10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Prater v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The only case that the State cites in support of this idea, Prater v. State, 222 Ga. App. 486, 488 (474 SE2d 684) (1996), is based on a statutory notice requirement that is not relevant to this case; Prater does not mention due process, fundamental fairness, or any other constitutional principle. 2023The only case that the State cites in support of this idea, Prater v. State, 222 Ga. App. 486, 488 (474 SE2d 684) (1996), is based on a statutory notice requirement that is not relevant to this case; Prater does not mention due process, fundamental fairness, or any other constitutional principle. | 1 | 1 |
Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A.green2 sentences2016See, e.g., Babalola, 324 Ga. App. at 751, n. 4 (attachment to a brief cannot be considered in a motion to dismiss). 2016See, e.g., Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 324 Ga. App. 750 , 751 n. 4 ( 751 SE2d 545 ) (2013) (attachment to a brief cannot be considered in a motion to dismiss). | 1 | 1 |
Classic City Bonding Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Northeast Atlanta Surety Co. v. Perdue, 294 Ga. App. 32, 33-34 (1) ( 668 SE2d 508 ) (2008); Classic City Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 577, 578 ( 568 SE2d 834 ) (2002); AAA Bonding Co. v. State of *576 Ga., 192 Ga. App. 684, 685 (2) ( 386 SE2d 50 ) (1989). 2 Second, a surety was entitled to relief, we said, only if he could affirmatively show harm from the failure to comply with the notice requirement. 2011See, e.g., Northeast Atlanta Surety Co. v. Perdue, 294 Ga. App. 32, 33-34 (1) ( 668 SE2d 508 ) (2008); Classic City Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 577, 578 ( 568 SE2d 834 ) (2002); AAA Bonding Co. v. State of *576 Ga., 192 Ga. App. 684, 685 (2) ( 386 SE2d 50 ) (1989). 2 Second, a surety was entitled to relief, we said, only if he could affirmatively show harm from the failure to comply with the notice requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Easy Out Bonding v. Stategreen1 sentence2011We reaffirmed this principle in Easy Out Bonding, 224 Ga. App. at 707 (1), and Troup Bonding, 292 Ga. App. at 6-7 . *577 In 2009, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) and added, as pertinent here, 3 these provisions: “Such ten-day notice shall be adhered to strictly. | 1 | 1 |
Northeast Atlanta Surety Co. v. Perduegreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Northeast Atlanta Surety Co. v. Perdue, 294 Ga. App. 32, 33-34 (1) ( 668 SE2d 508 ) (2008); Classic City Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 577, 578 ( 568 SE2d 834 ) (2002); AAA Bonding Co. v. State of *576 Ga., 192 Ga. App. 684, 685 (2) ( 386 SE2d 50 ) (1989). 2 Second, a surety was entitled to relief, we said, only if he could affirmatively show harm from the failure to comply with the notice requirement. 2011See, e.g., Northeast Atlanta Surety Co. v. Perdue, 294 Ga. App. 32, 33-34 (1) ( 668 SE2d 508 ) (2008); Classic City Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 577, 578 ( 568 SE2d 834 ) (2002); AAA Bonding Co. v. State of *576 Ga., 192 Ga. App. 684, 685 (2) ( 386 SE2d 50 ) (1989). 2 Second, a surety was entitled to relief, we said, only if he could affirmatively show harm from the failure to comply with the notice requirement. | 1 | 1 |
WMM Properties, Inc. v. Cobb Countygreen2 sentences2010Smith, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Helen Lumsden was not a signatory to the Agreement or the subsequent “Walk Through List.” 2 The parties’ Agreement contained a provision, in all capital letters, specifically informing the Lumsdens of the statutory notice requirement and stating that the failure to follow the statutory requirements may affect the buyer’s ability to file a lawsuit or other action. 3 Contrary to the Sellers’ contention, this Court has jurisdiction to review this order under OCGA § 5-6-34 (d). 4 At the time, this provision was codified as OCGA § 8-2-20 (9) (B) (i) (VI). 5 T 2010Smith, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Helen Lumsden was not a signatory to the Agreement or the subsequent “Walk Through List.” 2 The parties’ Agreement contained a provision, in all capital letters, specifically informing the Lumsdens of the statutory notice requirement and stating that the failure to follow the statutory requirements may affect the buyer’s ability to file a lawsuit or other action. 3 Contrary to the Sellers’ contention, this Court has jurisdiction to review this order under OCGA § 5-6-34 (d). 4 At the time, this provision was codified as OCGA § 8-2-20 (9) (B) (i) (VI). 5 T | 1 | 1 |
