circumstantial evidence standard in Florida

2025Knight v. State, 186 So. 3d 1005, 1010 (Fla. 2016) (“Courts should ask whether the evidence of that particular defendant’s guilt is entirely circumstantial, not whether all of the State’s evidence of the crime is circumstantial.” (emphasis omitted)). - 34 - to all criminal circumstantial evidence cases, not just capital cases. 26 Thus, the circumstantial evidence rule was not designed to help narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, and its abrogation is of no value in a facial challenge to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.

2025Knight v. State, 186 So. 3d 1005, 1010 (Fla. 2016) (“Courts should ask whether the evidence of that particular defendant’s guilt is entirely circumstantial, not whether all of the State’s evidence of the crime is circumstantial.” (emphasis omitted)). - 34 - to all criminal circumstantial evidence cases, not just capital cases. 26 Thus, the circumstantial evidence rule was not designed to help narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, and its abrogation is of no value in a facial challenge to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme.

2019“Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 557 (Fla. 2010); see also id. (“The state is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the Defendant’s theory of events.” (

2017Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he state is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation’ of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the Defendant’s theory of events.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1989)); see also Knight v. State, 186 So.3d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 2016) (“This Court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: ‘[wjhere the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the ev

2019“Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 557 (Fla. 2010); see also id. (“The state is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the Defendant’s theory of events.” (

2019See Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 557 (Fla. 2010) (“Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.”).

2006"Although the circumstantial evidence rule can be stated with certainty and ease, applying the rule is often a daunting task because `the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence in each case is unique.'" Haugabrook v. State, 827 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (quoting McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 976 (Fla.1977)).

2004With this additional circumstantial evidence, the trial court concluded that E.T.R. had committed the offense of principal to attempted bur-glai’y and denied his motion for dismissal. “[A]lthough the circumstantial evidence rule can be stated with certainty and ease, applying the rule is often a daunting task because ‘the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence in each case is unique.’ ” Haugabrook v. State, 827 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (quoting McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 976 (Fla.1977)).

2019See Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982) ("Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be 15Knight v. State, 186 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 2016). 16The en banc majority notes that the dissenter from the initial panel decision "cited the supreme court's opinion approving the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), approved, 186 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 2016)," perhaps giving the impression that he argued against employing the circumstantial evidence rule in

2019Our supreme court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: "Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Knight, 186 So. 3d at 1009 (alteration in original) (quoting Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982)).

2000See, e.g., Brennan v. State, 754 So.2d 1 (Fla.1999) (viewing evidence in light most favorable to state); Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 930 (Fla.1989) ("The circumstantial evidence standard does not require the jury to believe the defense version of facts on which the state has produced conflicting evidence, and the state, as appellee, is entitled to a view of any conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.") (citation omitted).

1999In Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 930 (Fla.1989), the Supreme Court of Florida stated: The circumstantial evidence standard does not require the jury to believe the defense version of facts on which the state has produced conflicting evidence, and the state, as appellee, is entitled to a view of any conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.

2023The State notes that, prior to Bush, the Florida Supreme Court, citing to Gustine, expressly declined to eliminate the special standard, in part because “the circumstantial evidence test guards against basing a conviction on impermissibly stacked inferences.” Miller v. State, 770 So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Fla. 2000).

2015See id. at 482 (reiterating that “the circumstantial evidence test 'guards against basing a conviction on im-permissibly stacked inferences” (quoting Miller v. State, 770 So.2d 1144, 1149 (Fla.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2017Reiterating that “the circumstantial evidence test guards against basing a conviction on impermissibly stacked inferences,” “we refuse[d] to surmise that [the - 29 - victim’s] manifested demeanor somehow denote[d] Hodgkins’ criminal intent towards her.” Id. (citing Ballard, 923 So. 2d at 482 ).

2017Reiterating that “the circumstantial evidence test guards against basing a conviction on im-permissibly stacked inferences,” “we refuse[d] to surmise that [the victim’s] manifested demeanor somehow denotefd] Hodgkins’ criminal intent towards her.” Id. (citing Ballard, 923 So.2d at 482 ).

