at-will presumption (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

at-will presumption in California

22 California opinions name it 3 courts 1988–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp.green
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2019
2 sentences

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

34
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.green
cal · 1988 · cited in 7 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–2000
2 sentences

2000On the contrary, employers may benefit from the increased loyalty and productivity that such agreements may inspire. [Citation.] Permitting proof of and reliance on implied-in-fact contract terms does not nullify the at-will rule, it merely treats such contracts in a manner in keeping *199 with general contract law. [Citation.] We see no sound reason to exempt the employment relationship from the ordinary rules of contract interpretation which permit proof of implied terms." ( Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 680-681, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 .) We reiterated these principles in Scott v

2000On the contrary, employers may benefit from the increased loyalty and productivity that such agreements may inspire. [Citation.] Permitting proof of and reliance on implied-in-fact contract terms does not nullify the at-will rule, it merely treats such contracts in a manner in keeping *199 with general contract law. [Citation.] We see no sound reason to exempt the employment relationship from the ordinary rules of contract interpretation which permit proof of implied terms." ( Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 680-681, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 .) We reiterated these principles in Scott v

27
Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green
cal · 1995 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–2010
2 sentences

2009Code, § 2922), the at-will presumption would surely apply to lesser quant[a] of discipline as well.” (Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 464-465 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 427 , 904 P.2d 834 ]; see DiGiacinto, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 634 — 635.) The at-will presumption authorizing an employer to discharge or demote an employee similarly and necessarily authorizes an employer to unilaterally alter the terms of employment, provided that the alteration does not violate a statute or breach an implied or express contractual agreement.

2009Code, § 2922), the at-will presumption would surely apply to lesser quant[a] of discipline as well.” (Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 464-465 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 427 , 904 P.2d 834 ]; see DiGiacinto, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 634 — 635.) The at-will presumption authorizing an employer to discharge or demote an employee similarly and necessarily authorizes an employer to unilaterally alter the terms of employment, provided that the alteration does not violate a statute or breach an implied or express contractual agreement.

24
McLain v. Great American Insurance Companiesgreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1995
2 sentences

1995Companies (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1487 [256 *631 Cal.Rptr. 863] [affirming jury verdict for employee on claim of breach of implied-in-fact contract where employee left prior employment based on “promises of long-term advancement possibilities’’].) Were it otherwise, every applicant employed at the time of an offer would be exempt from the at-will rule, a result inconsistent with Labor Code section 2922.

1989Companies (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1485, 1487 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 863 ], holding an employment application form containing an at-will clause was not an integrated document, and that substantial evidence established an implied contract that an employee could only be terminated for cause. 5 Wilkerson was transferred out of the Santa Monica branch on November 8, 1982. 6 Foley established that absent a violation of public policy, wrongful discharge does not have consequences in tort.

22
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc.green
cal · 2009 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2019
2 sentences

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

14
Taylor v. Johnstongreen
cal · 1975 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

12
Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakesgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

2019Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130 , 137, 123 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 539 P.2d 425 [express repudiation requires clear and unequivocal refusal to perform]; Mammoth Lakes LandAcquisition, LLC v. Town of Mammoth Lakes (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 435 , 463, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 [same].) 3 In any event, because the employment agreement between Diaz and Sohnen was at-will, Sohnen could unilaterally change the terms of Diaz's employment agreement, as long as it provided Diaz notice of the change. "[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alte

12
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.green
calctapp · 1981 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1995
2 sentences

1995Factors creating such an implied agreement include “ ‘the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.’ ” (Id. at p. 680, quoting Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 327 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 ].) In moving for summary judgment, Jeffer Mangels submitted the Camps’ signed acknowledgment forms on which they agreed that their employment was at will.

1995Factors creating such an implied agreement include “ ‘the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.’ ” (Id. at p. 680, quoting Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 327 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 ].) In moving for summary judgment, Jeffer Mangels submitted the Camps’ signed acknowledgment forms on which they agreed that their employment was at will.

