circumstantial evidence instruction in Montana

1979State v. White (1965), 146 Mont. 226, 239 , 405 P.2d 761 .

1979State v. White (1965), 146 Mont. 226, 239 , 405 P.2d 761 .

2021We have also “rejected the argument that if two interpretations of circumstantial evidence are equally persuasive, the jury must adopt the one favoring innocence.” Sanchez, ¶ 17 (citing State v. Misner, 2007 MT 235, ¶¶ 39-40 , 339 Mont. 176 , 168 P.3d 679 ). 7 ¶14 “If the district court’s jury instructions, reviewed as a whole, fully and fairly present the law to the jury, then the jury has been properly instructed.” State v. Longstreth, 1999 MT 204, ¶ 15 , 295 Mont. 457 , 984 P.2d 157 .

2021We have also “rejected the argument that if two interpretations of circumstantial evidence are equally persuasive, the jury must adopt the one favoring innocence.” Sanchez, ¶ 17 (citing State v. Misner, 2007 MT 235, ¶¶ 39-40 , 339 Mont. 176 , 168 P.3d 679 ). 7 ¶14 “If the district court’s jury instructions, reviewed as a whole, fully and fairly present the law to the jury, then the jury has been properly instructed.” State v. Longstreth, 1999 MT 204, ¶ 15 , 295 Mont. 457 , 984 P.2d 157 .

2021We have also “rejected the argument that if two interpretations of circumstantial evidence are equally persuasive, the jury must adopt the one favoring innocence.” Sanchez, ¶ 17 (citing State v. Misner, 2007 MT 235, ¶¶ 39-40 , 339 Mont. 176 , 168 P.3d 679 ). 7 ¶14 “If the district court’s jury instructions, reviewed as a whole, fully and fairly present the law to the jury, then the jury has been properly instructed.” State v. Longstreth, 1999 MT 204, ¶ 15 , 295 Mont. 457 , 984 P.2d 157 .

2021We have also “rejected the argument that if two interpretations of circumstantial evidence are equally persuasive, the jury must adopt the one favoring innocence.” Sanchez, ¶ 17 (citing State v. Misner, 2007 MT 235, ¶¶ 39-40 , 339 Mont. 176 , 168 P.3d 679 ). 7 ¶14 “If the district court’s jury instructions, reviewed as a whole, fully and fairly present the law to the jury, then the jury has been properly instructed.” State v. Longstreth, 1999 MT 204, ¶ 15 , 295 Mont. 457 , 984 P.2d 157 .

2019It points us to our recent decisions in Sanchez and State v. Iverson , 2018 MT 27 , 390 Mont. 260 , 411 P.3d 1284 , where we considered the same circumstantial-evidence instruction. ¶63 In Sanchez , we concluded that, on its face, the disputed circumstantial-evidence instruction did not relieve the State of any of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2019It points us to our recent decisions in Sanchez and State v. Iverson , 2018 MT 27 , 390 Mont. 260 , 411 P.3d 1284 , where we considered the same circumstantial-evidence instruction. ¶63 In Sanchez , we concluded that, on its face, the disputed circumstantial-evidence instruction did not relieve the State of any of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2017Subsequent precedent addressing sufficiency of the evidence built on the language of Atlas, and, in State v. Bowman, 2004 MT 119 , 321 Mont. 176 , 89 P.3d 986 , this Court ultimately replaced a prior circumstantial evidence instruction with the “most reasonable” instruction. ¶25 Importantly, pre-Bowman precedent leading to the “most reasonable” instruction did not contemplate a choice between two reasonable interpretations, but rather recognized that as between two interpretations, the jury must decide which is reasonable. 10 Our previous circumstantial evidence instruction as set forth in Sta

