circumstantial evidence rule in Nebraska

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N.W.2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case, based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: "Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weight the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, [ 51 Neb. 672 , 71 N.W. 788 ] supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, [ 153 Neb. 784 , 46 N.W.2d 158 ] supra: `The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N.W.2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case, based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: "Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weight the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, [ 51 Neb. 672 , 71 N.W. 788 ] supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, [ 153 Neb. 784 , 46 N.W.2d 158 ] supra: `The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N.W.2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case, based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: "Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weight the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, [ 51 Neb. 672 , 71 N.W. 788 ] supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, [ 153 Neb. 784 , 46 N.W.2d 158 ] supra: `The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N.W.2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case, based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: "Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weight the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, [ 51 Neb. 672 , 71 N.W. 788 ] supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, [ 153 Neb. 784 , 46 N.W.2d 158 ] supra: `The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N. W. 2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: “Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weigh the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, supra: ‘The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N. W. 2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: “Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weigh the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, supra: ‘The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N. W. 2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: “Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weigh the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, supra: ‘The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral c

1968In Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806 , 77 N. W. 2d 592 , this court, in a criminal case based largely on circumstantial evidence, said: “Under this rule, in the first instance, it is a function of the jury to weigh the circumstantial evidence and to test it by the following rule found in Morgan v. State, supra, and repeated in Kitts v. State, supra: ‘The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral c

1993Nothing in the circumstantial evidence instruction detracts from the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. “ ‘In an appeal based on the claim of an erroneous instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.’ ” State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 757 , 467 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1991), quoting Rose v. City of Lincoln, 234 Neb. 67 , 449 N.W.2d 522 (1989). *516 Since the challenged instructions accurately state the law, were not misleading, and did not deprive appellant of a substant

1993Nothing in the circumstantial evidence instruction detracts from the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. “ ‘In an appeal based on the claim of an erroneous instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.’ ” State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 757 , 467 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1991), quoting Rose v. City of Lincoln, 234 Neb. 67 , 449 N.W.2d 522 (1989). *516 Since the challenged instructions accurately state the law, were not misleading, and did not deprive appellant of a substant

1982Defendant also cites cases in this court which relate to the circumstantial evidence rule recently discussed by this court in State v. Buchanan, ante p. 20, 312 N.W.2d 684 (1981).

1978The reformulation is: The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” We have followed that rule in the recent cases of State v. Partee, 199 Neb. 305 , 258 N. W. 2d 634 (1977), and State v. Swayze, 197 Neb. 149 , 247 N. W. 2d 440 (1976).

1978The reformulation is: The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” We have followed that rule in the recent cases of State v. Partee, 199 Neb. 305 , 258 N. W. 2d 634 (1977), and State v. Swayze, 197 Neb. 149 , 247 N. W. 2d 440 (1976).

1978In State v. Bartlett, 194 Neb. 502 , 233 N. W. 2d 904 (1975), in an opinion by Clinton, J., we stated: “We have recently restated the circumstantial evidence rule in what we believe is a more accurate formulation of the principle involved.

1978In State v. Bartlett, 194 Neb. 502 , 233 N. W. 2d 904 (1975), in an opinion by Clinton, J., we stated: “We have recently restated the circumstantial evidence rule in what we believe is a more accurate formulation of the principle involved.

1978The reformulation is: The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” We have followed that rule in the recent cases of State v. Partee, 199 Neb. 305 , 258 N. W. 2d 634 (1977), and State v. Swayze, 197 Neb. 149 , 247 N. W. 2d 440 (1976).

1978The reformulation is: The test of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” We have followed that rule in the recent cases of State v. Partee, 199 Neb. 305 , 258 N. W. 2d 634 (1977), and State v. Swayze, 197 Neb. 149 , 247 N. W. 2d 440 (1976).

1971The circumstantial evidence rule stated in the second syllabus of Norcross v. Gingery, 181 Neb. 783 , 150 N. W. 2d 919 (1967), is either misleading or incorrect.

