at-will presumption in Pennsylvania

2009Over 30 years ago, our Court also embraced a common law exception to the at-will doctrine in the form of a claim for wrongful discharge where an employee’s termination contra venes a “clear mandate of public policy.” Geary v. United States Steel Carp., 456 Pa. 171, 185 , 319 A.2d 174, 181 (1974).

2009Over 30 years ago, our Court also embraced a common law exception to the at-will doctrine in the form of a claim for wrongful discharge where an employee’s termination contra venes a “clear mandate of public policy.” Geary v. United States Steel Carp., 456 Pa. 171, 185 , 319 A.2d 174, 181 (1974).

1996See also, Scott, supra (oral promise that her employment would be “permanent” held insufficient to rebut presumption of at-will employment); Marsh v. Boyle, 366 Pa. Super. 1 , 530 A.2d 491 (1987) (employer’s promise that plaintiff would hold position “at least two years” too vague to rebut the at-will presumption); Murphy v. Publicker Industries Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 409 , 516 A.2d 47 (1986) (promise of lifetime employment not definite enough to overcome the at-will presumption); Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa. Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571 (1986) (employer’s statement to employee that “I want us to retir

1996See also, Scott, supra (oral promise that her employment would be “permanent” held insufficient to rebut presumption of at-will employment); Marsh v. Boyle, 366 Pa. Super. 1 , 530 A.2d 491 (1987) (employer’s promise that plaintiff would hold position “at least two years” too vague to rebut the at-will presumption); Murphy v. Publicker Industries Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 409 , 516 A.2d 47 (1986) (promise of lifetime employment not definite enough to overcome the at-will presumption); Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa. Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571 (1986) (employer’s statement to employee that “I want us to retir

2024(Id. at 13-14 (quoting Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa. Super. 1988)).) Mann adds that recognizing such claims will “erode the long-standing principles of at-will employment” and that “[a]ny further erosion of the at-will presumption in Pennsylvania should be effected by the legislature, not the courts.” (Id.) Mann also disputes any suggestion by Salsberg that this Court has adopted Comment g to Section 766 of the Restatement and argues that we are under no obligation to adopt Comment g here.

2013Compare Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 90 , 545 A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. 1988) (finding discharge of company employee acting in alleged self-defense during fight on company premises did not violate public policy, and thus, not an exception to the at-will doctrine) with Cocchi v. Circuit City Stores, 2006 WL 870736 (N.D.

1999See Marsh, supra; Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 578 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 (1992)(“[B]ecause of its vitality, courts insist that to contraetaway the at-will presumption, much clarity is required.”).

1999See Marsh, supra; Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 578 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 (1992)(“[B]ecause of its vitality, courts insist that to contraetaway the at-will presumption, much clarity is required.”).

1992He only asserts that the employee handbook creates an implied contract. 2 “A handbook is enforceable against an employer if a reasonable person in the employee’s position would interpret its provisions as evidencing the employer’s intent to supplant the at-will rule.” Scott, supra, 376 Pa.Superior Ct. at 97, 545 A.2d at 337 ; accord Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa.Super. 199, 222 , 511 A.2d 830, 841-2 (1986).

1992He only asserts that the employee handbook creates an implied contract. 2 “A handbook is enforceable against an employer if a reasonable person in the employee’s position would interpret its provisions as evidencing the employer’s intent to supplant the at-will rule.” Scott, supra, 376 Pa.Superior Ct. at 97, 545 A.2d at 337 ; accord Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa.Super. 199, 222 , 511 A.2d 830, 841-2 (1986).

2004“To ascertain the parties’ intent, an important factor to consider is the presence of additional consideration.” Id. ¶ 7 We find the facts support the jury’s conclusion the parties negotiated and executed a valid contract for employment, for a specific duration and for additional consideration, thereby rebutting the at-will presumption.

1996See also, Scott, supra (oral promise that her employment would be “permanent” held insufficient to rebut presumption of at-will employment); Marsh v. Boyle, 366 Pa. Super. 1 , 530 A.2d 491 (1987) (employer’s promise that plaintiff would hold position “at least two years” too vague to rebut the at-will presumption); Murphy v. Publicker Industries Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 409 , 516 A.2d 47 (1986) (promise of lifetime employment not definite enough to overcome the at-will presumption); Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa. Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571 (1986) (employer’s statement to employee that “I want us to retir

2019This Court has held that “the clearest manner in which a party can overcome the at-will doctrine is where the employer and the employee have entered into a contract which expresses or implies a definite term of employment and forbids discharge in the absence of just cause “or without first utilizing an internal dispute resolution mechanism.” Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian–University Hospital, 612 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa.Super. 1992) (emphasis added).

1995Case argues that because he is a party to the Agreement, with a specific term, that he is not an at-will employee, relying on Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian University Hospital, 417 Pa.Superior Ct. 316, 321, 612 A.2d 500, 503 (1992), which states: The clearest manner in which a party can overcome the at-will doctrine is where the employer and the employee have entered into a contract which expresses a definite term of employment and forbids discharge in the absence of ‘just cause’ or without first utilizing an internal dispute resolution mechanism.

1994Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 398 Pa.Superior Ct. 294, 580 A.2d 1356 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 625 , 592 A.2d 45 (1991).

1994“It is a question of fact whether, in a given case, an employee has given additional consideration sufficient to rebut the at-will presumption.” Id. at 298, 580 A.2d at 1358 .

