circumstantial evidence standard in Minnesota

2026Thus, viewing the circumstances proved in the light most favorable to the verdict, and applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Hill of domestic assault-fear because the circumstances proved are “consistent with [Hill’s] guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (citation omitted). 14 II.

2026Under the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, we first identify the circumstances proved, “defer[ring] to the [fact-finder’s] acceptance of the proof of [the] circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

2026Having reviewed and reiterated our existing jurisprudence regarding the first step of the circumstantial-evidence test, we consider the following question about how we determine in the first step whether certain evidence is included in the subset of circumstances proved, on which we requested and received supplemental briefing: To determine whether a piece of evidence is a circumstance proved, how should we reconcile the statement in State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134 , 144 (Minn. 2020), that a jury is not compelled to believe statements merely because they are uncontradicted, with State v. Al-Na

2026After we first heard oral arguments, we requested supplemental briefing and reheard oral argument on six legal questions, which focused on how to identify the circumstances proved in a circumstantial-evidence analysis, including whether our decisions in State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134 , 144 (Minn. 2020) and State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 476 (Minn. 2010) were consistent with our long-standing circumstantial-evidence test, and also inquired as to the standard to be applied in considering a motion for a judgment of acquittal that is made and decided before a verdict is returned.

2018If the state introduces direct evidence on each element of the offense, there is no need to apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review. *765 State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303 , 309 (Minn. App. 2013).

2016See State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340 , 353 n.1 (Minn. 2012). “[I]f the state introduced direct evidence on each element of an offense, [appellate courts do] not apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.” State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013).

2026Even when applying the circumstantial-evidence test, we remain concerned with respecting the fact-finder’s “unique position to determine the credibility of the witnesses,” including the freedom “to accept part and reject part of a witness’s testimony.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the need to preserve a jury’s credibility assessments of witness testimony and citing circumstantial-evidence cases for this principle); see also Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 158 n.3 (Thissen, J., dissenting) (discussing the application of deference to credib

2026See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600–01 (articulating the second step of the circumstantial-evidence test).

2016We rejected his argument, concluding that the circumstantial-evidence standard did not apply because “[t]he State presented direct evidence on each element of the offense of .... first-degree premeditated murder.” Id.

2016See State v. Flowers, 788 N.W.2d 120 , 133 n.2 (Minn. 2010).

2025Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).

2025“When the direct evidence of guilt on a particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict, however, [appellate courts] apply a heightened [] standard, which we have called the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). 4 There are two steps to this standard.

2016See State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying circumstantial-evidence standard of review because state 6 introduced insufficient direct evidence); see also Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 160-61 (applying ordinary standard of review because state introduced sufficient direct evidence); State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Minn. App. 2015) (applying circumstantial-evidence standard of review because state did not introduce direct evidence).

2015Appellant specifically 1 In State v. Porte, we stated that if the state’s direct evidence, by itself, is sufficient to prove each element of the charged offense, we apply the traditional standard of review; but if the state’s direct evidence, by itself, is insufficient to prove each element of the charged offense, and the state also relies on circumstantial evidence to prove one or more elements, the circumstantial-evidence standard of review is applicable. 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013) (applying circumstantial-evidence standard of review because state introduced insufficient direct ev

2026At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we continue by determining whether “the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).

2026At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we also must determine whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).

2026In Sam, the court of appeals held that district courts must apply the circumstantial-evidence test to motions for judgment of acquittal when the State’s case rests on circumstantial evidence. 859 N.W.2d at 831 .

2026Citing the court of appeals’ decision in State v. Sam, 859 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn. App. 2015), Firkus argues the district court should have applied the circumstantial-evidence standard that 37 appellate courts use when reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence after a jury has returned a guilty verdict.

2025See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (observing that witness testimony “is direct evidence when it reflects a witness’s personal observations and allows the jury to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any inferences”). “[W]hen a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, . . . it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” Id. at 39 .

2025See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (observing that witness testimony “is direct evidence when it reflects a witness’s personal observations and allows the jury to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any inferences”). “[W]hen a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, . . . it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” Id. at 39 .

2026State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012).

2024When direct evidence establishes an element of the crime, we painstakingly review the record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989)).

2026In reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we will not reverse “on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016).

2025“The circumstantial evidence standard does not allow us to ‘analyze and parse each fact’ in a ‘piecemeal’ fashion to conclude that a hypothesis is reasonable.” State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145 , 150 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 415 (Minn. 2016)).

2024State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010).

2015Recently we discussed the circumstantial evidence standard of review for sufficiency challenges in State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320 (Minn.2010), in which the concurrence urged the court to adopt a rule requiring district courts to provide a rational-hypothesis instruction to the jury in circumstantial evidence cases.

2016Under the circumstantial-evidence test, we first identify the circumstances proved, deferring to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the proof of the[] circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” Id.

2016Under the circumstantial-evidence test, we first identify the circumstances proved, deferring to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the proof of the[ ] circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” Id., at 53-54 .

