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9 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waddoups v. Noordagreen2 sentences2015And our recent cases expressly repudiate the notion of an exception for clarifying amendments, emphasizing that "[tlhe sole exception spelled out explicitly by statute requires an express provision for retro-activity." Id.; see also Waddoups, 2013 UT 64, ¶ 9 , 321 P.8d 1108 (confirming that Gress-man "repudiated" this exception). 112 As to the County's second point, we reverse, but on grounds somewhat dis-tinet from those they advanced. 2015And our recent cases expressly repudiate the notion of an exception for clarifying amendments, emphasizing that "[the sole exception spelled out explicitly by statute requires an express provision for retroac-tivity." Id.; see also Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, ¶ 9 , 321 P.3d 1108 (confirming that Gressman "repudiated" this exception). {10 As to the County's second point, we also disagree, but on grounds somewhat distinct from those advanced in the' district court. | 2 | 2 |
Anderson v. Andersongreen2 sentences2022This assessment is fact-sensitive and individualized and must be limited to a determination of whether the claimed needs are “based on the parties’ historical standard of living.” See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 12 , 80 P.3d 153 ; see also Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 31 , 414 P.3d 1069 (defining “standard of living as a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances” and “disavow[ing] the notion that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone” (quotation simplifie 2022This assessment is fact-sensitive and individualized and must be limited to a determination of whether the claimed needs are “based on the parties’ historical standard of living.” See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 12 , 80 P.3d 153 ; see also Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 31 , 414 P.3d 1069 (defining “standard of living as a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances” and “disavow[ing] the notion that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone” (quotation simplifie | 1 | 1 |
Woolums v. Woolumsgreen2 sentences2017See Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, ¶ 9 , 312 P.3d 939 (explaining that we have “disavowed the notion that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2017See Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, ¶ 9 , 312 P.3d 939 (explaining that we have “disavowed the notion that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Savage v. Savagegreen1 sentence2017As a result, we cannot be confident that under the circumstances the court’s alimony award is equitable or actually advances one of alimony’s “chief functions”—“to permit [both] parties to maintain as much as possible the same standards after the dissolution of the marriage as those enjoyed during the marriage.” See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). ¶ 31 Moreover, the court’s needs determination represents Riehelle’s maximum permissible alimony award, and, as she points out, the court’s reduced needs determination may well impair her ability in the future to invoke the court’s | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Telford
green
2 sentences2015As for Telford and Brooks, those opinions may also be understood to have interpreted rule 22(e) in a manner endorsing an operative legal standard-in Tel-ford, the notion that the rule is limited to the correction of sentences that are "manifestly illegal," 2002 UT 51, ¶ 5 , 48 P.3d 228 ; and in Brooks, the principle that the rule encompasses challenges to sentences that are "patently illegal," 908 P.2d at 860 . 1 124 Yet these constructions of rule 22(e) are untenable. 2015As for Telford and Brooks, those opinions may also be understood to have interpreted rule 22(e) in a manner endorsing an operative legal standard-in Tel-ford, the notion that the rule is limited to the correction of sentences that are "manifestly illegal," 2002 UT 51, ¶ 5 , 48 P.3d 228 ; and in Brooks, the principle that the rule encompasses challenges to sentences that are "patently illegal," 908 P.2d at 860 . 1 124 Yet these constructions of rule 22(e) are untenable. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2015As for Telford and Brooks, those opinions may also be understood to have interpreted rule 22(e) in a manner endorsing an operative legal standard—in Telford, the notion that the rule is limited to the correction of sentences that are ―manifestly illegal,‖ 2002 UT 51, ¶ 5 ; and in Brooks, the principle that the rule encompasses challenges to sentences that are ―patently illegal,‖ 908 P.2d at 860 . ¶ 124 Yet these constructions of rule 22(e) are untenable. 2015As for Telford and Brooks, those opinions may also be understood to have interpreted rule 22(e) in a manner endorsing an operative legal standard-in Tel-ford, the notion that the rule is limited to the correction of sentences that are "manifestly illegal," 2002 UT 51, ¶ 5 , 48 P.3d 228 ; and in Brooks, the principle that the rule encompasses challenges to sentences that are "patently illegal," 908 P.2d at 860 . 1 124 Yet these constructions of rule 22(e) are untenable. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences2015In our prior decisions in this field, we have "sometimes" suggested that "amendments to procedural statutes are ... retroactive because they apply presently to cases whose causes of action arose in the past." Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13 , 251 P.3d 829 . 2015In our prior decisions in this field, we have "sometimes" suggested that "amendments to procedural statutes are ... retroactive because they apply presently to cases whose causes of action arose in the past." Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13 , 251 P.3d 829 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski
green
2 sentences2022This assessment is fact-sensitive and individualized and must be limited to a determination of whether the claimed needs are “based on the parties’ historical standard of living.” See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 12 , 80 P.3d 153 ; see also Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 31 , 414 P.3d 1069 (defining “standard of living as a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances” and “disavow[ing] the notion that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone” (quotation simplifie 2022This assessment is fact-sensitive and individualized and must be limited to a determination of whether the claimed needs are “based on the parties’ historical standard of living.” See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 12 , 80 P.3d 153 ; see also Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 31 , 414 P.3d 1069 (defining “standard of living as a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances” and “disavow[ing] the notion that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone” (quotation simplifie | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Dobson v. Dobson
green
2 sentences2022Indeed, it is not the job of the district court to “appl[y] its own sense of what was reasonable under the 20200032 22 2022 UT App 47 Knowles v. Knowles circumstances.” See Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 29 , 294 P.3d 591 . ¶56 In comporting with this principle, this court has upheld alimony awards that included unique expenses—even expenses some observers might deem frivolous or unnecessary—where such expenses were consistent with the marital standard of living. 2022Indeed, it is not the job of the district court to “appl[y] its own sense of what was reasonable under the 20200032 22 2022 UT App 47 Knowles v. Knowles circumstances.” See Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 29 , 294 P.3d 591 . ¶56 In comporting with this principle, this court has upheld alimony awards that included unique expenses—even expenses some observers might deem frivolous or unnecessary—where such expenses were consistent with the marital standard of living. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Knowles v. Knowles
green
1 sentence2022Indeed, it is not the job of the district court to “appl[y] its own sense of what was reasonable under the 20200032 22 2022 UT App 47 Knowles v. Knowles circumstances.” See Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 29 , 294 P.3d 591 . ¶56 In comporting with this principle, this court has upheld alimony awards that included unique expenses—even expenses some observers might deem frivolous or unnecessary—where such expenses were consistent with the marital standard of living. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re Gestational Agreement
green
1 sentence2021In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 13 , 449 P.3d 69 . ¶167 This provides a credible basis for skepticism of the notion of a requirement of adverse argument. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Rushton
green
1 sentence2019That conclusion is premised on the notion that the standard announced in Pierre was overruled “sub silentio” in Johnson— specifically, that Johnson implicitly held that an act in a “series of events was not sufficient . . . to satisfy the section 76-5-202(1)(c) aggravator,” but instead required that the precise act that caused the victim’s death also caused the great risk of death to another person. _____________________________________________________________ concurring in the judgment) (noting that multifactor tests “may have a place in the law—in a field, for example, where precision is unt | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Visser
green
1 sentence2005Id. ¶ 15 In Visser , the defendant indicated that he wished to enter a guilty plea after his trial began. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.