109 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chismgreen2 sentences2020Applying this standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court has cautioned that “[a]lthough the circumstantial evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.” State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La. 1983). 2010“Although the circumstantial evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.” State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La.1983). | 15 | 45 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2015R.S. 15:438 is “not a separate test” from' the Jackson v. Virginia standard, but rather that it “merely provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates -appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilty beyond, a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bridgewater, 2000-1529, p. 9 (La.1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 889 (quoting State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 (La.1984)). 2002When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La.Rev.Stat. 15:438 requires that "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable *910 hypothesis of innocence." The circumstantial evidence rule is not a separate test from the Jackson standard but "provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 ( | 9 | 27 |
United States v. Nelson Bellgreen2 sentences2004See United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Sutton, supra [ 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983)]. 2001See United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1982); State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Grahamgreen2 sentences1986In his brief, the defendant cites State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982), and State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982), for the proposition that, when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, the circumstantial evidence rule (LSA-R.S. 15:438) must be applied independently of and in addition to the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), standard of review. 1983Writing for the majority in Moore , I wrote that a combining of the Jackson standard and the circumstantial evidence standard set out in LSA-R.S. 15:438 could possibly lead to an "impermissible blurring of the proper role appellate courts should assume in evaluating sufficiency claims in circumstantial evidence cases." My views at that time were based in large part upon State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982), and the Moore opinion was tailored to comport in large part with the identical views expressed in State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1983), which we handed down the same day as Moore . | 2 | 5 |
State v. Nealygreen2 sentences2012State v. Nealy, 450 So.2d 634 (La.1984). 1987Thus, although the circumstantial evidence rule ... may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror's reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observation of the usual standard and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence." State v. Nealy, 450 So.2d 634, 637 (La.1984). | 1 | 7 |
State v. Shapirogreen2 sentences1990In his brief to this Court, the defendant cites State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La. 1982) and State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048 (La.1982), for the proposition that the circumstantial evidence rule (LSA-R.S. 15:438) provides a stricter standard of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. 1986In his brief, the defendant cites State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1982), and State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La.1982), for the proposition that, when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, the circumstantial evidence rule (LSA-R.S. 15:438) must be applied independently of and in addition to the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), standard of review. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Bridgewatergreen2 sentences2015R.S. 15:438 is “not a separate test” from' the Jackson v. Virginia standard, but rather that it “merely provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates -appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilty beyond, a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bridgewater, 2000-1529, p. 9 (La.1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 889 (quoting State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 (La.1984)). 2010Id., pp. 8-9, 823 So.2d at 889 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1987Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that “although the circumstantial evidence rule [LSA-R.S. 15:438] may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observation of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of the circumstantial evidence.” State v. Smith, 441 So.2d 739, 741 (La.1983). [Quoting State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La.1983)]. 1985Moreover, the Supreme Court recently noted that "although the circumstantial evidence rule [La.R.S. 15:438] may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror's reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observation of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence." State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La. 1983); State v. Smith, 441 So.2d 739 (La. 1983). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Captvillegreen2 sentences2000In State v. Juluke, 98-0341, p. 5 (La.1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291, 1293 , the Louisiana Supreme Court further discussed the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: In a case involving circumstantial evidence in which the jury has reasonably rejected the defense offered at trial, the reviewing court therefore "does not determine whether another possible hypothesis has been suggested by defendant which could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion." State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La.1984) (emphasis in original). 1984In regard to the correct standard of appellate review in cases involving circumstantial evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court has most recently made the following state ment in State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983): ‘Although the circumstantial evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.’ The above statement by the co | 1 | 3 |
State v. Porrettogreen2 sentences1993State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142, 1146 (La.1985), concluded that § 15:438 does not establish “a purely separate test from the Jackson standard,” that Court has also held that a “merger [of the Jackson constitutional standard and the circumstantial evidence rule] does not appear to promote clarity but could lead to a distortion of the standards .... [A]n in-tandem articulation may seem improperly to diminish the requirement of the circumstantial evidence rule by implying that, in a close case, this court will defer to the jury’s finding rather than follow its own determination of whether there 1992State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142 (La.1985). | 1 | 3 |
Linnear v. CENTERPOINT ENERGY ENTEX/RELIANTgreen1 sentence2026Yet, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor only applies when “the evidence [] sufficiently eliminate[s] other more probable causes of the injury, such as the conduct of the plaintiff or a third person.” Linnear v. CenterPoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy, 2006-3030, p. 6 (La. 9/5/07), 966 So. 2d 36, 41 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Holland v. United States. Holland v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hebron v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Westbrook v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montgomery v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harvillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Willsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hayesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sweeneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sutton
green
2 sentences2004See United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Sutton, supra [ 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983)]. 2004See United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Sutton, supra [ 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983)]. | 18 | 1984–2004 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2004Although the circumstantial evidence rule might not have established a stricter formula than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the rule emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases, as here, | ¡¿binging on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence. 2004Although the circumstantial evidence rule might not have established a stricter formula than the more general reasonable juror’s reasonable doubt formula, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the rule emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases, as here, | ¡¿binging on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence. | 10 | 1982–2004 |
State v. Lilly
green
2 sentences2014State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154 (La.1985). |1sIn circumstantial evidence cases, this court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis suggested by a defendant could afford an exculpatory explanation of the events. 2006State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154 (La.1985). | 6 | 2000–2014 |
