statutory notice requirement in Washington

2006For this proposition, the State relies on this court's statement that "[t]o establish a violation of due process, Defendants must at least allege that the incorrect DOL revocation notices deprived them of notice and/or an opportunity to be heard." State v. Storhoff, 133 Wash.2d 523, 527 , 946 P.2d 783 (1997); see also State v. Perry, 96 Wash.App. 1, 5 , 975 P.2d 6 (1999) (per curiam).

2006For this proposition, the State relies on this court’s statement that “[t]o establish a violation of due process, Defendants must at least allege that the incorrect DOL revocation notices deprived them of notice and/or an opportunity to be heard.” State v. Storhoff, 133 Wn.2d 523, 527 , 946 P.2d 783 (1997); see also State v. Perry, 96 Wn.

2006For this proposition, the State relies on this court's statement that "[t]o establish a violation of due process, Defendants must at least allege that the incorrect DOL revocation notices deprived them of notice and/or an opportunity to be heard." State v. Storhoff, 133 Wash.2d 523, 527 , 946 P.2d 783 (1997); see also State v. Perry, 96 Wash.App. 1, 5 , 975 P.2d 6 (1999) (per curiam).

2006For this proposition, the State relies on this court’s statement that “[t]o establish a violation of due process, Defendants must at least allege that the incorrect DOL revocation notices deprived them of notice and/or an opportunity to be heard.” State v. Storhoff, 133 Wn.2d 523, 527 , 946 P.2d 783 (1997); see also State v. Perry, 96 Wn.

2003Medina, 147 Wash.2d at 316 , 53 *625 P.3d 993.

2003Medina, 147 Wn.2d at 316 .

2001We say that because, as we have observed previously, the purpose underlying the statutory notice requirement embodied in RCW 10.95.040 is to apprise “the accused of the penalty that may be imposed upon conviction of the crime.” State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 805, 811 , 920 P.2d 187 (1996).

2001We say that because as we have observed previously, the purpose underlying the statutory notice requirement embodied in RCW 10.95.040 is to apprise "the accused of the penalty that may be imposed upon conviction of the crime." State v. Clark, 129 Wash.2d 805, 811 , 920 P.2d 187 (1996).

2001We have also observed that this notice requirement of RCW 10.95.040 “applies by its terms only to the prosecutor’s original decision to seek the death penalty.” State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 740 , 743 P.2d 210 (1987).

2001We have also observed that this notice requirement of RCW 10.95.040 “applies by its terms only to the prosecutor’s original decision to seek the death penalty.” State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 740 , 743 P.2d 210 (1987).

2001We say that because, as we have observed previously, the purpose underlying the statutory notice requirement embodied in RCW 10.95.040 is to apprise “the accused of the penalty that may be imposed upon conviction of the crime.” State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 805, 811 , 920 P.2d 187 (1996).

2001We say that because as we have observed previously, the purpose underlying the statutory notice requirement embodied in RCW 10.95.040 is to apprise "the accused of the penalty that may be imposed upon conviction of the crime." State v. Clark, 129 Wash.2d 805, 811 , 920 P.2d 187 (1996).

1999Vahl, 56 Wash.App. at 610 , 784 P.2d 1280 .

1999Vahl, 56 Wash.App. at 610 , 784 P.2d 1280 .

1943In re Krueger's Estate , 11 Wn.2d 329 , 119 P.2d 312 .

1943In re Krueger's Estate , 11 Wn.2d 329 , 119 P.2d 312 .

2020In Nguyen, 148 Wn.

2018There, we reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm where the trial *1080 court failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement of RCW 9.41.047(1), holding, "The only remedy appropriate for the statutory violation is to reverse the current conviction." Id. at 804, 174 P.3d 1162 . ¶ 12 We next considered a violation of RCW 9.41.047(1) in State v. Breitung , 173 Wash.2d 393 , 267 P.3d 1012 (2011) ( Breitung II ).

2018There, we reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm where the trial *1080 court failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement of RCW 9.41.047(1), holding, "The only remedy appropriate for the statutory violation is to reverse the current conviction." Id. at 804, 174 P.3d 1162 . ¶ 12 We next considered a violation of RCW 9.41.047(1) in State v. Breitung , 173 Wash.2d 393 , 267 P.3d 1012 (2011) ( Breitung II ).

2018There, we reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm where the trial *1080 court failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement of RCW 9.41.047(1), holding, "The only remedy appropriate for the statutory violation is to reverse the current conviction." Id. at 804, 174 P.3d 1162 . ¶ 12 We next considered a violation of RCW 9.41.047(1) in State v. Breitung , 173 Wash.2d 393 , 267 P.3d 1012 (2011) ( Breitung II ).

2000Vega, 118 Wn.2d at 451 .

2000Vega, 118 Wn.2d at 451 .

1999In Lawrence , the trial court suppressed documentary evidence on the basis of the State’s failure to comply with a statutory notice requirement. 585 P.2d at 728 .

1929In Lee v. Bellingham School District No. 301, 107 Wash. 482 , 182 Pac. 580 , the statutory notice requirement was held substantially complied with.

1929In Lee v. Bellingham School District No. 301, 107 Wash. 482 , 182 Pac. 580 , the statutory notice requirement was held substantially complied with.

1929So deciding, we said: “It is true, as pointed out by counsel, this court has held in Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427 , 33 Pac. 1059 , and Richards v. Klickitat County, 13 Wash. 509 , 43 Pac. 647 , and perhaps in other cases, that mere irregularities in an election notice, even of a special election, will not necessarily invalidate the result of such an election; but no decision has come to our notice, and we think none can be found, holding that such an irregularity as would be caused by the giving of only seventeen or eighteen days ’ notice, when the minimum statutory period for giving a notic

1929So deciding, we said: “It is true, as pointed out by counsel, this court has held in Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427 , 33 Pac. 1059 , and Richards v. Klickitat County, 13 Wash. 509 , 43 Pac. 647 , and perhaps in other cases, that mere irregularities in an election notice, even of a special election, will not necessarily invalidate the result of such an election; but no decision has come to our notice, and we think none can be found, holding that such an irregularity as would be caused by the giving of only seventeen or eighteen days ’ notice, when the minimum statutory period for giving a notic

1929So deciding, we said: “It is true, as pointed out by counsel, this court has held in Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427 , 33 Pac. 1059 , and Richards v. Klickitat County, 13 Wash. 509 , 43 Pac. 647 , and perhaps in other cases, that mere irregularities in an election notice, even of a special election, will not necessarily invalidate the result of such an election; but no decision has come to our notice, and we think none can be found, holding that such an irregularity as would be caused by the giving of only seventeen or eighteen days ’ notice, when the minimum statutory period for giving a notic

1929So deciding, we said: “It is true, as pointed out by counsel, this court has held in Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427 , 33 Pac. 1059 , and Richards v. Klickitat County, 13 Wash. 509 , 43 Pac. 647 , and perhaps in other cases, that mere irregularities in an election notice, even of a special election, will not necessarily invalidate the result of such an election; but no decision has come to our notice, and we think none can be found, holding that such an irregularity as would be caused by the giving of only seventeen or eighteen days ’ notice, when the minimum statutory period for giving a notic