16 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ressler v. Humane Society of Grand Forksgreen2 sentences2021See Ressler v. Humane Soc., 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992) (holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for honoring subpoena and informing employer she was prepared to testify contrary to employer’s interest in criminal proceeding); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 795 (N.D. 1987) (holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits). 2021Code § 1152 (rev. 1877). [¶25] In Ressler, this Court forthrightly acknowledged that such “public policy exceptions” operated to round off the rough edges of the law: “Judicially created exceptions to or modifications of the at-will rule have also emerged to ameliorate the sometimes harsh consequences of strict adherence to the at-will rule.” Ressler, 480 N.W.2d at 431 . | 4 | 4 |
Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Homegreen2 sentences2021See Ressler v. Humane Soc., 480 N.W.2d 429, 432 (N.D. 1992) (holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for honoring subpoena and informing employer she was prepared to testify contrary to employer’s interest in criminal proceeding); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 795 (N.D. 1987) (holding public policy prohibited employer from discharging employee in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits). 1992In Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, supra, we held that a public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine permitted an employee to sue an employer for a wrongful discharge in retaliation for seeking workers compensation benefits. | 2 | 3 |
Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Grand Forksgreen2 sentences1994It is well settled that terms such as “permanent employment,” “life employment,” and “as long as the employee chooses” are presumed to mean “steady” employment, not employment for a definite duration, and thus generally do not overcome the at-will presumption to create an employment contract. 2 See, e.g., Hillesland, supra; Aberman v. Malden Mills Industries, 414 N.W.2d 769 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); see also 82 Am.Jur.2d Wrongful Discharge § 103 (1992). 1994See Hillesland, supra. In Hillesland , we declined to follow those states which have recognized a bad-faith exception to the at-will doctrine. | 2 | 3 |
Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Societygreen2 sentences2001Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc., 417 N.W.2d 797, 799-800 (N.D.1987). [¶ 14] The construction of an employment contract to determine its legal effect is a question of law, and on appeal, we will independently examine and construe the contract to determine if the trial court erred in its interpretation. 1999Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 417 N.W.2d 797, 799 (N.D.1987). | 2 | 2 |
Lee v. Walstadgreen2 sentences2004Lee , at 547. [¶ 11] Since Lee , we have recognized employees may bring a tort action for retaliatory discharge against an employer, if the employer’s actions contravene a clear statement of public policy in a constitutional or a statutory provision. 1992The two most common modifications are the public policy exception, which allows a discharged employee to recover if his termination violates a well established and important public policy, and the imposition of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into the employment contract.” [Citations and footnote omitted.] In Lee v. Walstad, 368 N.W.2d 542 (N.D.1985), a discharged employee urged us to adopt a public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine. | 1 | 2 |
Bykonen v. United Hospitalgreen2 sentences2001See Bykonen, 479 N.W.2d at 142 (stating failure to include disclaimer in policy manual did not raise reasonable inference employer intended to override at-will presumption unambiguously preserved in employee handbook). 1998Id. [¶ 32] VMH issued Hougum an employee handbook that explicitly said it was not to be construed as an employment contract. | 1 | 2 |
Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 190 (Minn.Ct.App.2001) (stating that “[t]he doctrine of employment-based shareholder oppression is distinct from the wrongful-termination doctrine, and the analysis under the separate doctrines should attempt to protect close-corporation employment and, at the same time, respect the legitimate sphere of the at-will rule”); 1 Robert B. | 1 | 1 |
Whidden v. John S. Nerison, Inc.green2 sentences2001See Whidden v. *253 John S. Nerison, Inc., 294 Mont. 346 , 981 P.2d 271 , 1999 MT 110, ¶21 . 5 . 2001See Whidden v. *253 John S. Nerison, Inc., 294 Mont. 346 , 981 P.2d 271 , 1999 MT 110, ¶21 . 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc.green1 sentence2000The California Supreme Court followed decisions from Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington, which “relied for analytical support on the contract model of the employment relationship out of which contemporary limitations on the at-will doctrine arose.” Id. at 419. | 1 | 1 |
Southwest Gas Corp. v. Vargasgreen2 sentences2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. 2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc.green1 sentence2000See Bykonen, at 141; Hillesland , at 211; Bailey , at 122. | 1 | 1 |
Wallace L. Fatland v. Quaker State Corporationgreen1 sentence1999See Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir.1995) (applying North Dakota law). | 1 | 1 |
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreetgreen2 sentences1992In declining to adopt a public-policy exception because the employee had not defined a clear public policy which his removal violated, we quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court's statement in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561, 573 , 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983), that the “public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.” Lee, supra, 368 N.W.2d at 547 . 1992In declining to adopt a public-policy exception because the employee had not defined a clear public policy which his removal violated, we quoted the Wisconsin Supreme Court's statement in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561, 573 , 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983), that the “public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.” Lee, supra, 368 N.W.2d at 547 . | 1 | 1 |
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1987While we do not reject the propriety of such a rule, we are not persuaded that it should be the result of judicial decision." Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985). [Citation omitted.] The court intimated that in Arizona the covenant would be breached only by a termination which contravened public policy. 1987While we do not reject the propriety of such a rule, we are not persuaded that it should be the result of judicial decision." Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985). [Citation omitted.] The court intimated that in Arizona the covenant would be breached only by a termination which contravened public policy. | 1 | 1 |
Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroadgreen2 sentences1987The classic statement of the at-will rule is that an employer may discharge an employee “for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 , 179 S.W. 134 , 137-138 (1915). 1987The classic statement of the at-will rule is that an employer may discharge an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 , 179 S.W. 134 , 137-138 (1915). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dahlberg v. LUTHERAN SOCIAL SERV. OF ND
green
2 sentences2004In Dahlberg, 2001 ND 73, ¶¶ 32-38 , 625 N.W.2d 241 , we said we had recognized a limited public policy exception to the at-will doctrine if the employee established a termination in retaliation for complying with a clear public policy, and we then construed N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20 to require reports of violations or suspected violations of law to be made for the purpose of “blowing the whistle” to expose an illegality. 2004In Dahlberg, 2001 ND 73, ¶¶ 32-38 , 625 N.W.2d 241 , we said we had recognized a limited public policy exception to the at-will doctrine if the employee established a termination in retaliation for complying with a clear public policy, and we then construed N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20 to require reports of violations or suspected violations of law to be made for the purpose of “blowing the whistle” to expose an illegality. | 5 | 2001–2006 |
Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, N.A.
