New York , 149 AD3d 1026, 1027 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2021"The purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement is to afford the public corporation an [*2]adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the [claim] and to explore the merits of the claim while information is still readily available" ( Carroll v City of New York , 149 AD3d 1026, 1027 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018Auth., 103 AD3d 881 , 882; see Matter of Ramirez v City of New York, 148 AD3d 908 ). " The determination of an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the trial court'" ( Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 148 AD3d at 910, quoting Matter of Wooden v City of New York, 136 AD3d 932, 932 ). " In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether: (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim

2017Auth., 103 AD3d 881 , 882 [2013]; see Matter of Ramirez v City of New York, 148 AD3d 908 [2017]). “ ‘The determination of an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 148 AD3d at 910, quoting Matter of Wooden v City of New York, 136 AD3d 932, 932 [2016]).

2018Auth., 103 AD3d 881 , 882; see Matter of Ramirez v City of New York, 148 AD3d 908 ). " The determination of an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the trial court'" ( Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 148 AD3d at 910, quoting Matter of Wooden v City of New York, 136 AD3d 932, 932 ). " In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether: (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim

2018Auth., 103 AD3d 881 , 882; see Matter of Ramirez v City of New York, 148 AD3d 908 ). " The determination of an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the trial court'" ( Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 148 AD3d at 910, quoting Matter of Wooden v City of New York, 136 AD3d 932, 932 ). " In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether: (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim

2018Auth., 103 AD3d 881 , 882; see Matter of Ramirez v City of New York, 148 AD3d 908 ). " The determination of an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the trial court'" ( Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 148 AD3d at 910, quoting Matter of Wooden v City of New York, 136 AD3d 932, 932 ). " In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether: (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim

2017Auth., 103 AD3d 881 , 882 [2013]; see Matter of Ramirez v City of New York, 148 AD3d 908 [2017]). “ ‘The determination of an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim is left to the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (Matter of Ramos v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 148 AD3d at 910, quoting Matter of Wooden v City of New York, 136 AD3d 932, 932 [2016]).

2015The City is entitled to summary judgment because it met its prima facie burden of demonstrating that it did not receive prior written notice of the pothole that plaintiff identified as the cause of her fall (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-201 [c] [2]), and plaintiff and codefendant Central Parking Systems of New York, Inc. have failed to show that an exception to the statutory notice requirement applies (see Yarborough v City of New York, 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]).

2015In opposition, plaintiff did not demonstrate that any exception to the statutory notice requirement applies (see Yarborough v City of New York, 10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]).

2015The City’s 311 record of a citizen’s April 9, 2010 telephonic report of numerous potholes on West 49th Street between *416 Eighth Avenue and Ninth Avenue at the curbside did not provide the City with prior written notice of the particular pothole that was in the roadway in front of 304 West 49th Street where plaintiff fell on July 20, 2010 (see Stoller v City of New York, 126 AD3d 452, 452-453 [1st Dept 2015]; Boniello v City of New York, 106 AD3d 612 [1st Dept 2013]).

2015The City’s failure to discover an improper re-paving by a third party would be similarly insufficient because actual or constructive notice of a defect does not satisfy the statutory notice requirement (see Stoller v City of New York, 126 AD3d 452, 452-453 [1st Dept 2015]).

2014Significantly, any indictment obtained in violation of the statutory notice and waiver provisions ‘is invalid’ and ‘must be dismissed’ upon timely motion (CPL 190.50 [5] [c]; see also, CPL 210.20, 210.35 [4]).” As the Court explained in People v Evans ( 79 NY2d at 413-414 ), CPL 190.50 (5) “protect[s] defendants’ valued statutory option to appear at this critical accusatory stage to offer testimony that may affect the Grand Jury’s consideration of the otherwise exclusive, ex parte presentment of evidence by the prosecution.” To guard against abridgement of this “ ‘valued’ ” right, the Court of

2014People v Evans, 79 NY2d at 414 [affirming dismissal of indictment, because statutory right to testify was not satisfied by opportunity to appear after grand jury had voted indictment]).

2015This court recognizes that the District Attorney’s investigation does not necessarily impute knowledge to the municipality or other municipal agencies, such as the DOE (see Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 255 [2d Dept 1984] [“A municipality often will have numerous employees assigned to separate and diverse agencies . . . and the purpose of the statutory notice of claim requirement would simply not be fulfilled if all information obtained by municipal employees, officers or agencies in the regular course of their business was to be imputed to the municipality”]).

