notion doctrine in New York

2024Rather, the presumption "may be [*4]rebutted by clear and convincing evidence excluding the husband as the father or otherwise tending to disprove legitimacy" ( Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I ., 24 AD3d at 452 ; see Matter of Findlay , 253 NY at 7 ; Matter of Walker v Covington , 287 AD2d at 572 ; Murtagh v Murtagh , 217 AD2d at 539 )." ( Marilene S. v David H. , 63 AD3d 949, 950-951 [2d Dept 2009]).

2009Rather, the presumption “may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence excluding the husband as the father or otherwise tending to disprove legitimacy” (Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I., 24 AD3d at 452 ; see Matter of Findlay, 253 NY at 7 ; Matter of Walker v Covington, 287 AD2d at 572 ; Murtagh v Murtagh, 217 AD2d at 539 ).

2024Rather, the presumption "may be [*4]rebutted by clear and convincing evidence excluding the husband as the father or otherwise tending to disprove legitimacy" ( Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I ., 24 AD3d at 452 ; see Matter of Findlay , 253 NY at 7 ; Matter of Walker v Covington , 287 AD2d at 572 ; Murtagh v Murtagh , 217 AD2d at 539 )." ( Marilene S. v David H. , 63 AD3d 949, 950-951 [2d Dept 2009]).

2009Rather, the presumption “may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence excluding the husband as the father or otherwise tending to disprove legitimacy” (Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I., 24 AD3d at 452 ; see Matter of Findlay, 253 NY at 7 ; Matter of Walker v Covington, 287 AD2d at 572 ; Murtagh v Murtagh, 217 AD2d at 539 ).

2024Rather, the presumption "may be [*4]rebutted by clear and convincing evidence excluding the husband as the father or otherwise tending to disprove legitimacy" ( Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I ., 24 AD3d at 452 ; see Matter of Findlay , 253 NY at 7 ; Matter of Walker v Covington , 287 AD2d at 572 ; Murtagh v Murtagh , 217 AD2d at 539 )." ( Marilene S. v David H. , 63 AD3d 949, 950-951 [2d Dept 2009]).

2009Rather, the presumption “may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence excluding the husband as the father or otherwise tending to disprove legitimacy” (Matter of Barbara S. v Michael I., 24 AD3d at 452 ; see Matter of Findlay, 253 NY at 7 ; Matter of Walker v Covington, 287 AD2d at 572 ; Murtagh v Murtagh, 217 AD2d at 539 ).

2004(See, Matter of Adoption of Baade, 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters, 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206 [1993]; Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 123 Idaho 464 , 849 P2d 925 [1993]; Michael J., Jr. v Michael J., Sr., 198 Ariz 154, 7 P3d 960 [2000]; In re Elliot, 218 Mich App 196 , 554 NW2d 32 [1996].) But an analysis of Holyfield which focuses on its language about the tribe’s interests under the ICWA extends Holyfield too far.

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004(See, Matter of Adoption of Baade, 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters, 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206 [1993]; Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 123 Idaho 464 , 849 P2d 925 [1993]; Michael J., Jr. v Michael J., Sr., 198 Ariz 154, 7 P3d 960 [2000]; In re Elliot, 218 Mich App 196 , 554 NW2d 32 [1996].) But an analysis of Holyfield which focuses on its language about the tribe’s interests under the ICWA extends Holyfield too far.

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

1969Nevertheless, use of the term ‘ full hearing ’ itself engenders the notion of a hearing in which the parties will be permitted to introduce evidence at least in keeping with minimal due process requirements. (1 Cooper, State Administrative Law 367 [1965] ; see De Bierre v. Darvas, 22 A D 2d 550; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 18-19 [1938]; Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 480-481 .) The language certainly indicates an intention that fundamental requirements of fairness be accorded which are the essence of due process.

1968Nevertheless, use of the term "full hearing" itself engenders the notion of a hearing in which the parties will be permitted to introduce evidence at least in keeping with minimal due process requirements. (1 Cooper, State Administrative Law 367 [1965]; see De Bierre v. Darvas , 22 A D 2d 550; *414 Morgan v. United States , 304 U. S. 1, 18-19 [1938]; Morgan v. United States , 298 U. S. 468, 480-481 .) The language certainly indicates an intention that fundamental requirements of fairness be accorded which are the essence of due process.