Samay v. Somgreen2 sentences2003The purpose of the notice requirement “is to give the court and parties adequate preparation time to litigate the foreign law issue.” Samay v. Som, 213 Ga. App. 812, 815 (1) (c) ( 446 SE2d 230 ) (1994). 2003The purpose of the notice requirement “is to give the court and parties adequate preparation time to litigate the foreign law issue.” Samay v. Som, 213 Ga. App. 812, 815 (1) (c) ( 446 SE2d 230 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Power Co. v. Mooregreen2 sentences1998But the statutory notice requirement applies only to an alienee “who merely acquires property on which there is an existing nuisance, passively permits its continuance, and adds nothing thereto, [Cits.]” Ga. Power Co. v. Moore, 47 Ga. App. 411, 412 ( 170 SE 520 ) (1933). 1998But the statutory notice requirement applies only to an alienee “who merely acquires property on which there is an existing nuisance, passively permits its continuance, and adds nothing thereto, [Cits.]” Ga. Power Co. v. Moore, 47 Ga. App. 411, 412 ( 170 SE 520 ) (1933). | 1 | 1 |
Tilley v. Pagegreen2 sentences1989“Even assuming arguendo that the transaction occurred in ‘the context of the consumer marketplace’ (see Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 83 ( 273 SE2d 910 ) (1980)), [Thomas’] right to recover under the Act was foreclosed by [her] failure to introduce evidence that [she] had delivered a written demand for relief to the [defendants] at least 30 days prior to filing suit, as required by OCGA § 10-1-399 (b).” Tilley v. Page, 181 Ga. App. 98, 99 (2) ( 351 SE2d 464 ) (1986). 1989“Even assuming arguendo that the transaction occurred in ‘the context of the consumer marketplace’ (see Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 83 ( 273 SE2d 910 ) (1980)), [Thomas’] right to recover under the Act was foreclosed by [her] failure to introduce evidence that [she] had delivered a written demand for relief to the [defendants] at least 30 days prior to filing suit, as required by OCGA § 10-1-399 (b).” Tilley v. Page, 181 Ga. App. 98, 99 (2) ( 351 SE2d 464 ) (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Zeeman v. Blackgreen2 sentences1989“Even assuming arguendo that the transaction occurred in ‘the context of the consumer marketplace’ (see Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 83 ( 273 SE2d 910 ) (1980)), [Thomas’] right to recover under the Act was foreclosed by [her] failure to introduce evidence that [she] had delivered a written demand for relief to the [defendants] at least 30 days prior to filing suit, as required by OCGA § 10-1-399 (b).” Tilley v. Page, 181 Ga. App. 98, 99 (2) ( 351 SE2d 464 ) (1986). 1989“Even assuming arguendo that the transaction occurred in ‘the context of the consumer marketplace’ (see Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 83 ( 273 SE2d 910 ) (1980)), [Thomas’] right to recover under the Act was foreclosed by [her] failure to introduce evidence that [she] had delivered a written demand for relief to the [defendants] at least 30 days prior to filing suit, as required by OCGA § 10-1-399 (b).” Tilley v. Page, 181 Ga. App. 98, 99 (2) ( 351 SE2d 464 ) (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Fountain v. Georgia Marble Co.green2 sentences1963An award denying compensation was affirmed because the statutory notice requirement was not complied with in Fountain v. Georgia Marble Co., 95 Ga. App. 21, 23 ( 96 SE2d 656 ), when there was evidence that the claimant had stated to the employer that he knew of no recent injury occasioned on the job. 1963An award denying compensation was affirmed because the statutory notice requirement was not complied with in Fountain v. Georgia Marble Co., 95 Ga. App. 21, 23 ( 96 SE2d 656 ), when there was evidence that the claimant had stated to the employer that he knew of no recent injury occasioned on the job. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
AAA BONDING COMPANY v. State of Georgia
green
1 sentence2011See, e.g., Northeast Atlanta Surety Co. v. Perdue, 294 Ga. App. 32, 33-34 (1) ( 668 SE2d 508 ) (2008); Classic City Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 577, 578 ( 568 SE2d 834 ) (2002); AAA Bonding Co. v. State of *576 Ga., 192 Ga. App. 684, 685 (2) ( 386 SE2d 50 ) (1989). 2 Second, a surety was entitled to relief, we said, only if he could affirmatively show harm from the failure to comply with the notice requirement. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
TROUP BONDING CO., INC. v. State