State v. Eason
green
2 sentences1994State v. Wright, supra ; State v. Eason, supra. This court's authority to review questions of fact in a criminal case is limited to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence evaluation under Jackson v. Virginia, supra , and does not extend to credibility determinations made by the trier of fact. 1993State v. Wright, supra; State v. Eason, supra. This court’s authority to review questions of fact in a criminal case is limited to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence evaluation under Jackson v. Virginia, supra, and does not extend to credibility determinations made by the trier of fact. | 6 | 1986–1994 |
State v. Lott
green
2 sentences1994State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Lott, supra . 1993State v. Lott, supra . | 5 | 1992–1994 |
State v. Outlaw
neutral
2 sentences1987Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Outlaw, 485 So.2d 217 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986); LSA-R.S. 15:438. 1987Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Outlaw, 485 So.2d 217 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986); LSA-R.S. 15:438. | 4 | 1986–1987 |
State v. Austin
green
2 sentences2020Id. at 384.2 2 Indeed, in reaffirming this principle, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly rejected as follows the holding it would later adopt: While, at an earlier time in State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981), we expressed the Jackson constitutional standard and the circumstantial evidence rule of La. 1983While, at an earlier time in State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981), we expressed the Jackson constitutional standard and the circumstantial evidence rule of La.R.S. 15:438 in tandem, [6] we more recently qualified that expression in State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 at 129 (La.1982), as follows: [A] merger does not appear to promote clarity but could lead to a distortion of the standards. | 3 | 1983–2020 |
State v. Green
green
2 sentences1990State v. Green, 508 So.2d 602 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987). 1990State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984); State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983); State v. Brown, 556 So.2d 248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990); State v. Green, 508 So.2d 602 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987). | 3 | 1989–1990 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2008State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 ( [La.]1988). 1997State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 (1988). | 2 | 1997–2008 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2008State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 ( [La.]1988). 1997State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 (1988). | 2 | 1997–2008 |
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences2004State v. Quatrevingt, 93-1644 (La.2/28/96), 670 So.2d 197 ; State v. Mitchell, 96-207 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/96) ; 684 So.2d 6 ; State v. Morris, 414 So.2d 320 (La.1982). 1999State v. Morris, 414 So.2d 320 (La.1982); State v. Honeycutt, 438 So.2d 1303 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 443 So.2d 585 (La.1983). | 2 | 1999–2004 |
State v. Daniels
green
2 sentences2000Circumstantial evidence consists of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experi ence.State v. Major, 604 So.2d 137 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992); State v. Daniels, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general Jackson v. Virginia formula, but a hypothesis of innocence that is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong must necessarily lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable dou 1994State v. Major, 604 So.2d 137 (La.App.2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992); State v. Daniels, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general Jackson v. Virginia formula, but a hypothesis of innocence that is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong must necessarily lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt. | 2 | 1994–2000 |
Harris v. West Carroll Parish School Bd.
neutral
2 sentences2000Circumstantial evidence consists of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experi ence.State v. Major, 604 So.2d 137 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992); State v. Daniels, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general Jackson v. Virginia formula, but a hypothesis of innocence that is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong must necessarily lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable dou 1994State v. Major, 604 So.2d 137 (La.App.2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992); State v. Daniels, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general Jackson v. Virginia formula, but a hypothesis of innocence that is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong must necessarily lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt. | 2 | 1994–2000 |
State v. Major
green
2 sentences2000Circumstantial evidence consists of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experi ence.State v. Major, 604 So.2d 137 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992); State v. Daniels, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general Jackson v. Virginia formula, but a hypothesis of innocence that is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong must necessarily lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable dou 1994State v. Major, 604 So.2d 137 (La.App.2d Cir.1992), writ denied, 609 So.2d 255 (La.1992); State v. Daniels, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule of LSA-R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general Jackson v. Virginia formula, but a hypothesis of innocence that is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong must necessarily lead a rational fact finder to entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt. | 2 | 1994–2000 |
State v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences1996State v. Brown, 556 So.2d 248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990). 1990State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984); State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983); State v. Brown, 556 So.2d 248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990); State v. Green, 508 So.2d 602 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1987). | 2 | 1990–1996 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1991State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091 (La.1983); On rehearing, State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1983). 1985State v. Austin, supra ; State v. Johnson, supra ; State v. Jackson, 419 So.2d 837 (La.1982); State v. Graham, supra ; State v. Shapiro, supra . | 2 | 1985–1991 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1990In his brief to this Court, the defendant cites State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La. 1982) and State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048 (La.1982), for the proposition that the circumstantial evidence rule (LSA-R.S. 15:438) provides a stricter standard of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. 1983On the other hand, an in-tandem articulation may seem improperly to diminish the requirement of the circumstantial evidence rule by implying that, in a close case, this court will defer to the jury's finding rather than follow its own determination of whether there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence." The jurisprudence concerning the review of convictions obtained on the basis of circumstantial evidence was further clarified in State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048 (La. 1982). | 2 | 1983–1990 |
State v. Toups
green
1 sentence2025State v. Toups, 01-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 912 . “[W]here the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s fingerprints create a strong inference that the defendant was the perpetrator,” fingerprint evidence may suffice to support a conviction. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Major
green
1 sentence2024State v. Major, 2003- 3522 ( La. 12/ 1/ 04), 888 So. 2d 798, 801 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Seabrooks neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Becker green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Carson v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Kestle green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Carmouche green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Blake neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Seagrave v. Dean green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Mitchell neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Quatrevingt green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Juluke green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Powell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Honeycutt green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Black green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Jacobs green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Hamilton v. Hamilton neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Moore neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Howkins green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Eason green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.