2017The rule remains that “[u]nder the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So.3d 543, 557 (Fla. 2010) (citing Floyd v. State, 850 So.2d 383 (Fla. 2002)).

2017Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he state is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation’ of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the Defendant’s theory of events.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1989)); see also Knight v. State, 186 So.3d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 2016) (“This Court has described the circumstantial evidence standard as follows: ‘[wjhere the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be sustained unless the ev

2012Second, “the circumstantial evidence rule does not require the jury to believe the defendant’s version of the facts when the State has produced conflicting evidence.” Pearce, 880 So.2d at 572 (citing Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 381 (Fla.1994)).

2004Spencer, 645 So.2d at 381 .

2011After “competent, substantial evidence has been submitted on each element of the crime, it is for the jury to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284, 290 (Fla.1990) (quoting Hufliam v. State, 400 So.2d 133, 135-36 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)).

2003"Because the circumstantial evidence standard does not require the jury to believe the defense version of facts on which the state has produced conflicting evidence, the jury properly could have concluded that Holton's version of the facts was untrue." Id. at 290 (citation omitted).

2018Stated another way, the State “must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events.” Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003) (citing Daring v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 156 (Fla. 2002)).

2016In a circumstantial-evidence case, "the State is not required to ‘rebut conclusively, every possible variation of events’ which could be inferred from the evidence, but must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events.” Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 156 (Fla.2002)).

2006"Although the circumstantial evidence rule can be stated with certainty and ease, applying the rule is often a daunting task because `the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence in each case is unique.'" Haugabrook v. State, 827 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (quoting McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 976 (Fla.1977)).

2004With this additional circumstantial evidence, the trial court concluded that E.T.R. had committed the offense of principal to attempted bur-glai’y and denied his motion for dismissal. “[A]lthough the circumstantial evidence rule can be stated with certainty and ease, applying the rule is often a daunting task because ‘the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence in each case is unique.’ ” Haugabrook v. State, 827 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (quoting McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 976 (Fla.1977)).

2005In Bertone v. State, 870 So.2d 923, 924 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 889 So.2d 72 (Fla.2004), we described the operation of the section 812.022(2) statutory inference: In Jackson v. State, 736 So.2d 77, 83-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we held that the circumstantial evidence rule of State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla.1970), applied to the inference of guilty knowledge created by section 812.022(2).

2004In Jackson v. State, 736 So.2d 77, 83-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), we held that the circumstantial evidence rule of State v. Graham, 238 So.2d 618 (Fla.1970), applied to the inference of guilty knowledge created by section 812.022(2).

2013This Court deleted this instruction from the standard instructions in 1981, finding that where the jury is properly instructed on the standard of reasonable doubt, the circumstantial evidence instruction was "confusing and incorrect.” In re Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594, 595 (Fla.1981) (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)).

1999The supreme court deleted this instruction from the standard instructions, finding that where the jury is properly instructed on the standard of reasonable doubt, the circumstantial evidence instruction was "confusing and incorrect." In re Standard Jury Instructions, 431 So.2d at 595 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)).

2017Reiterating that “the circumstantial evidence test guards against basing a conviction on impermissibly stacked inferences,” “we refuse[d] to surmise that [the - 29 - victim’s] manifested demeanor somehow denote[d] Hodgkins’ criminal intent towards her.” Id. (citing Ballard, 923 So. 2d at 482 ).

2017Reiterating that “the circumstantial evidence test guards against basing a conviction on im-permissibly stacked inferences,” “we refuse[d] to surmise that [the victim’s] manifested demeanor somehow denotefd] Hodgkins’ criminal intent towards her.” Id. (citing Ballard, 923 So.2d at 482 ).

2010Because the circumstantial evidence standard does not require the jury to believe the defense's version of the facts on which the State has produced conflicting evidence, the jury properly could have concluded *632 that Crump's hypothesis of innocence was untrue. 622 So.2d at 971 .

2010Because the circumstantial evidence standard does not require the jury to believe the defense’s version of the facts on which the State has produced conflicting evidence, the jury properly could have con- eluded that Crump’s hypothesis of innocence was untrue. 622 So.2d at 971 .

