38 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1953–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whitson v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1994In Whitson , this Court said that unless the receivership court orders a different manner of notice, service of notice by first-class mail satisfies the statutory notice requirement of section 3(h); proof of receipt of that notice is not required. 5 Whitson, 792 S.W.2d at 208 (emphasis added). 1994In Whitson , this Court said that unless the receivership court orders a different manner of notice, service of notice by first-class mail satisfies the statutory notice requirement of section 3(h); proof of receipt of that notice is not required. 5 Whitson, 792 S.W.2d at 208 (emphasis added). | 3 | 3 |
Roccaforte v. Jefferson Countygreen2 sentences2012A similar issue, regarding the proper consequences for noncomplianee with a statutory notice requirement, was recently addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d at 926-27 . 2012A similar issue, regarding the proper consequences for noncompliance with a statutory notice requirement, was recently addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in Roccaforte v. Jefferson County , 341 S.W.3d at 926-27 . | 2 | 5 |
Hagedorn v. Tisdalegreen2 sentences2006As the court in Emeritus reasoned, if abatement under section 74.051 tolled the 120-day period, “ ‘a plaintiff would in fact be rewarded with additional time for the filing of his report by his failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement.”’ Id. (quoting Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.)). 2006As the court in Emeritus reasoned, if abatement under section 74.051 tolled the 120-day period, A > a plaintiff would in fact be rewarded with additional time for the filing of his report by his failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. = @ Id . (quoting Hagedorn v. Tisdale , 73 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App. C Amarillo 2002, no pet.)). | 2 | 3 |
Spiegel v. Strothergreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.2011) (holding county officials’ acknowledgement of hand-delivered notice satisfied statute’s “requisite notice” even though statute required notice to be delivered by certified or registered mail); Goforth v. Bradshaw, 296 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (holding expert reports and CVs sent by regular mail within statutory deadline, which defendants acknowledged receiving, were timely served even though statute required the documents to be served through registered or certified mail); Spiegel v. Strother, 262 S. 2011See, e.g. , Roccaforte v. Jefferson County , 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. 2011) (holding county officials’ acknowledgement of hand-delivered notice satisfied statute’s “requisite notice” even though statute required notice to be delivered by certified or registered mail); Goforth v. Bradshaw , 296 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (holding expert reports and CVs sent by regular mail within statutory deadline, which defendants acknowledged receiving, were timely served even though statute required the documents to be served through registered or certified mail); Spiegel v. Strother , | 2 | 2 |
Netherland v. Wittnergreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.2011) (holding county officials’ acknowledgement of hand-delivered notice satisfied statute’s “requisite notice” even though statute required notice to be delivered by certified or registered mail); Goforth v. Bradshaw, 296 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (holding expert reports and CVs sent by regular mail within statutory deadline, which defendants acknowledged receiving, were timely served even though statute required the documents to be served through registered or certified mail); Spiegel v. Strother, 262 S. 2011See, e.g. , Roccaforte v. Jefferson County , 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. 2011) (holding county officials’ acknowledgement of hand-delivered notice satisfied statute’s “requisite notice” even though statute required notice to be delivered by certified or registered mail); Goforth v. Bradshaw , 296 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (holding expert reports and CVs sent by regular mail within statutory deadline, which defendants acknowledged receiving, were timely served even though statute required the documents to be served through registered or certified mail); Spiegel v. Strother , | 2 | 2 |
Goforth v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.2011) (holding county officials’ acknowledgement of hand-delivered notice satisfied statute’s “requisite notice” even though statute required notice to be delivered by certified or registered mail); Goforth v. Bradshaw, 296 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (holding expert reports and CVs sent by regular mail within statutory deadline, which defendants acknowledged receiving, were timely served even though statute required the documents to be served through registered or certified mail); Spiegel v. Strother, 262 S. 2011See, e.g. , Roccaforte v. Jefferson County , 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. 2011) (holding county officials’ acknowledgement of hand-delivered notice satisfied statute’s “requisite notice” even though statute required notice to be delivered by certified or registered mail); Goforth v. Bradshaw , 296 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (holding expert reports and CVs sent by regular mail within statutory deadline, which defendants acknowledged receiving, were timely served even though statute required the documents to be served through registered or certified mail); Spiegel v. Strother , | 2 | 2 |
