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10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998Ed. 2d 589, 597 , 78 S. Ct. 622, 627 (1958) (if a defendant takes the stand to testify on his own behalf, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness; the breadth of his waiver of the privilege is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination); United States ex rel. 1998Ed. 2d 589, 597 , 78 S. Ct. 622, 627 (1958) (if a defendant takes the stand to testify on his own behalf, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness; the breadth of his waiver of the privilege is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination); United States ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
United States of America Ex Rel. James Irwin v. Frank J. Pate, Warden, Illinois State Penitentiarygreen2 sentences1998Irwin v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1966) (if defendant voluntarily takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, his testimony may be impeached and he may be cross-examined; the extent of the waiver of the privilege is determined by what defendant’s testimony makes relevant for cross-examination); see also People v. Dawson, 57 Ill. 1998Irwin v. Pate , 357 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1966) (if defendant voluntarily takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, his testimony may be impeached and he may be cross- examined; the extent of the waiver of the privilege is determined by what defendant's testimony makes relevant for cross- examination); see also People v. Dawson , 57 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dawsongreen2 sentences1998Irwin v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1966) (if defendant voluntarily takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, his testimony may be impeached and he may be cross-examined; the extent of the waiver of the privilege is determined by what defendant’s testimony makes relevant for cross-examination); see also People v. Dawson, 57 Ill. 1998Irwin v. Pate , 357 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1966) (if defendant voluntarily takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, his testimony may be impeached and he may be cross- examined; the extent of the waiver of the privilege is determined by what defendant's testimony makes relevant for cross- examination); see also People v. Dawson , 57 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
North American Insurance v. Kemper National Insurancegreen2 sentences2004The doctrine "prohibits a party who has repudiated a contract on one ground from changing his ground after litigation has begun." Smith v. Union Automobile Indemnity Co., 323 Ill.App.3d 741, 745 , 257 *1246 Ill.Dec. 81, 752 N.E.2d 1261 (2001); see also North American Insurance Co. v. Kemper National Insurance Co., 325 Ill.App.3d 477, 484 , 259 Ill.Dec. 448 , 758 N.E.2d 856 (2001) (The "mend the hold" doctrine "estops a contract party from changing the grounds on which he has refused to perform the contract"). 2004The doctrine "prohibits a party who has repudiated a contract on one ground from changing his ground after litigation has begun." Smith v. Union Automobile Indemnity Co., 323 Ill.App.3d 741, 745 , 257 *1246 Ill.Dec. 81, 752 N.E.2d 1261 (2001); see also North American Insurance Co. v. Kemper National Insurance Co., 325 Ill.App.3d 477, 484 , 259 Ill.Dec. 448 , 758 N.E.2d 856 (2001) (The "mend the hold" doctrine "estops a contract party from changing the grounds on which he has refused to perform the contract"). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Union Automobile Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2004The doctrine “prohibits a party who has repudiated a contract on one ground from changing his ground after litigation has begun.” Smith v. Union Automobile Indemnity Co., 323 Ill. 2004The doctrine "prohibits a party who has repudiated a contract on one ground from changing his ground after litigation has begun." Smith v. Union Automobile Indemnity Co., 323 Ill.App.3d 741, 745 , 257 *1246 Ill.Dec. 81, 752 N.E.2d 1261 (2001); see also North American Insurance Co. v. Kemper National Insurance Co., 325 Ill.App.3d 477, 484 , 259 Ill.Dec. 448 , 758 N.E.2d 856 (2001) (The "mend the hold" doctrine "estops a contract party from changing the grounds on which he has refused to perform the contract"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Friedman
green
2 sentences2006True to the breadth of the rule’s scope, Friedman even broadly refers to the defendant’s bare offer as “a plea-related discussion.” (Emphasis added.) Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 352 . 2006True to the breadth of the rule's scope, Friedman even broadly refers to the defendant's bare offer as "a plea-related discussion." (Emphasis added.) Friedman, 79 Ill.2d at 352 , 38 Ill.Dec. 141 , 403 N.E.2d 229 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
In Re MW
green
1 sentence2021“Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power ‘to bring a person into its adjudicative process.’ ” In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408 , 415 (2009) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Castleberry
green
1 sentence2021Because the breadth of this principle threatens the finality of judgments, “only the most fundamental defects, i.e., a lack of personal jurisdiction or lack of subject matter jurisdiction *** warrant declaring a judgment void.’ ” Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re KH
green
2 sentences2004The dissent asserts that "all procedural safeguards must be adhered to," a statement *1122 that sounds benign until the dissent makes clear that it considers objecting to hearsay evidence to be a "procedural safeguard." Op. 281 Ill.Dec. at 836 , 804 N.E.2d at 1131 . 2004The dissent asserts that "all procedural safeguards must be adhered to," a statement *1122 that sounds benign until the dissent makes clear that it considers objecting to hearsay evidence to be a "procedural safeguard." Op. 281 Ill.Dec. at 836 , 804 N.E.2d at 1131 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Arizona v. Roberson
green
2 sentences1989Ed. 2d at 714 , 108 S. Ct. at 2098 .) The Court, in Roberson, did not address the breadth of the waiver or whether the waiver is as broad as the right to counsel, which attaches upon request. 1989Roberson , while adopting the bright line rule of Edwards that all interrogation must cease when a suspect requests an attorney, also acknowledged the holding of Edwards that the accused may waive his right to counsel by himself initiating further communications, exchanges or conversations with the police. ( Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 714 , 108 S.Ct. at 2098 .) The Court, in Roberson , did not address the breadth of the waiver or whether the waiver is as broad as the right to counsel, which attaches upon request. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co.
green
2 sentences1988Ill. 1972), 57 F.R.D. 509 .) The breadth of the privilege indicates that it was intended not only to encourage “full and honest disclosure” (154 Ill. 1988Ill. 1972), 57 F.R.D. 509 .) The breadth of the privilege indicates that it was intended not only to encourage "full and honest disclosure" ( 154 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
In re October 1985 Grand Jury No. 746
green
1 sentence1988Ill. 1972), 57 F.R.D. 509 .) The breadth of the privilege indicates that it was intended not only to encourage "full and honest disclosure" ( 154 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Alfano v. BD. OF TRADE OF CITY OF CHICAGO
green
2 sentences1980The breadth of the doctrine of “having charge of,” as interpreted by the Illinois courts, was discussed in Alfano v. Board of Trade (1979), 76 Ill. 1980App. 3d 248, 251 , 395 N.E.2d 384, 386 , as follows: “Recently, in Norton, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized the expansiveness of the concept of having charge of the work. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.