breadth exception in New Jersey

1996Despite the breadth of the exception, "`[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.'" California v. Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. at 2070 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1982)).

1996Despite the breadth of the exception, "`[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.'" California v. Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. at 2070 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1982)).

1996Despite the breadth of the exception, "`[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.'" California v. Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. at 2070 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1982)).

1996Despite the breadth of the exception, "`[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.'" California v. Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. at 2070 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 , 72 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1982)).

1996In short, "a warrantless search of a motor vehicle is justifiable... where police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity." State v. Martin, supra, 87 N.J. at 567 , 436 A. 2d 96 . [ Id. at 174-75, 584 A. 2d 832 .] In this case although the confidential informant was not reliable, the source advised that Paturzzio was in the Mystic Islands area at a house owned or rented by Anthony Manto and that she was in possession of a large quantity of PCP and marijuana which she was distributing.

1995The breadth of the rule is designed to assure “that all persons wrongfully injured have financially responsible persons to look to for damages” because “a liability insurance contract is for the benefit of the public as well as for the benefit of the named or additional insured.” Odolecki, supra, 55 N.J. at 549 , 264 A.2d 38 .

1995The breadth of the rule is designed to assure “that all persons wrongfully injured have financially responsible persons to look to for damages” because “a liability insurance contract is for the benefit of the public as well as for the benefit of the named or additional insured.” Odolecki, supra, 55 N.J. at 549 , 264 A.2d 38 .

1995The only question remaining is whether James H.’s use of the vehicle constituted “theft or the like.” The Court has reasoned that “the ‘theft’ component of the exception connotes nothing less than the willful taking of another’s car with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of its possession and use.” Motor Club, supra, 73 N.J. at 438 , 375 A.2d 639 .

1995The only question remaining is whether James H.’s use of the vehicle constituted “theft or the like.” The Court has reasoned that “the ‘theft’ component of the exception connotes nothing less than the willful taking of another’s car with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of its possession and use.” Motor Club, supra, 73 N.J. at 438 , 375 A.2d 639 .

1986If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.” Id. at 154-155, 78 S.Ct. at 626-27 .

1986This reasoning “applies to a witness in any proceeding who voluntarily take the stand and offers testimony in his own behalf.” Id. at 155 , 78 S.Ct. at 627 .

1981Petitioners principally rely upon Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

1981Petitioners principally rely upon Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 , 97 S.Ct. 2691 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977).

1975App. 1935) rev'd on other grounds, 131 Tex. 368 , 114 S.W. 2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1938), a delay in commencement of the construction of a tunnel under a contract with a city, caused by the failure of the city to acquire a right of way before *210 it had ordered commencement of the work, was held not the character of delay contemplated by a clause in the contract that the contractor should "not be entitled to any claim for damages for hindrance or delay for any cause whatever in the progress of the work," but if the contractor should be delayed for any cause beyond his control, the time for completin

1975App. 1935) rev'd on other grounds, 131 Tex. 368 , 114 S.W. 2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1938), a delay in commencement of the construction of a tunnel under a contract with a city, caused by the failure of the city to acquire a right of way before *210 it had ordered commencement of the work, was held not the character of delay contemplated by a clause in the contract that the contractor should "not be entitled to any claim for damages for hindrance or delay for any cause whatever in the progress of the work," but if the contractor should be delayed for any cause beyond his control, the time for completin

1975In holding it inapplicable the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out that notwithstanding the breadth of the clause, it was clear that "the delay from the city's failure to obtain complete right of way was not in the class of difficulties and delays which were in the minds of the parties." In Dallas v. Shortall, 87 S.W. 2d 844 (Tex. Civ.

1966In holding it inapplicable, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out that, notwithstanding the breadth of the clause, it was clear that “the delay from the city’s failure to obtain complete right of way was not in the class of difficulties and delays which were in the minds of the parties.” 62 A., at p. 642 .