green
2 sentences2001Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, N.A. , 1999 ND 175, ¶ 17 , 599 N.W.2d 293 ; Ressler v. Humane Soc. of Grand Forks , 480 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D. 1992); see N.D.C.C. § 34-03-01. 2001Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, N.A. , 1999 ND 175, ¶ 17 , 599 N.W.2d 293 ; Ressler v. Humane Soc. of Grand Forks , 480 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D. 1992); see N.D.C.C. § 34-03-01. | 3 | 2000–2001 |
Hunt v. Banner Health System
green
2 sentences2015Id. at ¶ 16. [¶ 25] In Hunt, 2006 ND 174, ¶ 3 , 720 N.W.2d 49 , an employee handbook stated that “Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a guarantee of continued employment. 2015Id. at ¶ 16. [¶ 25] In Hunt, 2006 ND 174, ¶ 3 , 720 N.W.2d 49 , an employee handbook stated that “Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a guarantee of continued employment. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Olson v. Souris River Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006It does not speak to whether the progressive disciplinary procedures will be followed or whether Banner and its employees are contracting on any other aspect of the employment. [¶ 16] However, Hunt misconstrues our case law when she argues that preservation of the at-will presumption is only accomplished with bold-faced and highlighted disclaimers containing the magic words “This is not a contract.” See Olson v. Souris River Telecommunications Coop., Inc., 1997 ND 10 , 558 N.W.2d 333 . 2006It does not speak to whether the progressive disciplinary procedures will be followed or whether Banner and its employees are contracting on any other aspect of the employment. [¶ 16] However, Hunt misconstrues our case law when she argues that preservation of the at-will presumption is only accomplished with bold-faced and highlighted disclaimers containing the magic words “This is not a contract.” See Olson v. Souris River Telecommunications Coop., Inc., 1997 ND 10 , 558 N.W.2d 333 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co.
green
2 sentences2004In Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶29 , 630 N.W.2d 46 , we said under either the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine or the statutory provisions in N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20, a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge required an employee to show: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (3) the existence of a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. [¶ 12] Vandall claims our decision in Anderson recognizes the coexistence of both a common law an 2004In Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶29 , 630 N.W.2d 46 , we said under either the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine or the statutory provisions in N.D.C.C. § 34-01-20, a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge required an employee to show: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (3) the existence of a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. [¶ 12] Vandall claims our decision in Anderson recognizes the coexistence of both a common law an | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Thompson v. Associated Potato Growers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Thompson v. Associated Potato Growers, Inc., 2000 ND 95, ¶ 8 , 610 N.W.2d 53 . 2001Thompson v. Associated Potato Growers, Inc., 2000 ND 95, ¶ 8 , 610 N.W.2d 53 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co.
green
2 sentences2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. 2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. 2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp.
green
2 sentences2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. 2000See Southwest Gas v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064 , 901 P.2d 693 (1995); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20 , 766 P.2d 280 (1988); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96 , 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence, 112 Wash.2d 127 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989). [¶ 17] The California Supreme Court recognized an employer may contract away its right to decide whether facts constituting cause for termination exist, but an agreement to contract away that prerogative would not be inferred. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Phillips v. Dickinson Management, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Phillips v. Dickinson Management, Inc., 1998 ND 123, ¶ 7 , 580 N.W.2d 148 . *297 [¶ 11] The parties by contract can overcome the at-will presumption and create enforceable employment rights. 1999Phillips v. Dickinson Management, Inc., 1998 ND 123, ¶ 7 , 580 N.W.2d 148 . *297 [¶ 11] The parties by contract can overcome the at-will presumption and create enforceable employment rights. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes
green
2 sentences1999Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 ND 24, ¶ 31 , 574 N.W.2d 812 . 1999Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 ND 24, ¶ 31 , 574 N.W.2d 812 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Aberman v. Malden Mills Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1994It is well settled that terms such as “permanent employment,” “life employment,” and “as long as the employee chooses” are presumed to mean “steady” employment, not employment for a definite duration, and thus generally do not overcome the at-will presumption to create an employment contract. 2 See, e.g., Hillesland, supra; Aberman v. Malden Mills Industries, 414 N.W.2d 769 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); see also 82 Am.Jur.2d Wrongful Discharge § 103 (1992). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Hutton v. Watters
green
2 sentences1987The classic statement of the at-will rule is that an employer may discharge an employee “for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.” Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 , 179 S.W. 134 , 137-138 (1915). 1987The classic statement of the at-will rule is that an employer may discharge an employee "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 , 179 S.W. 134 , 137-138 (1915). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.