notion defense in California

2016There is no basis to limit its scope to the first communication dealing with a given subject." ( Id. at p. 454, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 , original italics.) Despite the trial court's conclusion that the communications at the later sessions were rendered nonconfidential by the earlier disclosure of similar communications on the same subject, the privilege remained intact. "[T]o our mind, what is spoken at one time cannot reasonably be deemed to reveal what is not yet spoken." ( Id. at p. 455, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 .) "In categorically rejecting the notion that the privilege

2016There is no basis to limit its scope to the first communication dealing with a given subject." ( Id. at p. 454, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 , original italics.) Despite the trial court's conclusion that the communications at the later sessions were rendered nonconfidential by the earlier disclosure of similar communications on the same subject, the privilege remained intact. "[T]o our mind, what is spoken at one time cannot reasonably be deemed to reveal what is not yet spoken." ( Id. at p. 455, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 .) "In categorically rejecting the notion that the privilege

2016There is no basis to limit its scope to the first communication dealing with a given subject." ( Id. at p. 454, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 , original italics.) Despite the trial court's conclusion that the communications at the later sessions were rendered nonconfidential by the earlier disclosure of similar communications on the same subject, the privilege remained intact. "[T]o our mind, what is spoken at one time cannot reasonably be deemed to reveal what is not yet spoken." ( Id. at p. 455, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 .) "In categorically rejecting the notion that the privilege

2016There is no basis to limit its scope to the first communication dealing with a given subject." ( Id. at p. 454, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 , original italics.) Despite the trial court's conclusion that the communications at the later sessions were rendered nonconfidential by the earlier disclosure of similar communications on the same subject, the privilege remained intact. "[T]o our mind, what is spoken at one time cannot reasonably be deemed to reveal what is not yet spoken." ( Id. at p. 455, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 834 P.2d 786 .) "In categorically rejecting the notion that the privilege

1991(See maj. opn. in In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82 [ 284 Cal. Rptr. 305 , 813 P.2d 1335 ].) It agreed with language in People v. Oaxaca (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 153, 164 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 178 ], objecting that it would be "`"intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceeding to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not."'" Further, the Court of Appeal in Robert S. rejected the notion that rule 244 im

1991(See maj. opn. in In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82 [ 284 Cal. Rptr. 305 , 813 P.2d 1335 ].) It agreed with language in People v. Oaxaca (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 153, 164 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 178 ], objecting that it would be "`"intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceeding to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not."'" Further, the Court of Appeal in Robert S. rejected the notion that rule 244 im

2023(Unilogic, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 .) There was substantial evidence presented to the jury here that Padideh showed a lack of candor or even lied in her deposition in the Underlying Action, and that this had a direct effect on Kamarei and Moradi’s litigation decisions in that action, which was the precipitating action for this malicious-prosecution suit.

2023These suggested additional requirements to invoke the unclean-hands doctrine conflict with the notion that the doctrine “is not a legal or technical defense to be used 35 as a shield against a particular element of a cause of action” and that its availability benefits the court and protects it “from having its powers used to bring about an inequitable result in the litigation before it. [Citations.]” (Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 985 .) As a different panel of this court did in Unilogic, we reject this “unreasonably narrow view of the unclean hands doctrine” that Padideh urges.

2022(See Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 702-703, 704; see also Vieira Enterprises, Inc. v. McCoy (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1087 [rejecting the argument that Scruby’s rule only applies to ambiguous easements: “[Appellant] contends that Scruby is distinguishable because [appellant]’s recorded right of 13 way is not ambiguous.

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ] (Godinez), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the standard for determining 5 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta). 7 competence to plead guilty or waive counsel was higher than or different from the standard for competence to stand trial.

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ] (Godinez), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the standard for determining 5 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta). 7 competence to plead guilty or waive counsel was higher than or different from the standard for competence to stand trial.

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ] (Godinez), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the standard for determining 5 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta). 7 competence to plead guilty or waive counsel was higher than or different from the standard for competence to stand trial.