2016The second step of the circumstantial-evidence standard is to “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted). “[Appellate courts] review the circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts, but as a whole,” and “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved; including the inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[Appellate courts] give no deference

2016See State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340 , 353 n.1 (Minn. 2012). “[I]f the state introduced direct evidence on each element of an offense, [appellate courts do] not apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.” State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013).

2026There is no direct evidence that there was no intruder and, because the jury did not observe Firkus making his statements, the statements were not susceptible to credibility assessment for purposes of step one of the circumstantial-evidence test. 8 Thus, we accept the statements 8 Firkus’s statements are different than the defendant’s statement in State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1989).

2026There is no direct evidence that there was no intruder and, because the jury did not observe Firkus making his statements, the statements were not susceptible to credibility assessment for purposes of step one of the circumstantial-evidence test. 8 Thus, we accept the statements 8 Firkus’s statements are different than the defendant’s statement in State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1989).

2025See State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 768-71 (Minn. App. 2000) (affirming conviction of constructive possession of a firearm in a car based on evidence that the firearm was in proximity to the defendant and the defendant was the sole occupant of the car), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).

2016“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants stricter scrutiny.” State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001).

2023To be clear, the court in this case does not disagree with this principle. 4 Minnesota courts historically instructed juries that “to authorize a conviction, the circumstances should not only be consistent with the prisoner’s guilt, but they must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.” State v. Johnson, 35 N.W. 373, 376 (Minn. 1887).

2017Johnson, 217 N.W. at 684 (“[A]ll the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guiity and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” (citing State v. Johnson, 37 Minn. 493 , 35 N.W. 373, 376 (1887)).

2016See State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) (stating that intent is a state of mind that is generally proved circumstantially). 5 In determining the circumstances proved, it is not our role to weigh the evidence.

2015In general, intent is “generally proved circumstantially by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).

2024State v. Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2010). 8 The state proved the following circumstances regarding Johnson’s knowledge: (1) two minor children were in the home during the incident; (2) Johnson was doing the dishes loudly, muttering, and throwing the dishes around; (3) R.R. told Johnson she was concerned he would wake up the children when he was doing the dishes; (4) during this exchange, one of the children woke up and came out of their room; and (5) soon after, Johnson resumed screaming, swearing, and slammed his fists onto a desk in the basement.

2015The circumstantial-evidence standard of review is appropriate because “[k]nowledge is customarily determined from circumstantial evidence.” See id. at 919 .

2023State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849 , 869–70 (Minn. 2009) (Meyer, J., concurring) (outlining the D-4 history of the circumstantial evidence test both as a required jury instruction and as a standard of appellate review); see State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592 , 599 n.4 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the reason for heightened review in circumstantial evidence cases was concern over the inferences made by the jury from facts proved).

2015Id. at 337-40 (Meyer, J., concurring); see also State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 871 (Minn.2008) (Meyer, J., concurring).

1952The correct rule, whether pertaining to exculpatory or in-culpatory evidence, is set out' in State v. Johnson, 173 Minn. 543, 545 , 217 N. W. 683 , 684: “* * * all the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” (Italics supplied.) In that case, we went on to say that there may be testimony for the defense which the jury reject, and that this would not be “eir- cumstances proved.” The only Inference to be drawn from that statement is the converse — that, if exculpatory circumstan

1952The correct rule, whether pertaining to exculpatory or in-culpatory evidence, is set out' in State v. Johnson, 173 Minn. 543, 545 , 217 N. W. 683 , 684: “* * * all the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” (Italics supplied.) In that case, we went on to say that there may be testimony for the defense which the jury reject, and that this would not be “eir- cumstances proved.” The only Inference to be drawn from that statement is the converse — that, if exculpatory circumstan

2016We then 7 Because the evidence here is sufficient to identify Robertson as the shooter even under the stricter circumstantial-evidence standard, we need not resolve whether the direct- evidence or circumstantial-evidence standard applies here. 10 “independently examine ‘the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved,’ including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Hurd, 819 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 242 ).

2015Id. at 161 n.4. 7 v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010).

2026See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478; see also Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d at 648-49 (identifying circumstances proved relevant to whether appellant knowingly violated predatory-offender-registration statute by not registering primary address).

2026State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. 1998). “[P]ossibilities of innocence” do not justify relief.

2026Id. (citing Costello v. Johnson, 121 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Minn. 1963)).

2025See id. at 600 ; see also State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 358, 363 (Minn. 2016) (stating that, after a bench trial, we defer to the district court’s assessment of “the credibility of the evidence” in establishing circumstances proved (quotation omitted)).

2025Even when there is evidence that a witness “[k]nowingly and willfully testified 6 McGruder also argues that K.G. made prior inconsistent statements and failed to credibly recant those statements. 7 falsely as to a material fact, . . . the credibility of such a witness is, nevertheless, for the [factfinder] and [it] may believe or disbelieve [the] testimony as to other facts.” State v. Stevens, 80 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Minn. 1956); see also State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017) (reaffirming that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review protects the [factfinder’s] “unique position” to