12
Veronese v. Lucasfilm Ltd.green
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Rather, an instruction on the business judgment rule must convey to the jury that “a plaintiff in a discrimination case must show discrimination, not just that the employer’s decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise.” (Id. at p. 21.)9 8 The trial court also instructed the jury on the elements of a claim for retaliation, including requiring Frawley to prove “[t]hat Frawley’s opposing race discrimination was a substantial motivating reason for MTA’s decision to discharge Frawley.” (CACI No. 2505.) 9 The court noted that the following at-will instruction given by the trial court did not include th

11
Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmarogreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997(Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 629 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 329 ].) In this case, the record reveals that plaintiff did not present evidence at trial of an express oral or written agreement specifying the length of his employment or the permissible grounds for termination.

1997(Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 629 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 329 ].) In this case, the record reveals that plaintiff did not present evidence at trial of an express oral or written agreement specifying the length of his employment or the permissible grounds for termination.

11
Anderson v. Savin Corp.green
calctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991Plaintiff argues the at-will clause in the employment application is not determinative, since the application is not an integrated contract. *1555 (4) We begin our analysis by acknowledging the established rule that a valid express contract creating at-will employment cannot be contradicted by evidence of an implied agreement to the contrary. ( Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 806 ; Anderson v. Savin Corp. (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 356, 364 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 ]; Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 467, 482 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 ], criticize

1991Plaintiff argues the at-will clause in the employment application is not determinative, since the application is not an integrated contract. *1555 (4) We begin our analysis by acknowledging the established rule that a valid express contract creating at-will employment cannot be contradicted by evidence of an implied agreement to the contrary. ( Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 806 ; Anderson v. Savin Corp. (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 356, 364 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 ]; Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 467, 482 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 ], criticize

11
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisorsgreen
calctapp · 1984 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991Plaintiff argues the at-will clause in the employment application is not determinative, since the application is not an integrated contract. *1555 (4) We begin our analysis by acknowledging the established rule that a valid express contract creating at-will employment cannot be contradicted by evidence of an implied agreement to the contrary. ( Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 806 ; Anderson v. Savin Corp. (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 356, 364 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 ]; Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 467, 482 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 ], criticize

1991Plaintiff argues the at-will clause in the employment application is not determinative, since the application is not an integrated contract. *1555 (4) We begin our analysis by acknowledging the established rule that a valid express contract creating at-will employment cannot be contradicted by evidence of an implied agreement to the contrary. ( Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 806 ; Anderson v. Savin Corp. (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 356, 364 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 ]; Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 467, 482 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 ], criticize

11
American Center for Education, Inc. v. Cavnargreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
2 sentences

1989As with Labor Code section 2922, the at-will presumption can only “be overcome by evidence that despite the absence of a specified term, the parties agreed that the employer’s power to terminate would be limited in some way, e.g., by a requirement that termination be based only on ‘good cause.’ [Citations.]” (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal. 3d at p. 677 .) Corporations always retain the authority to enforce at-will employment conditions through bylaws or resolutions or through express contracts to this effect with individual officers (See e.g., American Center For Education, In

1989As with Labor Code section 2922, the at-will presumption can only “be overcome by evidence that despite the absence of a specified term, the parties agreed that the employer’s power to terminate would be limited in some way, e.g., by a requirement that termination be based only on ‘good cause.’ [Citations.]” (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal. 3d at p. 677 .) Corporations always retain the authority to enforce at-will employment conditions through bylaws or resolutions or through express contracts to this effect with individual officers (See e.g., American Center For Education, In

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad green
cal · 2003
2 sentences

2021Even assuming Johnson preserved the issue without an objection (see Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 7 ), the court did not err in giving the at-will instruction.

2020Even assuming Johnson preserved the issue without an objection (see Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1, 7 ), the court did not err in giving the at-will instruction.