2019See Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla. 1982) ("Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt[,] a conviction cannot be 15Knight v. State, 186 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 2016). 16The en banc majority notes that the dissenter from the initial panel decision "cited the supreme court's opinion approving the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), approved, 186 So. 3d 1005 (Fla. 2016)," perhaps giving the impression that he argued against employing the circumstantial evidence rule in

2016Knight, 107 So.3d at 462 .

2018Since the element in question is one that often turns on circumstantial evidence, it may be time to reconsider our decisions in Phillips , 961 So.2d 1137 , Jackson , 818 So.2d 539 , and Williams , 569 So.2d 1376 , to the extent their underpinning is an erroneous element-centric application of the circumstantial evidence rule.

2018Since the element in question is one that often turns on circumstantial evidence, it may be time to reconsider our decisions in Phillips, 961 So. 2d 1137 , Jackson, 818 So. 2d 539 , and Williams, 569 So. 2d 1376 , to the extent their underpinning is an erroneous element-centric application of the circumstantial evidence rule.

2018Stated another way, the State “must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events.” Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003) (citing Daring v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 156 (Fla. 2002)).

2016In a circumstantial-evidence case, "the State is not required to ‘rebut conclusively, every possible variation of events’ which could be inferred from the evidence, but must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events.” Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 283 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 156 (Fla.2002)).

2018See Williams , 569 So.2d at 1376 (reciting circumstantial evidence rule and decreeing that defendant's possession of ten pieces of cocaine, marijuana rolling papers, razor blades, $72 cash, and a weapon were not inconsistent with defendant's theory that the cocaine he possessed was for personal use, not for sale); see also Phillips , 961 So.2d at 1138 ("Where the only proof of an intent to sell is circumstantial, [that proof] may support a conviction only if it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." (alteration in original) (quoting Glenn v. State , 824 So.2d 1046 , 1049 (Fla. 4th

2018See Williams, 569 So. 2d at 1376 (reciting circumstantial evidence rule and decreeing that defendant's possession of ten pieces of cocaine, marijuana rolling papers, razor blades, $72 cash, and a weapon were not inconsistent with defendant's theory that the cocaine he possessed was for personal use, not for sale); see also Phillips, 961 So. 2d at 1138 ("Where the only proof of an intent to sell is circumstantial, [that proof] may support a conviction only if it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." (alteration in original) (quoting Glenn v. State, 824 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. 4th

2020Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimate facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510 , 526 n.14 (Fla. 2009) (citation omitted). 7 Here, the trial court erred in applying the circumstantial evidence standard, because the state’s evidence of guilt was not wholly circumstantial.

2015“Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So.Bd 548, 557 (Fla.2010). “ ‘The state is not required to ‘rebut conclusively every possible variation’ of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the [defendant's theory of events.’” Id. (quotin

2019Id.; see also Knight v. State, 186 So. 3d 1005, 1010 (Fla. 2016) (explaining that the circumstantial evidence standard applies when all of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is circumstantial, not when any element is supported only by circumstantial evidence); Kocaker v. State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1225 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that the State is only required to introduce competent evidence inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events and need not conclusively rebut every possible variation of events that may be inferred). 6 According to Appellant, the State’s evidence was not sufficient t

2013Id. “ ‘Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be, deniedf.]’ ” Kocaker v. State, 119 So.3d 1214 (Fla.2013) (quoting Durousseau v. State, 55 So.3d 543, 556-57 (Fla.2010)); see also Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 262 (Fla.1996) (“[T]he sole function of the trial court on motion for directed verdict in a circumstantial-evidence case is to determine whe

2018Since the element in question is one that often turns on circumstantial evidence, it may be time to reconsider our decisions in Phillips , 961 So.2d 1137 , Jackson , 818 So.2d 539 , and Williams , 569 So.2d 1376 , to the extent their underpinning is an erroneous element-centric application of the circumstantial evidence rule.

2018Since the element in question is one that often turns on circumstantial evidence, it may be time to reconsider our decisions in Phillips, 961 So. 2d 1137 , Jackson, 818 So. 2d 539 , and Williams, 569 So. 2d 1376 , to the extent their underpinning is an erroneous element-centric application of the circumstantial evidence rule.