2026Even if we did deem the officer's statements objectionable, the latter point clearly informed defense counsel's cross-examination, which sought to emphasize the officer's failure to consider alternative theories and suggest to the jury that the investigation was flawed, which dispels the notion that defense counsel's failure to object "lacked a legitimate strategic purpose" ( People v Saunders , 220 AD3d 812 , 813 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 1041 [2023]; see People v Lall , 223 AD3d 1098 , 1110 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 41 NY3d 984 [2024]; People v Njoku , 218 AD3d 1047, 1052 [3d Dept 20

2022Defendant’s theory on appeal that the promised sentence, as clearly recorded by the parties and the court at the sentence proceeding, conflicted with his understanding of the consequences of his plea depends on the notion that defense counsel failed to advise his client of the sentence offer (see Missouri v Frye, 566 US 134 [2012]) and then made a false representation at the outset of the sentencing proceeding.

2020The United States Supreme Court has "reject[ed] the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization" ( Frazee v Illinois Dept. of Employment Security , 489 US 829, 834 ). "[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not demand adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect" ( id. at 834 ; see F.F. v State of New York , 65 Misc 3d 616 , 632 [Sup Ct, Albany County]; Ford v McGinnis , 352 F3d 582, 589 [2d Cir]).

2020The United States Supreme Court has "reject[ed] the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization" ( Frazee v Illinois Dept. of Employment Security , 489 US 829, 834 ). "[T]he Free Exercise Clause does not demand adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect" ( id. at 834 ; see F.F. v State of New York , 65 Misc 3d 616 , 632 [Sup Ct, Albany County]; Ford v McGinnis , 352 F3d 582, 589 [2d Cir]).

2020In First Amendment jurisprudence, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, laws specifically targeting religious conduct are subject to strict scrutiny; they "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest" ( Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v Hialeah , 508 US 520, 531-532 ).

2016(Gentile v Gentile, 31 AD3d 1158 [4th Dept 2006]; Matter of Tafuro v Tafuro, 102 AD3d 877 [2d Dept 2013] [mother’s express waiver of her future child support payments was valid and enforceable when contained in a letter to the father].) A waiver of a contractual claim to maintenance—a cost of living adjustment (COLA) in maintenance under a separation agreement—can also be inferred from inaction.

2016(Gentile v Gentile, 31 AD3d 1158 [4th Dept 2006]; Matter of Tafuro v Tafuro, 102 AD3d 877 [2d Dept 2013] [mother’s express waiver of her future child support payments was valid and enforceable when contained in a letter to the father].) A waiver of a contractual claim to maintenance—a cost of living adjustment (COLA) in maintenance under a separation agreement—can also be inferred from inaction.

2014By the same token, the court must reject the intervenors’ notion that the doctrine of laches bars the request for renewal (see Ferguson, 59 AD3d at 389 ; see generally Arias-Paulino v Academy Bus Tours, Inc., 48 AD3d 350 [1st Dept 2008]).

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

2004In his decision Justice Brennan wrote: "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians." ( Holyfield at 49 .) Although Holyfield does not discuss the EIF exception, courts have cited the case as authority for the notion that the doctrine is bad law, because it conflicts with the emphasis Justice Brennan placed on the tribe's interests. ( See, Matter of Adoption of Baade , 462 NW2d 485 [SD 1990]; Quinn v Walters , 117 Or App 579 , 845 P2d 206

1988Cases such as People v Cook (supra), People v Sledge ( 90 AD2d 588 , supra), and People v Alfano ( 75 AD2d 584 ), upon which the defendant relies, effectively dispel the notion that the waiver of indictment process may be invoked at the prosecutor’s whim.

1988Cases such as People v Cook (supra), People v Sledge ( 90 AD2d 588 , supra), and People v Alfano ( 75 AD2d 584 ), upon which the defendant relies, effectively dispel the notion that the waiver of indictment process may be invoked at the prosecutor’s whim.