City of San Antonio v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2010Johnson, 103 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. den.). 2010Johnson, 103 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. den.). | 2 | 2 |
Star Houston, Inc. v. Kundakgreen2 sentences2007Star Houston Inc. v. Kundak, 843 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). 2007Star Houston Inc. v. Kundak , 843 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). | 2 | 2 |
Emeritus Corp. v. Highsmithgreen2 sentences2022In McWashington, we cited an opinion from the San Antonio Court of Appeals, in which the court reasoned that, if abatement under section 74.051 tolled the 120-day period, “a plaintiff would in fact be rewarded with additional time for the filing of his report by his failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement.” Emeritus Corp. v. Highsmith, 211 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (internal quotation omitted). 2016Without deciding whether the plaintiff effectively abated the case, the court held that “an abatement of the proceedings under Section 74.052(a) does not toll or extend the 120-day period for filing an expert report[,]” id. (citing Emeritus, 211 S.W.3d at 327 ), and echoed the concerns expressed by the Emeritus and Hagedorn courts that to hold otherwise would reward the plaintiff with additional time to comply with Chapter 74’s expert report deadline by his failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. | 1 | 3 |
Hash v. Hinesgreen2 sentences1993Id. 1993Id. | 1 | 2 |
Sunshine Datsun, Inc. v. Ramseygreen2 sentences1992Hash v. Hines, 796 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, writ granted); Sunshine Datsun, Inc. v. Ramsey, 680 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1984, no writ). 1990Id. | 1 | 2 |
Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chathagreen1 sentence2025Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 515 (Tex. 2012) (“[A] statutory prerequisite to suit, 4 whether administrative (such as filing a charge of discrimination) or procedural (such as timely filing a lawsuit) is jurisdictional when the defendant is a governmental entity.”); State v. Navarrette, 656 S.W.3d 681 , 691 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“One jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the [TTCA] is compliance with the statutory notice requirement.”). | 1 | 1 |
Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Coronadogreen1 sentence2025Univ. of Tex. Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka, 715 S.W.3d 734 , 744 (Tex. 2025) (“[C]ourts always have the duty to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction—their own and that of the lower courts—is secure.”) (citing S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428 , 449 (Tex. 2022)); Freedom Communications, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]e must consider our jurisdiction, even if that consideration is sua sponte.”). | 1 | 1 |
Edgar L. Hull, Jr. v. South Coast Catamarans, L.P., Oguz Aksan, Individually, Aksano Catamarans, LLC and James Babcockgreen1 sentence2019See 365 S.W.3d 35, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (“Failure to notify the seller of the breach, thereby allowing the seller an opportunity to cure, bars recovery on the basis of breach of warranty.”). | 1 | 1 |
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v. Estate of Arancibia Ex Rel. Vasquez-Arancibiagreen1 sentence2016See Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 539 ; Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 345 ; Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341 . | 1 | 1 |
Jose Carreras, M.D., P.A. v. Marroquingreen1 sentence2016See Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 74 ; see also Nicholson v. Shinn, No. 01-07-00973-CV, 2009 WL 3152111 , at *5-6 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1, 2009, no pet.) *252 (mem. op.) (holding that notice and authorization were ineffective to toll statute because release failed to include information on plaintiffs physicians for previous five years and portion requiring her to identify her treating physicians was also incomplete). | 1 | 1 |
Roethel v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Roethel, 80 S.W.3d at 282 . | 1 | 1 |
Terrence Brent McNeil v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See McNeil v. State, No. 01-13-00234-CR, 2014 WL 6601514, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2014, no pet. h.). 4 Miller’s second argument relies on the failure to comply with the statutory-notice requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Moreno v. Brittany Square Associates, L.P.green2 sentences1999See Moreno , 899 S.W.2d at 262-63 . 1999See Moreno , 899 S.W.2d at 262-63 . | 1 | 1 |
HOW Insurance Co. v. Patriot Financial Services of Texas, Inc.green2 sentences1995Servs. , 786 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, writ denied) (under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act--Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"), notice must be in writing and must meet the specific requirements of the statute). (4) In HOW Insurance we held that the burden of pleading and proving compliance with the statutory notice requirement is on the party seeking recovery. 1995Id. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Boylegreen1 sentence1987Ex parte Boyle, 545 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Loutzenhiser