22020–2021
Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp. green
calctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2016Ingrande argues that, notwithstanding the express language in his contract,14 he raised a 14 Ingrande also asserts that, under Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1550 , an at-will clause in an employment application is not controlling but instead may be rebutted by evidence showing the parties intended to limit the employer's ability to terminate the employee to "for cause" terminations.

2016Ingrande argues that, notwithstanding the express language in his contract,14 he raised a 14 Ingrande also asserts that, under Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1550 , an at-will clause in an employment application is not controlling but instead may be rebutted by evidence showing the parties intended to limit the employer's ability to terminate the employee to "for cause" terminations.

22016–2016
Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin green
cal · 2008
1 sentence

2016However, neither party requested such a “mixed motive” instruction.12 If Zelaya felt such an instruction was necessary, either before or after the trial court decided to give the at-will instruction, it was incumbent upon him to request it. “ ‘ “ ‘In a civil case, each of the parties must propose complete and comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation; if the parties do not do so, the court has no duty to instruct on its own motion.’ ” ’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121 , 1130- 1131.) “ ‘Neither a trial court nor a reviewing court in a

12016–2016
Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc. green
wash · 1989
2 sentences

1998At least one state high court has reasoned that striking a fair balance between the interests of the parties to the employment contract through an objective just-cause standard will promote the continued use of such limitations on the at-will doctrine; imbalances, on the other hand, encourage employers to adopt defensive measures by "remov[ing] such [just-cause] provisions from their [employment] handbooks." ( Baldwin, supra, 769 P.2d at p. 304 .) The proper inquiry for the jury, in other words, is not, "Did the employee in fact commit the act leading to dismissal?" It is, "Was the factual bas

1998At least one state high court has reasoned that striking a fair balance between the interests of the parties to the employment contract through an objective just-cause standard will promote the continued use of such limitations on the at-will doctrine; imbalances, on the other hand, encourage employers to adopt defensive measures by “remov[ing] such [just-cause] provisions from their [employment] handbooks.” (Baldwin, supra, 769 P.2d at p. 304 .) The proper inquiry for the jury, in other words, is not, “Did the employee in fact commit the act leading to dismissal?” It is, “Was the factual basi

11998–1998
Gantt v. Sentry Insurance green
cal · 1992
2 sentences

1998The Legislature has spoken [by enacting express exceptions to the at-will employment rule, e.g., former Elections Code section 1655 and Labor Code section 923]; if the system is to work, the Legislature will redeclare its position.” (Id. at pp. 182-183; cf. Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 .) Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals cited similar reasons for declining to adopt a public policy exception to at-will employment: “Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to have been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract underpinnings of t

1998The Legislature has spoken [by enacting express exceptions to the at-will employment rule, e.g., former Elections Code section 1655 and Labor Code section 923]; if the system is to work, the Legislature will redeclare its position." ( Id. at pp. 182-183, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ; cf. Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 .) Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals cited similar reasons for declining to adopt a public policy exception to at-will employment: "Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to have been

11998–1998
Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp. green
or · 1982
2 sentences

1998(See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d 654 , and cases cited at pp. 676-677.) An Oregon decision, Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp. (1982) 293 Or. 96 [ 643 P.2d 1276 ] (Simpson), typifies the reasoning of these cases.

1998(See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d 654 , and cases cited at pp. 676-677.) An Oregon decision, Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp. (1982) 293 Or. 96 [ 643 P.2d 1276 ] (Simpson), typifies the reasoning of these cases.

