statutory notice requirement in Illinois

1993As the J.I.D. court noted, "PJittle purpose is served by the statutory notice requirement [of section 2 — 22(2)] if it is deemed to be merely directory without any sanction for noncompliance.” J.I.D., 177 Ill.

1989App. 3d at 735-36 , 532 N.E.2d at 551 .) And further: “Little purpose is served by the statutory notice requirement if it is deemed to be merely directory without any sanction for noncompliance.” (Emphasis added.) (J.I.D., 177 Ill.

1989App. 3d at 936 , 514 N.E.2d at 5 .) The plaintiff in Shortt argued that the defendants should be estopped from raising a statutory notice defense because defendants had engaged in extensive discovery and negotiation with the plaintiff for five years.

1989App. 3d at 935 .) The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the city had actual notice, citing authority that “actual notice is insufficient to satisfy the statutory notice requirement.” 160 Ill.

2003Plaintiff cites this court's decision in Joseph v. Chicago Transit Authority, 306 Ill.App.3d 927 , 240 Ill.Dec. 46 , 715 N.E.2d 733 (1999), in support of this argument.

2003Plaintiff cites this court's decision in Joseph v. Chicago Transit Authority, 306 Ill.App.3d 927 , 240 Ill.Dec. 46 , 715 N.E.2d 733 (1999), in support of this argument.

1979App. 3d 660 , 338 N.E.2d 920 , the court emphasized that there had not even been token compliance with a statutory notice requirement.

1979App.3d 660 , 338 N.E.2d 920 , the court emphasized that there had not even been token compliance with a statutory notice requirement.

2023Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment in favor of Kids’ Work and enter judgment for the Delaware LLCs. ¶6 Background -2- 1-21-1350 ¶7 In Bryton Properties, LLC v. Kids’ Work Chicago, Inc. 2022 IL App (1st) 210441 , we affirmed the trial court’s order requiring Kids’ Work to make use and occupancy payments to the Delaware LLCs.

2020Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”); Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill.2d 413, 432 (1990) (“Due process entails an orderly proceeding wherein a person is served with notice, actual or constructive, and has an opportunity to be heard and to enforc

1994(Thomas v. State (1961), 24 Ill.

1992The court held that the statutory notice requirement of the Act was a jurisdictional point, and the Board’s decision was void because the statutory notice requirement was not met. “[A]n administrative authority derives its power solely from the statute by which it was created [citation]. *** The State agency and, in this instance, the Pollution Control Board cannot ignore the mandatory requirements of notice in an effort to evade the responsibility to complete a hearing within the required time ***.” 137 Ill.

1992App. 3d at 452 , 484 N.E.2d at 900 .

1990(See, e.g., Borushek v. Kincaid (1979), 78 Ill.

1989App. 3d 710 , 508 N.E.2d 285 .) The statutory notice requirement, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed against the local public entity.

1989Section 8 — 102 provided that such notice give, as stated by the court in Rio ( 104 Ill. 2d at 361-62 , 472 N.E.2d at 423 ), “ ‘in substance the following information: the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the accident occurred, the general nature of the accident, the name and address of the attending physician, if any, and the name and address of the treating hospital or hospitals, if any.’ ” In Rio ( 104 Ill. 2d at 367 , 472 N.E.2d at 426 ), the cou

1989Section 8 — 102 provided that such notice give, as stated by the court in Rio ( 104 Ill. 2d at 361-62 , 472 N.E.2d at 423 ), “ ‘in substance the following information: the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the accident occurred, the general nature of the accident, the name and address of the attending physician, if any, and the name and address of the treating hospital or hospitals, if any.’ ” In Rio ( 104 Ill. 2d at 367 , 472 N.E.2d at 426 ), the cou

1989Because any order entered subsequent to an improper denial of a change of venue is void (Wheaton National Bank v. Aarvold (1973), 16 Ill.

1988Landwer, 94 Ill.

1988The appellate court in that case followed the reasoning of Spaulding School District No. 58 v. City of Waukegan (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 526, 528 , in which this court reaffirmed the well-established principle that it is the function of the legislature to define the annexation procedures and the role of the court to determine whether the municipality complied with those procedures.

1988Ed. 2d 775 , 89 S. Ct. 864 , which held that a municipality need only comply with the statutory notice requirement, it need not provide superior notice.

1987Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 185, 188 , 326 N.E.2d 771 ; Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 357, 361 , 282 N.E.2d 437 .

1987Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 185, 188 , 326 N.E.2d 771 ; Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 357, 361 , 282 N.E.2d 437 .

1987Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 185, 188 , 326 N.E.2d 771 ; Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 357, 361 , 282 N.E.2d 437 .

1987Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 185, 188 , 326 N.E.2d 771 ; Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 357, 361 , 282 N.E.2d 437 .

1986Although plaintiff argues that the filing of a complaint satisfies the statutory notice requirement, courts have so held only where a defendant was served with defective notice during the required time, and the defect was cured by the filing of a complaint with the missing information within the statutory period (Oliver v. City of Chicago (1985), 137 Ill.

1986App. 3d 958 , 485 N.E.2d 428 ).

1985While circuit courts derive their jurisdiction directly from the constitution (In re Estate of Mears (1982), 110 Ill.

1985Likewise, the contention that the minor's interests here were adequately represented by others is based upon speculation and does not fulfill the statutory notice requirement. *698 • 3 The supreme court has expressly held that the failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in the failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. ( People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1 , 470 N.E.2d 297 ; People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77 , 445 N.E.2d 293 .) The State does not contend that notification was given to the minors here.

1985Likewise, the contention that the minor's interests here were adequately represented by others is based upon speculation and does not fulfill the statutory notice requirement. *698 • 3 The supreme court has expressly held that the failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in the failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. ( People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1 , 470 N.E.2d 297 ; People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77 , 445 N.E.2d 293 .) The State does not contend that notification was given to the minors here.

1985(Zych v. Jones (1980), 84 Ill.

1985Likewise, the contention that the minor's interests here were adequately represented by others is based upon speculation and does not fulfill the statutory notice requirement. *698 • 3 The supreme court has expressly held that the failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in the failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. ( People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1 , 470 N.E.2d 297 ; People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77 , 445 N.E.2d 293 .) The State does not contend that notification was given to the minors here.

1985Likewise, the contention that the minor's interests here were adequately represented by others is based upon speculation and does not fulfill the statutory notice requirement. *698 • 3 The supreme court has expressly held that the failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in the failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction. ( People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1 , 470 N.E.2d 297 ; People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77 , 445 N.E.2d 293 .) The State does not contend that notification was given to the minors here.

1985In Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1980), 84 Ill.