1994The purpose of the statutory notice of claim is to afford the municipality an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding an accident and explore the merits of the claim while the information is likely to be still available (see, Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251 ; Altmayer v City of New York, 149 AD2d 638, 639 ).

2024Auth., 162 AD3d 884 , 885 [2d Dept 2018], citing Matter of Porcaro v City of New York, 20 AD3d 357, 358 [1st Dept 2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v Brown, 25 NY3d 247, 251 [2015] [“remedial statutes . . . should be interpreted broadly to accomplish their goals”]).

2018Since the statutory notice requirement "is not intended to operate as a device to frustrate the rights of individuals with legitimate claims," and because of its remedial nature, it "should be liberally construed" ( Matter of Porcaro v City of New York , 20 AD3d 357, 358 ; see Robb v New York City Hous.

2026"Failure to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement is a ground for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action" (<i>Parpounas v Ohagan</i>, 216 AD3d 985, 986 ).</p> <p>"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (<i>Watts v

2025"Failure to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement is a ground for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action" ( Parpounas v Ohagan , 216 AD3d 985, 986 ; see Singh v City of New York , 189 AD3d 1697, 1699 , affd 40 NY3d 138 ).

1989In People v Michel ( 56 NY2d 1014, 1015 [1982]), the Court of Appeals held that where: "[T]he confession itself was negotiated, drafted, and signed by both the defendant and his attorney and specifically stated that it was 'going to be used in court’ * * * [and] it was clear to the defense that the confession was an integral part of the agreement. * * * [W]e cannot say that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the defense had actual notice of the prosecution’s intent to introduce the confession at trial and, therefore, good cause for dispensing with the statutory notice req

1985Were we inclined to hold to the contrary, we would nonetheless conclude from the circumstances herein that appellant had actual knowledge of petitioner’s intention to introduce the gun at the hearing and, therefore, that there was good cause to dispense with the statutory notice requirement (see, Family Ct Act § 330.2 [2]; cf. People v Michel, 56 NY2d 1014 , rearg denied 57 NY2d 775 ).

2011Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the defendants were under no obligation to plead, as an affirmative defense, the plaintiffs failure to comply with the statutory notice of claim requirement (see Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760, 761 [2007]; Maxwell v City of New York, 29 AD3d 540, 541 [2006]; Lynch v New York City Tr.

2007Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the defendants were under no obligation to plead, as an affirmative defense, the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the statutory notice of claim requirement (see Maxwell v City of New York, 29 AD3d at 541 ; Lynch v New York City Tr.

2025NO. 41 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/10/2025 and now reject again, proposals to compromise the strict statutory notice of claim requirement, because to do so would lead to uncertainty and vexing disputes”); Parochial Bus Sys. v. Bd. of Educ., 60 NY2d 539, 548 [1983] (“Nor may a claimant be relieved of a positive statutory mandate simply because no prejudice has resulted, even to avoid a harsh result”); Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 NY2d 252, 265 [1969] (Even foreign sovereign must comply with Notice of Claim requirements).

2013(Parochial Bus Sys., 60 NY2d 539 .) This applies even if the results are harsh.

2014Significantly, any indictment obtained in violation of the statutory notice and waiver provisions ‘is invalid’ and ‘must be dismissed’ upon timely motion (CPL 190.50 [5] [c]; see also, CPL 210.20, 210.35 [4]).” As the Court explained in People v Evans ( 79 NY2d at 413-414 ), CPL 190.50 (5) “protect[s] defendants’ valued statutory option to appear at this critical accusatory stage to offer testimony that may affect the Grand Jury’s consideration of the otherwise exclusive, ex parte presentment of evidence by the prosecution.” To guard against abridgement of this “ ‘valued’ ” right, the Court of

2007The right of a defendant to appear and testify before a grand jury is a “valued” right that must be “scrupulously protected” (People v Corrigan, 80 NY2d 326, 332 [1992]) to allow a defendant “to offer testimony that may affect the Grand Jury’s consideration of the otherwise exclusive, ex parte presentment of evidence by the prosecution” (People v Evans at 414 ). “[A]ny indictment obtained in violation of the statutory notice and waiver provisions ‘is invalid’ and ‘must be dismissed’ upon timely motion” (People v Smith, 87 NY2d 715, 720 , quoting CPL 190.50 [5] [c]; see also People v Degnan, 24