Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
38 California opinions name it 4 courts 1949–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2021As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 : “Insofar as the federal Constitution itself does not require courts to instruct on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence where, as here, the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt [citations], defendant’s claim necessarily rests on the asserted arbitrary denial of a state-created liberty interest. [Citation.] We doubt the common law right to a circumstantial evidence instruction rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause.” (Id. at pp. 886-887; see also People v. Smith, sup 2015As our Supreme Court articulated in Rogers, “[w]e doubt the common law right to a circumstantial evidence instruction rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. [Citation.] In any event, any federal constitutional error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the reasons expressed above.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 887 .) 2. | 2 | 8 |
People v. Wileygreen2 sentences2016(People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 175 .) Under these principles, because the prosecution in this case primarily relied on direct evidence to prove the lying-in-wait special circumstance, the trial court did not err in failing to give, sua sponte, a circumstantial evidence instruction in connection with that special circumstance. 2015(People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 175 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 554 P.2d 881 ].) Under these principles, because the prosecution in this case primarily relied on direct evidence to prove the lying-in-wait special circumstance, the trial court did not err in failing to give, sua sponte, a circumstantial evidence instruction in connection with that special circumstance. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Virgilgreen2 sentences2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit 2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit | 2 | 2 |
People v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2016We have long and ―consistently‖ held that a trial court must give a circumstantial evidence instruction only when the prosecution ―substantially relies on [such] evidence to 3 prove its case.‖ (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 582 .) ―Conversely, the instruction need not be given when circumstantial evidence is merely incidental to and corroborative of direct evidence . . . .‖ (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 676 (McKinnon).) Indeed, where circumstantial evidence ―is not the primary means by which the prosecution seeks to establish‖ its case, the instruction ―should not be g 2016In McKinnon, the defendant based his argument that circumstantial evidence was ―central to the prosecution‘s case,‖ such that a circumstantial evidence instruction should have been given, on ―the ‗quality‘ of the evidence,‖ asserting that a finding of substantial reliance is appropriate when ―the quality of the direct evidence is weak, and the quality of the circumstantial evidence is strong.‖ (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 676 & fn. 40.) We rejected that argument, finding ―no persuasive authority for our consideration of [the quality of the evidence] in analyzing whether an instruction on | 2 | 2 |
People v. Morrissongreen2 sentences2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Livingstongreen2 sentences2016(People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1167 .) However, this court ―has long held‖ that, under certain circumstances, ―trial courts must give ‗an instruction embodying the principle that to justify a conviction on circumstantial evidence the facts and circumstances must not only be entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) In this case, however, the court did not err in failing to give a circumstantial evidence instruction with respect to lying in wait because two of the circumstances that would have triggered it 2015(People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1167 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 , 274 P.3d 1132 ].) However, this court “has long held” that, under certain circumstances, ‘“trial courts must give ‘an instruction embodying the principle that to justify a conviction on circumstantial evidence the facts and circumstances must not only be entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.’ ” (Ibid.) In this case, however, the court did not err in failing to give a circumstantial evidence instruction with respect to lying in wait because two of the ci | 1 | 3 |
People v. Malbroughgreen2 sentences1994He claims *1142 the error was prejudicial because the prosecutor relied substantially, if not exclusively, upon circumstantial evidence to prove the requisite mental states for the crimes charged. (32) "It is the general rule that a trial court is not required to instruct on the rules of law applicable to circumstantial evidence where the alleged circumstantial evidence is incidental to, and corroborative of, direct evidence. [Citations.]" ( People v. Malbrough (1961) 55 Cal.2d 249, 250-251 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 632 , 359 P.2d 30 ].) Moreover, "when the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial 1994He claims *1142 the error was prejudicial because the prosecutor relied substantially, if not exclusively, upon circumstantial evidence to prove the requisite mental states for the crimes charged. (32) "It is the general rule that a trial court is not required to instruct on the rules of law applicable to circumstantial evidence where the alleged circumstantial evidence is incidental to, and corroborative of, direct evidence. [Citations.]" ( People v. Malbrough (1961) 55 Cal.2d 249, 250-251 [ 10 Cal. Rptr. 632 , 359 P.2d 30 ].) Moreover, "when the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial | 1 | 3 |
People v. Medinagreen2 sentences2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit 2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit | 1 | 2 |
People v. Fostergreen2 sentences2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit 2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit | 1 | 2 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2016We have long and ―consistently‖ held that a trial court must give a circumstantial evidence instruction only when the prosecution ―substantially relies on [such] evidence to 3 prove its case.‖ (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 582 .) ―Conversely, the instruction need not be given when circumstantial evidence is merely incidental to and corroborative of direct evidence . . . .‖ (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 676 (McKinnon).) Indeed, where circumstantial evidence ―is not the primary means by which the prosecution seeks to establish‖ its case, the instruction ―should not be g 2015We have long and ‘“consistently” held that a trial court must give a circumstantial evidence instruction only when the prosecution “substantially relies on [such] evidence to prove its case.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 582 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 ].) “Conversely, the instruction need not be given when circumstantial evidence is merely incidental to and corroborative of direct evidence . . . .” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 676 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 590 , 259 P.3d 1186 ] (McKinnon).) Indeed, where circumstantial evidence “is not the primary means by which th | 1 | 2 |
