breadth waiver in Pennsylvania

1975In the words of Justice Frankfurter, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S.Ct. 622, 626 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958): “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘[H]e has no right to set forth to the [trier of fact] all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts.’ ” The most recent statement o

1975In the words of Justice Frankfurter, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S.Ct. 622, 626 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958): “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘[H]e has no right to set forth to the [trier of fact] all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts.’ ” The most recent statement o

1975In the words of Justice Frankfurter, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S.Ct. 622, 626 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958): “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘[H]e has no right to set forth to the [trier of fact] all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts.’ ” The most recent statement o

1975In the words of Justice Frankfurter, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S.Ct. 622, 626 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958): “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘[H]e has no right to set forth to the [trier of fact] all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts.’ ” The most recent statement o

2024Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 459-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

2020See, e.g., Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Where the party making the misrepresentation 1) purports to have special knowledge; 2) stands in a fiduciary or [J-99-2020] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 11 doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

2007Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 382 , 368 A.2d 675, 681 (1977). 6 Our Supreme Court has ex *920 plained the breadth of the immunity as follows: The immunity of the legislators must be absolute as to their actions within the “legitimate legislative sphere.” To accomplish this we must not only insulate the legislator against the results of litigation brought against him for acts in the discharge of the responsibilities of his office, but also relieve him of the responsibility of defending against such claims.

2007Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 382 , 368 A.2d 675, 681 (1977). 6 Our Supreme Court has ex *920 plained the breadth of the immunity as follows: The immunity of the legislators must be absolute as to their actions within the “legitimate legislative sphere.” To accomplish this we must not only insulate the legislator against the results of litigation brought against him for acts in the discharge of the responsibilities of his office, but also relieve him of the responsibility of defending against such claims.

2007Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 174 , 507 A.2d 323, 331 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275 , 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 , 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979)) (emphasis added).

2007Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 174 , 507 A.2d 323, 331 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275 , 877 A.2d 383 (2005) (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 , 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979)) (emphasis added).

2003See McArthur, 108 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that "a narrow proviso to a more general statutory offense is more likely to be an affirmative defense than an element of the offense"); accord McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 , 43 S.Ct. 132, 134 , 67 L.Ed. 301 (1922) ("an indictment ... founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense... need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere").

2003See McArthur, 108 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that “a narrow proviso to a more general statutory offense is more likely to be an affirmative defense than an element of the offense”); accord McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 , 43 S.Ct. 132, 134 , 67 L.Ed. 301 (1922) (“an indictment ... founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense ... need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere”).

2003See McArthur, 108 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that “a narrow proviso to a more general statutory offense is more likely to be an affirmative defense than an element of the offense”); accord McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 , 43 S.Ct. 132, 134 , 67 L.Ed. 301 (1922) (“an indictment ... founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense ... need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere”).

2003See McArthur, 108 F.3d at 1353 (explaining that “a narrow proviso to a more general statutory offense is more likely to be an affirmative defense than an element of the offense”); accord McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 , 43 S.Ct. 132, 134 , 67 L.Ed. 301 (1922) (“an indictment ... founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense ... need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere”).

2000See the discussion pertaining to the breadth of this immunity provision in Fulmer v. Duquesne Light Co., 374 Pa. Super. 537, 540-41 , 543 A.2d 1101 -1102 (1988).

1971See, also, Sawyer v. U. S., 202 U.S. 150 (1906); Brown v. U. S., 356 U.S. 148 (1958) (“the breadth of his waiver [of the privilege] is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.”).

1971See, also, Sawyer v. U.S., 202 U.S. 150 (1906); Brown v. U.S., 356 U.S. 148 (1958) ("the breadth of his waiver [of the privilege] is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination."). [] As to the permissible scope of cross-examination of witnesses in criminal trials in Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth v. Cheatham, 429 Pa. 198 , 239 A. 2d 293 (1968); Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284 , 234 A. 2d 552 , vacated on other grounds, Lopinson v. Penna., 392 U.S. 647 (1968); Commonwealth v. Mickens, 201 Pa. Superior Ct. 48 , 191 A. 2d 719 (1963). [6] Appellant's attorney objected to this comm