2022See Brief for Appellant at 51; see also Braun, 24 A.3d at 943 (noting that compensation contracts modify an employee’s at-will status if a reasonable person would interpret the provisions of the contract as establishing an employer’s intent to overcome the at-will presumption); Cooper v. Broadspire Services, Inc., 2005 WL 1712390 , at *3 (E.D.

2022See Brief for Appellant at 51; see also Braun, 24 A.3d at 943 (noting that compensation contracts modify an employee’s at-will status if a reasonable person would interpret the provisions of the contract as establishing an employer’s intent to overcome the at-will presumption); Cooper v. Broadspire Services, Inc., 2005 WL 1712390 , at *3 (E.D.

1987A jury might reasonably interpret the above cited facts so as to conclude that [the employee] has clearly rebutted the at-will presumption.” Id. 363 Pa.Super. at 556 , 526 A.2d at 1202 .

1987A jury might reasonably interpret the above cited facts so as to conclude that [the employee] has clearly rebutted the at-will presumption.” Id. 363 Pa.Super. at 556 , 526 A.2d at 1202 .

1987Citing Lucacher v. Kerson, 158 Pa.Super. 437 , 45 A.2d 245 (1946), the Darlington court noted that a substantial hardship such as moving one’s family to take a new position would be regarded as sufficient additional consideration to overcome the at-will presumption.

1987Citing Lucacher v. Kerson, 158 Pa.Super. 437 , 45 A.2d 245 (1946), the Darlington court noted that a substantial hardship such as moving one’s family to take a new position would be regarded as sufficient additional consideration to overcome the at-will presumption.

2025Rapagnani v. Judas Co., 736 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citation omitted).

2019Rapagnani, 736 A.2d at 671 (citing Scott, 545 A.2d at 340 ).

2005In order to rebut this presumption, plaintiff must establish one of the following: “(1) an agreement for a definite duration; (2) an agreement specifying that the employee will be discharged for just cause only; (3) sufficient additional consideration to establish a contract; or (4) an applicable recognized public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.” Luteran , 455 Pa. Super, at 370, 688 A.2d at 214 .

1999Luteran, 688 A.2d at 214 (citations omitted).

1986Darlington v. General Electric, supra. This court has recently reaffirmed the at-will rule in the en banc case of Banas v. Matthews International Corporation, 348 Pa.Super. 464, 483-86 , 502 A.2d 637, 647-48 (1985) (Judges Rowley, Beck and Johnson dissenting.) There, the employee was discharged after he used company property for personal use.

1986Darlington v. General Electric, supra. This court has recently reaffirmed the at-will rule in the en banc case of Banas v. Matthews International Corporation, 348 Pa.Super. 464, 483-86 , 502 A.2d 637, 647-48 (1985) (Judges Rowley, Beck and Johnson dissenting.) There, the employee was discharged after he used company property for personal use.

1996Compare Robertson v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum Products Co., 371 Pa. Super. 49 , 537 A.2d 814 (1987) (written offer to reassign employee, rather than discharge him, if evaluation showed unsatisfactory performance, held sufficient to obligate employer to reassign employee for reasonable period before discharging). (b) Whether the court erred in concluding the issuance of the October 1981 handbook did not modify plaintiff’s at-will employment status to one in which he could not be discharged without just cause Plaintiff asserts that even if the 1977 handbook did not create an enforceable obli

1996Compare Robertson v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum Products Co., 371 Pa. Super. 49 , 537 A.2d 814 (1987) (written offer to reassign employee, rather than discharge him, if evaluation showed unsatisfactory performance, held sufficient to obligate employer to reassign employee for reasonable period before discharging). (b) Whether the court erred in concluding the issuance of the October 1981 handbook did not modify plaintiff’s at-will employment status to one in which he could not be discharged without just cause Plaintiff asserts that even if the 1977 handbook did not create an enforceable obli

1995Rettinger v. American Can Company, 574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D.

1991See also, Rettinger v. American Can Company, 574 F. Supp. 306 (M.D.

1992Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa. Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571 (1986); DiBonaventura v. Conrail, 372 Pa. Super. 420 , 539 A.2d 865 (1988).

1992Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa. Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571 (1986); DiBonaventura v. Conrail, 372 Pa. Super. 420 , 539 A.2d 865 (1988).

2025Id.; see also Permenter, 38 F.Supp. 2d at 379 .

2020See also, e.g., Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the employee’s claim that “Pennsylvania’s public policy exception to the at-will doctrine extends to cases in which an employee ‘reasonably believes’ that his employer has requested him to perform an unlawful act and is discharged for objecting to the proposal be believes is unlawful”);7 Mikhail, 63 A.3d at 321 (“[W]e cannot conclude that [the appellee’s] decision to terminate [the appellant] based upon differences in judgment violates the public policy of this Commonwealth.”); Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497,

2020See also, e.g., Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the employee’s claim that “Pennsylvania’s public policy exception to the at-will doctrine extends to cases in which an employee ‘reasonably believes’ that his employer has requested him to perform an unlawful act and is discharged for objecting to the proposal be believes is unlawful”);7 Mikhail, 63 A.3d at 321 (“[W]e cannot conclude that [the appellee’s] decision to terminate [the appellant] based upon differences in judgment violates the public policy of this Commonwealth.”); Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497,