breadth waiver in New York

2014Recognizing the breadth of the principle informing Garrity , Judge Breitel stated “While there was once a different view, it is now . . . undisputed that one may not be ‘coerced’ into waiving his constitutional privilege by the withholding of a substantial right to engage in one’s occupation or of any other substantial or fundamental exercise of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 279 , supra; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493, 497 )” (id. at 273 [Breitel, J., concurring] [emphasis supplied]).

1969(Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273 ; Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comr., 392 U. S. 280 .) While the Supreme Court did not deal specifically with the problem posed by the present appeal—as the subsequent discussion will make clear —■ nevertheless, it is an essential underpinning of these decisions that a public employee who is a target of an investigation may be subpoenaed by a Grand Jury and the issuance of that subpoena does not of itself constitute a violation of the employee’s Fifth Amendment rights.

2014Recognizing the breadth of the principle informing Garrity , Judge Breitel stated “While there was once a different view, it is now . . . undisputed that one may not be ‘coerced’ into waiving his constitutional privilege by the withholding of a substantial right to engage in one’s occupation or of any other substantial or fundamental exercise of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 279 , supra; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493, 497 )” (id. at 273 [Breitel, J., concurring] [emphasis supplied]).

2008Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected as unfaithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause its prior test in Ohio v Roberts ( 448 US 56 [1980]), which admitted out-of-court statements “so long as [they had] adequate indicia of reliability—i.e., [fell] within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ ” (Crawford, 541 US at 42 , quoting Roberts, 448 US at 66 ).

2008Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected as unfaithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause its prior test in Ohio v Roberts ( 448 US 56 [1980]), which admitted out-of-court statements "so long as [they had] adequate indicia of reliability — i.e., [fell] within a `firmly rooted hearsay exception'" ( Crawford, 541 US at 42 , quoting Roberts, 448 US at 66 ).

2008Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected as unfaithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause its prior test in Ohio v Roberts ( 448 US 56 [1980]), which admitted out-of-court statements “so long as [they had] adequate indicia of reliability—i.e., [fell] within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ ” (Crawford, 541 US at 42 , quoting Roberts, 448 US at 66 ).

2008Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected as unfaithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause its prior test in Ohio v Roberts ( 448 US 56 [1980]), which admitted out-of-court statements “so long as [they had] adequate indicia of reliability—i.e., [fell] within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ ” (Crawford, 541 US at 42 , quoting Roberts, 448 US at 66 ).

1997P. This appeal tests the breadth of the exception to the prior written notice requirement that excuses a failure to establish the statutorily mandated notice in a case where the claimed defect is readily apparent and the municipal defendant had, shortly prior to the accident, either inspected the subject area for the purpose of discovering such defects or performed work thereon (see, Krach v Town of Nassau, 217 AD2d 737 ; Giganti v Town of Hempstead, 186 AD2d 627, 628 ; Klimek v Town of Ghent, 114 AD2d 614, 615 ; Blake v City of Albany, 63 AD2d 1075 , affd 48 NY2d 875 ).

1997P. This appeal tests the breadth of the exception to the prior written notice requirement that excuses a failure to establish the statutorily mandated notice in a case where the claimed defect is readily apparent and the municipal defendant had, shortly prior to the accident, either inspected the subject area for the purpose of discovering such defects or performed work thereon (see, Krach v Town of Nassau, 217 AD2d 737 ; Giganti v Town of Hempstead, 186 AD2d 627, 628 ; Klimek v Town of Ghent, 114 AD2d 614, 615 ; Blake v City of Albany, 63 AD2d 1075 , affd 48 NY2d 875 ).

1997P. This appeal tests the breadth of the exception to the prior written notice requirement that excuses a failure to establish the statutorily mandated notice in a case where the claimed defect is readily apparent and the municipal defendant had, shortly prior to the accident, either inspected the subject area for the purpose of discovering such defects or performed work thereon (see, Krach v Town of Nassau, 217 AD2d 737 ; Giganti v Town of Hempstead, 186 AD2d 627, 628 ; Klimek v Town of Ghent, 114 AD2d 614, 615 ; Blake v City of Albany, 63 AD2d 1075 , affd 48 NY2d 875 ).

