breadth waiver in Maryland

2026Id. at 257 .

1980Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion in Pearce pointed to the breadth of the principle there enunciated in the Court’s opinion and urged an alternative rule: [I]n my view', [this Court] should authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding. [ 395 U.S. 711, 751 , 89 S. Ct. at 2089 .] Had the Supreme Court adopted the rule suggested by Justice White or had the legislature chosen that language when formulating the statutory counterpart applicable to trials de novo in

1980Mr. Justice White in his concurring opinion in Pearce pointed to the breadth of the principle there enunciated in the Court’s opinion and urged an alternative rule: [I]n my view', [this Court] should authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding. [ 395 U.S. 711, 751 , 89 S. Ct. at 2089 .] Had the Supreme Court adopted the rule suggested by Justice White or had the legislature chosen that language when formulating the statutory counterpart applicable to trials de novo in

1978In a footnote to Doyle , Justice Stevens quoted from Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) as follows: “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘ [H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.’ (citation omitted).” Id. 426 U. S. at 629 n. 8.

1978In a footnote to Doyle , Justice Stevens quoted from Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) as follows: “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘ [H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.’ (citation omitted).” Id. 426 U. S. at 629 n. 8.

1978In a footnote to Doyle , Justice Stevens quoted from Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154-55 , 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) as follows: “If he takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination. ‘ [H]e has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.’ (citation omitted).” Id. 426 U. S. at 629 n. 8.

1977App. 336, 340-341 , 338 A. 2d 72 (where an erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question of self-defense was held to be immaterial where no fair jury question had been generated as to self-defense), and O’Connor v. State, 234 Md. 459, 461 , 199 A. 2d 807 (where an erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question of insanity was held to be immaterial where no fair jury question had been generated as to insanity), we concluded, ‘Erroneous instructions on non-issues are self-evidently immaterial.’ ” So it is clear that the need to narrow the breadth of the presu

1977App. 336, 340-341 , 338 A. 2d 72 (where an erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question of self-defense was held to be immaterial where no fair jury question had been generated as to self-defense), and O’Connor v. State, 234 Md. 459, 461 , 199 A. 2d 807 (where an erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question of insanity was held to be immaterial where no fair jury question had been generated as to insanity), we concluded, ‘Erroneous instructions on non-issues are self-evidently immaterial.’ ” So it is clear that the need to narrow the breadth of the presu

1977App. 336, 340-341 , 338 A. 2d 72 (where an erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question of self-defense was held to be immaterial where no fair jury question had been generated as to self-defense), and O’Connor v. State, 234 Md. 459, 461 , 199 A. 2d 807 (where an erroneous allocation of the burden of persuasion on the question of insanity was held to be immaterial where no fair jury question had been generated as to insanity), we concluded, ‘Erroneous instructions on non-issues are self-evidently immaterial.’ ” So it is clear that the need to narrow the breadth of the presu

1974Hardisty v. Kay, 268 Md. 202 , 299 A. 2d 711 (1973) involved the reverse of the usual tax sale dispute.

1972Although we are not presented with a situation in which the use of an ambiguous term would require the construction of the policy against the company preparing it (Allstate v. Humphrey, supra), the statement of the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Pennington, 324 F. 2d 340 (8th Cir. 1963) would still seem appropriate: “* * * even though there does exist that familial relationship which is the ordinary object of the exclusionary clause, there is no exclusion unless the factual situation fits the exclusionary language.” 324 F. 2d at 344 . *266 Cf. State Farm Mutual Auto

1972Although we are not presented with a situation in which the use of an ambiguous term would require the construction of the policy against the company preparing it (Allstate v. Humphrey, supra), the statement of the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Pennington, 324 F. 2d 340 (8th Cir. 1963) would still seem appropriate: “* * * even though there does exist that familial relationship which is the ordinary object of the exclusionary clause, there is no exclusion unless the factual situation fits the exclusionary language.” 324 F. 2d at 344 . *266 Cf. State Farm Mutual Auto

1972Although we are not presented with a situation in which the use of an ambiguous term would require the construction of the policy against the company preparing it (Allstate v. Humphrey, supra), the statement of the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Pennington, 324 F. 2d 340 (8th Cir. 1963) would still seem appropriate: “* * * even though there does exist that familial relationship which is the ordinary object of the exclusionary clause, there is no exclusion unless the factual situation fits the exclusionary language.” 324 F. 2d at 344 . *266 Cf. State Farm Mutual Auto

1972Although we are not presented with a situation in which the use of an ambiguous term would require the construction of the policy against the company preparing it (Allstate v. Humphrey, supra), the statement of the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Pennington, 324 F. 2d 340 (8th Cir. 1963) would still seem appropriate: “* * * even though there does exist that familial relationship which is the ordinary object of the exclusionary clause, there is no exclusion unless the factual situation fits the exclusionary language.” 324 F. 2d at 344 . *266 Cf. State Farm Mutual Auto