People v. Heishmangreen2 sentences2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Salasgreen2 sentences1986Defendant refers us to the case of People v. Salas (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 460 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 871 ], in which the court found prejudicial error in the giving of a circumstantial evidence instruction with respect to one specific intent determination but in not also giving the instruction with regard to another specific intent requirement. 1986Defendant refers us to the case of People v. Salas (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 460 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 871 ], in which the court found prejudicial error in the giving of a circumstantial evidence instruction with respect to one specific intent determination but in not also giving the instruction with regard to another specific intent requirement. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Pheagreen1 sentence2021(See Phea, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 613 [“it is apparent our high court saw no conflict between the [Evidence Code] section 1108 instruction and the circumstantial evidence instruction”].) 34 E. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fraziergreen2 sentences2018The court then went on to address the People's contention that defects in an instruction can be viewed as harmless when cured by other instructions. ( Id . at p. 36, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100 .) On this point, the court reasoned that the combination of the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant had committed the prior offenses and the circumstantial evidence instruction, which told the jury each fact supporting an inference essential to establish guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, added to the confusion. ( Id . at pp. 36-37, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100 .) "If 2018The court then went on to address the People's contention that defects in an instruction can be viewed as harmless when cured by other instructions. ( Id . at p. 36, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100 .) On this point, the court reasoned that the combination of the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether the defendant had committed the prior offenses and the circumstantial evidence instruction, which told the jury each fact supporting an inference essential to establish guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, added to the confusion. ( Id . at pp. 36-37, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100 .) "If | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunklegreen2 sentences2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brevermangreen1 sentence2015(People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 886 [error in failing to instruct on sufficiency of circumstantial evidence was harmless where “evidence pointing toward innocence was weak”]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177 [in applying Watson, “an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.”].) 3. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguesgreen2 sentences2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Doolingreen2 sentences2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Diazgreen2 sentences2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 2015The applicable rule on this is well established. “ ‘[Wjhen the only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a requisite mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given sua sponte: ” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 , 885 P.2d 1 ], italics added; see People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 791-794 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 152 ]; see also People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 928 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 ] (Dunkle), disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hughesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bradfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DeLeongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bloydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gleghorngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Richard M.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Butlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Daughertygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Coronagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Redrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Yrigoyengreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Saundersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ibarragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holland v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. De Santiagogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Elguera
green
2 sentences2024(Elguera, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 .) The court also concluded this error was not harmless even though (1) the trial court had given “virtually the full standard instruction on the subject in the morning at the start of jury selection”; (2) the reasonable doubt requirement had been repeatedly referenced to the venire and each prospective juror stated he or she understood it; (3) the oral and written instructions included reference to the reasonable doubt standard in the circumstantial evidence instruction; (4) the court reminded the jury just before argument that the prosecutor had the 2021(Elguera, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 .) The court also concluded this error was not harmless even though (1) the trial court had given “virtually the full standard instruction on the subject in the morning at the start of jury selection”; (2) the reasonable doubt requirement had been repeatedly referenced to the venire and each prospective juror stated he or she understood it; (3) the oral and written instructions included reference to the reasonable doubt standard in the circumstantial evidence instruction; (4) the court reminded the jury just before argument that the prosecutor had the | 3 | 2006–2024 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2016The error in failing to properly instruct a jury on the circumstantial evidence rule is reviewed for prejudice under the standard set forth in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 . 2016The error in failing to properly instruct a jury on the circumstantial evidence rule is reviewed for prejudice under the standard set forth in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 . | 3 | 2006–2021 |
People v. Centeno
green