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ] (Godinez), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the standard for determining 5 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta). 7 competence to plead guilty or waive counsel was higher than or different from the standard for competence to stand trial.

2020(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) In Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 ] (Godinez), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the standard for determining 5 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ] (Faretta). 7 competence to plead guilty or waive counsel was higher than or different from the standard for competence to stand trial.

2017In Juana Briones House, the court cited the traditional standard from Guidelines section 15369 requiring “ ‘fixed standards or objective measurements’ ” and quoted the observation in Department of Housing that a permit is ministerial only if “ ‘the official decision of conformity or nonconformity leaves scant room for the play of personal judgment.’ ” (Juana Briones House, at p. 300.) Similarly, Sierra Club determined a permit’s issuance is ministerial if “[t]he fixed approval standards delineate objective criteria or measures which merely require the agency official to apply the local law ...

2015Dept. of Transportation (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1152, 1160 , italics added.) Fundamental to this notion is the requirement that the conduct being complained of is conduct attributable to the government, not a private entity: "It is settled . . . that 'nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.' " (Zelig v. 11 County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1147 , italics added.) Darulis cannot assert a viable claim that Edward Don deprived him of due process of law under the f

2015Dept. of Transportation (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1152, 1160 , italics added.) Fundamental to this notion is the requirement that the conduct being complained of is conduct attributable to the government, not a private entity: "It is settled . . . that 'nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.' " (Zelig v. 11 County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1147 , italics added.) Darulis cannot assert a viable claim that Edward Don deprived him of due process of law under the f

2013(Id. at pp. 228-229.) In remanding the matter for a hearing, the United States Supreme Court stated in part: “The presumption [of prejudice] is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 229.) The California Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the “substantial likelihood” standard, often stating it in conjunction with Remmer (see, e.g., People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1342 ; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1

2013While a juror’s declaration of impartiality may not be conclusive (Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 728 ; People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129 ), neither is it irrelevant: “‘[One] may not know or altogether understand the imponderables which cause one to think what he thinks, but surely one who is trying as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.’ [Citations.]” (Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 217, fn. 7 .) At the time of trial, section 1122 provided, in pertinent part: “(a) After th

2013While a juror’s declaration of impartiality may not be conclusive (Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 728 ; People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129 ), neither is it irrelevant: “‘[One] may not know or altogether understand the imponderables which cause one to think what he thinks, but surely one who is trying as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.’ [Citations.]” (Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 217, fn. 7 .) At the time of trial, section 1122 provided, in pertinent part: “(a) After th

2013(Id. at pp. 228-229.) In remanding the matter for a hearing, the United States Supreme Court stated in part: “The presumption [of prejudice] is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 229.) The California Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the “substantial likelihood” standard, often stating it in conjunction with Remmer (see, e.g., People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1342 ; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1

2013(Id. at pp. 228-229.) In remanding the matter for a hearing, the United States Supreme Court stated in part: “The presumption [of prejudice] is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 229.) The California Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the “substantial likelihood” standard, often stating it in conjunction with Remmer (see, e.g., People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1342 ; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1

2013The court explained that “a hearing officer who prevents the reviewing panel from conducting its review ‘votes’ by ensuring that the peer review committee’s recommendation will be the final decision.” (Id. at p. 1271.) The court’s decision in Mileikowsky, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1259 , rested on the notion that the hearing officer’s decision to terminate the proceeding effectively commandeered the panel’s adjudicatory function.

2013The court explained that “a hearing officer who prevents the reviewing panel from conducting its review ‘votes’ by ensuring that the peer review committee’s recommendation will be the final decision.” (Id. at p. 1271.) The court’s decision in Mileikowsky, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1259 , rested on the notion that the hearing officer’s decision to terminate the proceeding effectively commandeered the panel’s adjudicatory function.

2013(Id. at pp. 228-229.) In remanding the matter for a hearing, the United States Supreme Court stated in part: “The presumption [of prejudice] is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 229.) The California Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the “substantial likelihood” standard, often stating it in conjunction with Remmer (see, e.g., People v. Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1342 ; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1