red
2 sentences2015If two-plus time, something Loutzenhiser held should be raised “as years qualifies as “timely asserted” or “as soon as possible”— soon as possible” since the statutory purpose is to avoid at least in the context of a statutory notice requirement litigation altogether. 140 S.W.3d at 360 . commanding action—then these phrases have been drained Section 89.0041 may not be a prerequisite to bringing of all meaning. 26 Indeed, the only thing the County “timely suit, but it is a postrequisite to maintaining suit. 2015If two-plus time, something Loutzenhiser held should be raised “as years qualifies as “timely asserted” or “as soon as possible”— soon as possible” since the statutory purpose is to avoid at least in the context of a statutory notice requirement litigation altogether. 140 S.W.3d at 360 . commanding action—then these phrases have been drained Section 89.0041 may not be a prerequisite to bringing of all meaning. 26 Indeed, the only thing the County “timely suit, but it is a postrequisite to maintaining suit. | 3 | 2011–2015 |
Cathey v. Booth
green
2 sentences2018Id. case-ids="10008337" index="173" url="https://cite.case.law/sw2d/900/339/#p341"> at 340-41 (access to medical records did not convey to the hospital its possible culpability as required to satisfy the purpose of the statutory notice requirement). 2016See Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 539 ; Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 345 ; Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341 . | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Lee v. Fenwick
green
2 sentences2002Fenwick , 907 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied), appellees argued that notice to appellants' attorney satisfied a statutory notice requirement that "defendant receive written notice" of a claim and that prejudgment interest began to accrue on the date the attorney received notice. 2002In Lee v. Fenwick, 907 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied), appellees argued that notice to appellants’ attorney satisfied a statutory notice requirement that “defendant receive written notice” of a claim and that prejudgment interest began to accrue on the date the attorney received notice. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Thomas v. Ray
green
1 sentence2025P. 21a(a) (providing “[m]ethods of [s]ervice” for “[e]very notice required by these rules, and every pleading, plea, motion, or other form of request required to be served under Rule 21 [i.e., ‘[e]very pleading, plea, motion, or application to the court for an order . . . unless presented during a hearing or trial’], other than the citation to be served upon the filing of a cause of action and except as otherwise expressly provided in these rules”). 4 Although at the trial court hearing Mohrman cited Thomas v. Ray, 889 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1994) as holding that 9 at 691 (“One jurisdictional prereq | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Joy Worsdale, Individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Scott Worsdale v. the City of Killeen, Texas
green
1 sentence2021Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 62 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons
green
1 sentence2016See Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d at 539 ; Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 345 ; Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hines v. Hash
green
1 sentence2016Code Ann. § 541.156 ; Hines, 843 S.W.2d at 469 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Estate of Regis v. Harris County Hospital District
green
1 sentence2016Without deciding whether the plaintiff effectively abated the case, the court held that “an abatement of the proceedings under Section 74.052(a) does not toll or extend the 120-day period for filing an expert report[,]” id. (citing Emeritus, 211 S.W.3d at 327 ), and echoed the concerns expressed by the Emeritus and Hagedorn courts that to hold otherwise would reward the plaintiff with additional time to comply with Chapter 74’s expert report deadline by his failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| City of Dallas v. Crownrich green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Westwood Development Company v. City of Abilene
neutral
1 sentence1980In support of its position, the city primarily relies on City of Lubbock v. Stubbs, 160 Tex. Ill, 327 S.W.2d 411 (1959); White v. City of Dallas, 517 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, no writ); City of Dallas v. Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Huguley v. Board of Adjustment, 341 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1960, no writ); Westwood Development Company v. City of Abilene, 273 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Dallas v. Meserole Bros., 164 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.); and City of Dallas | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Dallas v. Meserole green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Lubbock v. Stubbs green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Huguley v. Board of Adjustment of City of Dallas green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| White v. City of Dallas green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Dallas v. Meserole Bros. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Texas Employment Commission v. Todd Shipyards Corp. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.