2 sentences2023In the primary authority Gaines cites for this point, the California Supreme Court expressly permits such argument, stating that “[i]t is permissible to argue that the jury may reject impossible or unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to so characterize a defense theory.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672 .) On reply, Gaines contends that the prosecutor’s argument “equat[ing] proof beyond a reasonable doubt with the circumstantial evidence instruction and inform[ing] the jury that reasonable doubt ‘boils down’ to whether defense counsel’s argument is reasonable” implicitly conv 2021Nothing in the prosecutor’s closing argument “lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof.” (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 416 .) Defendants’ reliance on Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th 659 , is unavailing. | 2 | 2021–2023 |
Mckinney v. Rees
green
2 sentences2018In the published portion of this decision (Discussion parts I.A. & I.E.3.) we reject defendant's due process contentions and in doing so, we conclude that reliance upon McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378 ( McKinney ) is misplaced because that case has no application in the context of section 1108 evidence. 2018In the published portion of this decision (Discussion parts I.A. & I.E.3.) we reject defendant’s due process contentions and in doing so, we conclude that reliance upon 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 2 McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378 (McKinney) is misplaced because that case has no application in the context of section 1108 evidence. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Reliford
green
2 sentences2018In addition, the jury was told that circumstantial evidence could support a finding of guilt of the charged offenses only if the proved circumstances could not be reconciled with any other rational conclusion [citation]-which is merely another way of restating the reasonable-doubt standard. [Citation.] The jury thus would have understood that a conviction that relied on inferences to be drawn from defendant's prior offense would have to be proved beyond a reasonable *613 doubt." ( Reliford, supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016 , 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254 , 62 P.3d 601 .) Thus, it is apparent our high court 2018In addition, the jury was told that circumstantial evidence could support a finding of guilt of the charged offenses only if the proved circumstances could not be reconciled with any other rational conclusion [citation]-which is merely another way of restating the reasonable-doubt standard. [Citation.] The jury thus would have understood that a conviction that relied on inferences to be drawn from defendant's prior offense would have to be proved beyond a reasonable *613 doubt." ( Reliford, supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 1016 , 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254 , 62 P.3d 601 .) Thus, it is apparent our high court | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Loy
green
2 sentences2018In Loy, supra , 52 Cal.4th 46 , 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 679 , 254 P.3d 980 , our high court further discussed circumstantial evidence in the context of approving a section 1108 evidence instruction. 2018In Loy, supra , 52 Cal.4th 46 , 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 679 , 254 P.3d 980 , our high court further discussed circumstantial evidence in the context of approving a section 1108 evidence instruction. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Law
green
2 sentences1994(Conservatorship of Law, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1342 .) Similarly, the court here gave the expert testimony instruction applicable to civil cases, BAJI No. 2.40, and not the corresponding criminal instruction, CALJIC No. 2.80. 1994The court held because the trial court gave the circumstantial evidence instruction applicable to civil cases, BAJI No. 2.00, the jury was sufficiently advised as to the quality, nature, and use of circumstantial evidence. ( Conservatorship of Law, supra, 202 Cal. App.3d at p. 1342 .) Similarly, the court here gave the expert testimony instruction applicable to civil cases, BAJI No. 2.40, and not the corresponding criminal instruction, CALJIC No. 2.80. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Aranda
green
2 sentences2023(See Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 361 .) Our Supreme Court recognized that the gang enhancement allegation set forth the burden of proof, but it did not mention the burden of proof for the substantive gang offense and that the circumstantial evidence instruction’s reference to the burden of proof was inadequate where the case depended largely on direct evidence. 2023(Ibid.) However, unlike Aranda, the trial court here instructed the jury as to their deliberations and the verdict form (CALCRIM No. 3517) that for attempted murder, 20. assault with a deadly weapon, and child abuse, the jury must follow directions which included completing the verdict form for the greater offense if each juror agreed that the prosecutor had proven defendant guilty of the greater offense and further explained that “whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell you otherwise.” Therefore, “[w]e | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Romero
green
1 sentence2021Nothing in the prosecutor’s closing argument “lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof.” (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 416 .) Defendants’ reliance on Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th 659 , is unavailing. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Mosby
green
2 sentences2018Farwell argues that Mosby "made a clear statement that the circumstantial evidence test is not applicable to silent record cases." He quotes the following passage: "[I]f the transcript does not reveal complete advisements and waivers, the reviewing court must examine the record of 'the entire proceeding'...." ( Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 361 , 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 .) According to Farwell, our use of the word "complete" means that the Howard test applies to "incomplete" advisements, but not silent record cases. 2018Farwell argues that Mosby "made a clear statement that the circumstantial evidence test is not applicable to silent record cases." He quotes the following passage: "[I]f the transcript does not reveal complete advisements and waivers, the reviewing court must examine the record of 'the entire proceeding'...." ( Mosby , supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 361 , 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 .) According to Farwell, our use of the word "complete" means that the Howard test applies to "incomplete" advisements, but not silent record cases. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit 2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Griffin v. California green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Vargas green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Phillips green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Crawford green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Hicks v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Towler green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Smith v. California green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| People v. Yoder green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Lamson green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Staples green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| People v. Bender green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.