green
1 sentence2011We reaffirmed this principle in Easy Out Bonding, 224 Ga. App. at 707 (1), and Troup Bonding, 292 Ga. App. at 6-7 . *577 In 2009, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 17-6-71 (a) and added, as pertinent here, 3 these provisions: “Such ten-day notice shall be adhered to strictly. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rayburn v. State
green
2 sentences1990OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (2) provides that one “commits the offense of criminal trespass when he knowingly and without authority . . . [e]nters upon the land or premises of another person . . . after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner [or] rightful occupant . . . that such entry is forbidden.” (Emphasis supplied.) Inherent in the statutory notice requirement, which is an essential element that must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, is “a requirement that notice be reasonable under the circumstances, as well as sufficiently explicit to apprise the trespasser w 1990OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (2) provides that one “commits the offense of criminal trespass when he knowingly and without authority . . . [e]nters upon the land or premises of another person . . . after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner [or] rightful occupant . . . that such entry is forbidden.” (Emphasis supplied.) Inherent in the statutory notice requirement, which is an essential element that must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, is “a requirement that notice be reasonable under the circumstances, as well as sufficiently explicit to apprise the trespasser w | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Williamson v. State
green
2 sentences1990This court has recognized that “[c]riminal trespass is ... a location crime and its purpose is to keep the defendant off the property of others. . . . [T]he term ‘premises’ has varying meanings, but it is inclusive enough generally to mean land and the buildings thereon.” Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583 ( 215 SE2d 518 ) (1975). 1990This court has recognized that “[c]riminal trespass is ... a location crime and its purpose is to keep the defendant off the property of others. . . . [T]he term ‘premises’ has varying meanings, but it is inclusive enough generally to mean land and the buildings thereon.” Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583 ( 215 SE2d 518 ) (1975). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Crews v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1963In Crews v. General Motors Corp. 107 Ga. App. 592 ( 130 SE2d 925 ), ". . . the only evidence relating to the giving of notice by the employee to the employer of [the employee's] said heart attack simply disclosed that the claimant's wife, three days after the claimant had last worked for the defendant, informed the *405 employer through its personnel supervisor that her husband was in the hospital suffering from a heart attack. . ." Hence, "the finding of the full board that the notice provision of Code § 114-303 had not been complied with was fully authorized." In Employers Ins. 1963In Crews v. General Motors Corp. 107 Ga. App. 592 ( 130 SE2d 925 ), ". . . the only evidence relating to the giving of notice by the employee to the employer of [the employee's] said heart attack simply disclosed that the claimant's wife, three days after the claimant had last worked for the defendant, informed the *405 employer through its personnel supervisor that her husband was in the hospital suffering from a heart attack. . ." Hence, "the finding of the full board that the notice provision of Code § 114-303 had not been complied with was fully authorized." In Employers Ins. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Farmers & Traders National Bank v. Willis
neutral
1 sentence1937Pritchard v. McCrary, 122 Ga. 606 ( 50 S. E. 366 ); Turner v. Bank of Maysville, 13 Ga. App. 547 ( 79 S. E. 180 ). | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Pritchard v. McCrary
neutral
1 sentence1937Pritchard v. McCrary, 122 Ga. 606 ( 50 S. E. 366 ); Turner v. Bank of Maysville, 13 Ga. App. 547 ( 79 S. E. 180 ). | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Turner v. Bank of Maysville
neutral
2 sentences1937Pritchard v. McCrary, 122 Ga. 606 ( 50 S. E. 366 ); Turner v. Bank of Maysville, 13 Ga. App. 547 ( 79 S. E. 180 ). 1937Pritchard v. McCrary, 122 Ga. 606 ( 50 S. E. 366 ); Turner v. Bank of Maysville, 13 Ga. App. 547 ( 79 S. E. 180 ). | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.