1971The circumstantial evidence rule stated in the second syllabus of Norcross v. Gingery, 181 Neb. 783 , 150 N. W. 2d 919 (1967), is either misleading or incorrect.

1965The instruction given conformed to the rules stated in State v. Nichols, 175 Neb. 761 , 123 N. W. 2d 860 , and State v. Ohler, 178 Neb. 596 , 134 N. W. 2d 265 .

1965The instruction given conformed to the rules stated in State v. Nichols, 175 Neb. 761 , 123 N. W. 2d 860 , and State v. Ohler, 178 Neb. 596 , 134 N. W. 2d 265 .

1964To support its contention that here the circumstantial evidence rule was not satisfied by the evidence in the case the defendant cites Howell v. Robinson Iron & Metal Co., 173 Neb. 445 , 113 N. W. 2d 584 , and other cases.

1964To support its contention that here the circumstantial evidence rule was not satisfied by the evidence in the case the defendant cites Howell v. Robinson Iron & Metal Co., 173 Neb. 445 , 113 N. W. 2d 584 , and other cases.

1964In that case it was said: “The burden of establishing a cause of action by circumstantial evidence requires that such evidence, to be sufficient to sustain a verdict or require submission of a case to a jury, shall be of such character and the circumstances so related to each other that a conclusion fairly and reasonably arises that the cause of action has been proved.” In the case it is also stated: “The burden of a plaintiff, relying on circumstantial evidence to sustain a cause of action for damages, does not require him to exclude the possibility that damages flowed from some cause other t

1964In that case it was said: “The burden of establishing a cause of action by circumstantial evidence requires that such evidence, to be sufficient to sustain a verdict or require submission of a case to a jury, shall be of such character and the circumstances so related to each other that a conclusion fairly and reasonably arises that the cause of action has been proved.” In the case it is also stated: “The burden of a plaintiff, relying on circumstantial evidence to sustain a cause of action for damages, does not require him to exclude the possibility that damages flowed from some cause other t

1964In that case it was said: “The burden of establishing a cause of action by circumstantial evidence requires that such evidence, to be sufficient to sustain a verdict or require submission of a case to a jury, shall be of such character and the circumstances so related to each other that a conclusion fairly and reasonably arises that the cause of action has been proved.” In the case it is also stated: “The burden of a plaintiff, relying on circumstantial evidence to sustain a cause of action for damages, does not require him to exclude the possibility that damages flowed from some cause other t

1964In that case it was said: “The burden of establishing a cause of action by circumstantial evidence requires that such evidence, to be sufficient to sustain a verdict or require submission of a case to a jury, shall be of such character and the circumstances so related to each other that a conclusion fairly and reasonably arises that the cause of action has been proved.” In the case it is also stated: “The burden of a plaintiff, relying on circumstantial evidence to sustain a cause of action for damages, does not require him to exclude the possibility that damages flowed from some cause other t

1957Were the evidence of intent to embezzle as to these matters fully stated, I think it insufficient to sustain a conviction under the circumstantial evidence rule stated in Larson v. State, 161 Neb. 339 , 73 N. W. 2d 388 .

1957Were the evidence of intent to embezzle as to these matters fully stated, I think it insufficient to sustain a conviction under the circumstantial evidence rule stated in Larson v. State, 161 Neb. 339 , 73 N. W. 2d 388 .

1944As stated in Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672 , 71 N. W. 788 : “The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” See, also, Dreessen v. State, 38 Neb. 375 , 56 N. W. 1024 ; Robino v. State, supra. An instruction was given submitting the question of the sufficiency of the evidence under the circumstantial evidence rule and the jury found th

1944As stated in Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672 , 71 N. W. 788 : “The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution, is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” See, also, Dreessen v. State, 38 Neb. 375 , 56 N. W. 1024 ; Robino v. State, supra. An instruction was given submitting the question of the sufficiency of the evidence under the circumstantial evidence rule and the jury found th