1997P. This appeal tests the breadth of the exception to the prior written notice requirement that excuses a failure to establish the statutorily mandated notice in a case where the claimed defect is readily apparent and the municipal defendant had, shortly prior to the accident, either inspected the subject area for the purpose of discovering such defects or performed work thereon (see, Krach v Town of Nassau, 217 AD2d 737 ; Giganti v Town of Hempstead, 186 AD2d 627, 628 ; Klimek v Town of Ghent, 114 AD2d 614, 615 ; Blake v City of Albany, 63 AD2d 1075 , affd 48 NY2d 875 ).

1997P. This appeal tests the breadth of the exception to the prior written notice requirement that excuses a failure to establish the statutorily mandated notice in a case where the claimed defect is readily apparent and the municipal defendant had, shortly prior to the accident, either inspected the subject area for the purpose of discovering such defects or performed work thereon (see, Krach v Town of Nassau, 217 AD2d 737 ; Giganti v Town of Hempstead, 186 AD2d 627, 628 ; Klimek v Town of Ghent, 114 AD2d 614, 615 ; Blake v City of Albany, 63 AD2d 1075 , affd 48 NY2d 875 ).

1993The breadth of this waiver renders the prolongation of this action for the recovery of an undisputed debt utterly pointless (see, Key Bank v Munkenbeck, 162 AD2d 503 ).

1983In the case of preliminary investigative inquiries, made before charges have been preferred, we have stated that the required factual basis “is not very exacting” (Virag v Hynes, 54 NY2d 437, 442 ) and that a “bare showing” of the basis of the inquiry is sufficient (see Matter of A’Hearn, supra, at p 918).

1980The underpinnings of the rule were well stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Brown v United States ( 356 US 148, 154-156 ): "If [a defendant in a criminal case] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. '[H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.’ Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 ; and see

1980The underpinnings of the rule were well stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Brown v United States ( 356 US 148, 154-156 ): "If [a defendant in a criminal case] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. '[H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.’ Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 ; and see

1980The underpinnings of the rule were well stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Brown v United States ( 356 US 148, 154-156 ): "If [a defendant in a criminal case] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. '[H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.’ Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 ; and see

1978(Matter of A’Hearn v Committee on Unlawful Practice, 23 NY2d 916 .) The information furnished to the court is inadequate to support any charge that Dr. Schachter is engaging in professional misconduct, and there is no allegation respecting the breadth of the inquiry or the extent of the preceding investigation.

1978(Matter of A’Hearn v Committee on Unlawful Practice, 23 NY2d 916 .) The information furnished to the court is inadequate to support any charge that Dr. Schachter is engaging in professional misconduct, and there is no allegation respecting the breadth of the inquiry or the extent of the preceding investigation.

1977But it is nevertheless true that what the scorekeeper may record as an ’error’ is not the equivalent, in law, of negligence.” (McGee v Board of Educ., supra, pp 101-102.) In dealing with a horseback riding injury, the court in Diderou v Pinecrest Dunes ( 34 AD2d 672 ) affirmed the breadth of the doctrine.

1969(Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273 ; Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comr., 392 U. S. 280 .) While the Supreme Court did not deal specifically with the problem posed by the present appeal—as the subsequent discussion will make clear —■ nevertheless, it is an essential underpinning of these decisions that a public employee who is a target of an investigation may be subpoenaed by a Grand Jury and the issuance of that subpoena does not of itself constitute a violation of the employee’s Fifth Amendment rights.

1961Since Matter of Goddington ( 307 N. Y. 181 ) and the resulting amendment to section 354 of the Civil Practice Act (L. 1955, ch. 466), the breadth of the waiver is no longer in question (see Twenty-first Annual Report of N. Y.