11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Woods v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Indeed, the court observed that “the very notion that violation of a probationary term will result in revocation no matter the reason is constitutionally suspect.” Id. at 641 . 2017In its analysis, the Court recognized that “[i]n one sense, all probation requires ‘strict compliance’ ” because a probationer is expected to comply with terms and conditions of probation, and “[i]f the probationer fails to do so, a probation violation has occurred.” 892 N.E.2d at 641 , However, the Court continued, the very notion that violation of a probationary term will result in revocation no matter' the reason is constitutionally suspect. [[Image here]] [T]elling a defendant that he is on ‘strict compliance’ is a dramatic way of putting him on notice that he is on a short leash and has b | 1 | 3 |
Winbush v. Stategreen1 sentence2020As the State points out, by simultaneously expanding the trial court’s authority to order consecutive sentences and limiting the total length of a 2 In his reply brief, Hobbs cites Winbush v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1219, 1224-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003), wherein the court stated, “The doctrine of amelioration allows a defendant to be sentenced under the more lenient provisions of a statute which is in effect at the time of sentencing rather than be sentenced under a more harsh statute in effect at the time the offense was committed.” However, the case does not even address whether | 1 | 1 |
Teegarden v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2016See Teegarden, 145 Ind. 98 , 44 N.E. at 12 (“The Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 07A01-1503-EM-108 | January 20, 2016 Page 15 of 19 relation of parent and child, as to presumption of fraud, and the onus of proof to rebut the same, in business transactions between them, does not stand upon the same footing as the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, principal and agent, and the like relations.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Wm. P. Jungclaus Co., Inc.green1 sentence2007P. Jungclaus Co., 352 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind.Ct.App.1976) (emphasis in original). 8 The procedural history of Ragnar Benson closely parallels that of our case. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of LJMgreen1 sentence1998As recognized in Scroggins , many statutory privileges in that vein exist: school counselors, psychologists, social workers, physicians, clergy, attorneys, and spouses. 4 In rejecting the notion that a privilege *95 could be based upon “natural law,” this Court reiterated that “ ‘[e]videntiary privileges are generally disfavored and must be strictly construed.’ ” Scroggins, 506 N.E.2d at 85-86 , (quoting Matter of L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ind.Ct.App.1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., Wilson, 472 N.E.2d 932 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tittle v. Mahan
green
2 sentences1993Accordingly, in Tittle , we stated that the immunity provided by Section 3(7) was limited to “activities at tendant to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law.” 582 N.E.2d at 801 . 1993Accordingly, in Tittle , we stated that the immunity provided by Section 3(7) was limited to "activities attendant *1287 to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law." 582 N.E.2d at 801 . | 2 | 1992–1993 |
James Ripps v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2016While Sullivan admitted' to not reporting to community corrections on October 20, 2015, he" “must still be given an opportunity to offer' mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant 'revocation,”' Ripps, 968 N.E.2d at 326 (citing Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640 ), and he offered evidence that his house and phone were approved for home detention, that he was hospitalized at the time he was to report, and that he was under the impression his counsel would contact the court and community corrections. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Beckett v. Clinton Prairie School Corp.
green
2 sentences2008That said, I nevertheless fully agree with the notion that the defense of incurred risk "demands a subjective analysis into the actor's actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk," and that "the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious, deliberate and intentional embarkation upon the course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances." Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 918 ; Beckett, 504 N.E.2d at 554 . 2008That said, I nevertheless fully agree with the notion that the defense of incurred risk “demands a subjective analysis into the actor’s actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk,” and that “the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious, deliberate and intentional embarkation upon the course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances.” Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 918 ; Beckett, 504 N.E.2d at 554 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Clark v. Wiegand
green
2 sentences2008That said, I nevertheless fully agree with the notion that the defense of incurred risk "demands a subjective analysis into the actor's actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk," and that "the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious, deliberate and intentional embarkation upon the course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances." Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 918 ; Beckett, 504 N.E.2d at 554 . 2008That said, I nevertheless fully agree with the notion that the defense of incurred risk “demands a subjective analysis into the actor’s actual knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the risk,” and that “the very essence of incurred risk is the conscious, deliberate and intentional embarkation upon the course of conduct with knowledge of the circumstances.” Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 918 ; Beckett, 504 N.E.2d at 554 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Aznel v. Gasso
green
1 sentence1998As recognized in Scroggins , many statutory privileges in that vein exist: school counselors, psychologists, social workers, physicians, clergy, attorneys, and spouses. 4 In rejecting the notion that a privilege *95 could be based upon “natural law,” this Court reiterated that “ ‘[e]videntiary privileges are generally disfavored and must be strictly construed.’ ” Scroggins, 506 N.E.2d at 85-86 , (quoting Matter of L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ind.Ct.App.1985)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.