2017Subsequent precedent addressing sufficiency of the evidence built on the language of Atlas, and, in State v. Bowman, 2004 MT 119 , 321 Mont. 176 , 89 P.3d 986 , this Court ultimately replaced a prior circumstantial evidence instruction with the “most reasonable” instruction. ¶25 Importantly, pre-Bowman precedent leading to the “most reasonable” instruction did not contemplate a choice between two reasonable interpretations, but rather recognized that as between two interpretations, the jury must decide which is reasonable. 10 Our previous circumstantial evidence instruction as set forth in Sta

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017Subsequent precedent addressing sufficiency of the evidence built on the language of Atlas , and, in State v. Bowman, 2004 MT 119 , 321 Mont. 176 , 89 P.3d 986 , this Court ultimately replaced a prior circumstantial evidence instruction with the “most reasonable” instruction. ¶25 Importantly, pre- Bowman precedent leading to the “most reasonable” instruction did not contemplate a choice between two reasonable interpretations, but rather recognized that as between two interpretations, the jury must decide which is reasonable.

2017Subsequent precedent addressing sufficiency of the evidence built on the language of Atlas , and, in State v. Bowman, 2004 MT 119 , 321 Mont. 176 , 89 P.3d 986 , this Court ultimately replaced a prior circumstantial evidence instruction with the “most reasonable” instruction. ¶25 Importantly, pre- Bowman precedent leading to the “most reasonable” instruction did not contemplate a choice between two reasonable interpretations, but rather recognized that as between two interpretations, the jury must decide which is reasonable.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

2017State v. Bullman, 2009 MT 37, ¶ 21 , 349 Mont. 228 , 203 P.3d 768 (“When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one which supports guilt and the other which supports innocence, the trier of fact determines which interpretation is most reasonable.”); State v. Rosling, 2008 MT 62, ¶ 36 , 342 Mont. 1 , 180 P.3d 1102 ; State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 22 , 297 Mont. 111 , 991 P.2d 929 ; State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 91 , 906 P.2d 216, 221 . ¶18 A district court has broad discretion in formulating and approving jury instructions.

1938Ev., p. 122: ‘That there should be some fact deposed to, independently altogether of the evidence of the accomplice, which taken by itself leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but that the prisoner is implicated in it.’ ” (See, also, to the same effect, State v. Lawson, 44 Mont. 488 , 120 Pac. 808 .) *261 In the case of Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 362 , 26 Pac. (2d) 973 , Mr. Justice Anderson in a dissenting opinion had occasion to define the term “tend” in connection with the circumstantial evidence rule in a workmen’s compensation case.

1938Ev., p. 122: ‘That there should be some fact deposed to, independently altogether of the evidence of the accomplice, which taken by itself leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but that the prisoner is implicated in it.’ ” (See, also, to the same effect, State v. Lawson, 44 Mont. 488 , 120 Pac. 808 .) *261 In the case of Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 362 , 26 Pac. (2d) 973 , Mr. Justice Anderson in a dissenting opinion had occasion to define the term “tend” in connection with the circumstantial evidence rule in a workmen’s compensation case.

1938Ev., p. 122: ‘That there should be some fact deposed to, independently altogether of the evidence of the accomplice, which taken by itself leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but that the prisoner is implicated in it.’ ” (See, also, to the same effect, State v. Lawson, 44 Mont. 488 , 120 Pac. 808 .) *261 In the case of Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 362 , 26 Pac. (2d) 973 , Mr. Justice Anderson in a dissenting opinion had occasion to define the term “tend” in connection with the circumstantial evidence rule in a workmen’s compensation case.

1938Ev., p. 122: ‘That there should be some fact deposed to, independently altogether of the evidence of the accomplice, which taken by itself leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but that the prisoner is implicated in it.’ ” (See, also, to the same effect, State v. Lawson, 44 Mont. 488 , 120 Pac. 808 .) *261 In the case of Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 362 , 26 Pac. (2d) 973 , Mr. Justice Anderson in a dissenting opinion had occasion to define the term “tend” in connection with the circumstantial evidence rule in a workmen’s compensation case.