11998–1998
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green
cal · 1980
2 sentences

1998The Legislature has spoken [by enacting express exceptions to the at-will employment rule, e.g., former Elections Code section 1655 and Labor Code section 923]; if the system is to work, the Legislature will redeclare its position." ( Id. at pp. 182-183, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ; cf. Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 .) Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals cited similar reasons for declining to adopt a public policy exception to at-will employment: "Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to have been

1998The Legislature has spoken [by enacting express exceptions to the at-will employment rule, e.g., former Elections Code section 1655 and Labor Code section 923]; if the system is to work, the Legislature will redeclare its position." ( Id. at pp. 182-183, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ; cf. Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 .) Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals cited similar reasons for declining to adopt a public policy exception to at-will employment: "Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to have been

11998–1998
Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co. green
calctapp · 1990
1 sentence

1991Plaintiff argues the at-will clause in the employment application is not determinative, since the application is not an integrated contract. *1555 (4) We begin our analysis by acknowledging the established rule that a valid express contract creating at-will employment cannot be contradicted by evidence of an implied agreement to the contrary. ( Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 806 ; Anderson v. Savin Corp. (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 356, 364 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 627 ]; Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 467, 482 [ 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 ], criticize

11991–1991
Montalvo v. Zamora green
calctapp · 1970
2 sentences

1988(See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege (1985) 21 Idaho L.Rev. 201, 226-227, fns. 109-110 [hereafter Mauk].) [5] A number of California decisions have followed Petermann to bar discharge of at-will employees in violation of state policies governing labor-management relations. ( Montalvo v. Zamora (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 69 [ 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 ]; Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 168 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 543 ]; Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn.

1988(See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege (1985) 21 Idaho L.Rev. 201, 226-227, fns. 109-110 [hereafter Mauk].) [5] A number of California decisions have followed Petermann to bar discharge of at-will employees in violation of state policies governing labor-management relations. ( Montalvo v. Zamora (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 69 [ 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 ]; Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 168 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 543 ]; Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn.

11988–1988
Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. green
calctapp · 1969
2 sentences

1988(See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege (1985) 21 Idaho L.Rev. 201, 226-227, fns. 109-110 [hereafter Mauk].) [5] A number of California decisions have followed Petermann to bar discharge of at-will employees in violation of state policies governing labor-management relations. ( Montalvo v. Zamora (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 69 [ 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 ]; Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 168 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 543 ]; Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn.

1988(See Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege (1985) 21 Idaho L.Rev. 201, 226-227, fns. 109-110 [hereafter Mauk].) [5] A number of California decisions have followed Petermann to bar discharge of at-will employees in violation of state policies governing labor-management relations. ( Montalvo v. Zamora (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 69 [ 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 ]; Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 168 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 543 ]; Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn.

11988–1988

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Labor Code § 2922 (12) CA § Cal. Corporations Code § 207 (3) CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 210 (3) CA § Cal. Government Code § 12900 (3) CA § Cal. Government Code § 12940 (3) CA § Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 69 (1985–2025) TX 43 (1986–2025) DC 26 (1991–2018) UT 22 (1989–2018) CA 22 (1988–2021) WA 21 (1989–2023) AR 20 (1983–2021) OH 19 (1986–2022) NY 17 (1983–2018) OK 17 (1987–2022) ND 16 (1987–2021) MN 14 (1983–2017) AZ 13 (1984–2001) NC 12 (1989–2011) NM 12 (1986–2005) IA 12 (1989–2024) WY 12 (1989–2010) MO 12 (1985–2020) CT 11 (1985–2016) MS 11 (1999–2023) MA 10 (1987–2025) VA 10 (1992–2016) WI 10 (1984–2023) NJ 8 (1985–2002) ID 7 (1988–2015) IN 7 (1997–2019) VT 7 (1985–2015) AL 7 (1987–2008) NV 7 (1984–2022) SD 7 (1988–2024) KY 7 (1998–2022) MD 6 (1995–2015) TN 6 (1997–2011) HI 5 (1982–2008) IL 5 (1990–2025) MI 4 (2009–2022) SC 4 (1984–2013) WV 4 (1996–2022) OR 4 (1989–2006) NE 3 (1983–1988) DE 3 (1996–2022) NH 3 (1988–2015) FL 2 (1989–1993) GA 2 (2004–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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