notion presumption in Ohio

2022First, we noted that deeds sometimes referred to the mineral interest itself as a “royalty,” id. at ¶ 25, citing 1 Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, Section 15.4 (2021), and second, we recognized that the present right to a future royalty is real property and that such an interest was owned by Mary Fleahman at the time of the conveyance, id. at ¶ 27, citing 3 Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, Section 38.2. {¶ 20} Similar to the exception in the deed transferring the property from Mary Fleahman to Jones, the deed transferring the property from Jones to Doughty stated that

2022First, we noted that deeds sometimes referred to the mineral interest itself as a “royalty,” id. at ¶ 25, citing 1 Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, Section 15.4 (2021), and second, we recognized that the present right to a future royalty is real property and that such an interest was owned by Mary Fleahman at the time of the conveyance, id. at ¶ 27, citing 3 Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, Section 38.2. {¶ 20} Similar to the exception in the deed transferring the property from Mary Fleahman to Jones, the deed transferring the property from Jones to Doughty stated that

2022We explained that notwithstanding evidence challenging the state’s theory of the case, the state had nevertheless presented evidence that “was credible, even if not unassailable.” Id. at 96 .

2020Lee at ___, 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 137 S.Ct. at 1966 .

2019In addressing Philpotts’s argument regarding the grand jury system and the notion of the presumption of innocence, we find the reasoning put forth by the federal court in United States v. Laurent, 861 F.Supp.2d 71 (E.D.N.Y.2011) persuasive.

2019Id. at 96 .

2001And because a violation of the Vienna Convention is not a constitutional error, see Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100 , it therefore cannot be deemed “structural error.” Accord Garcia v. State (Nev.2001), 17 P.3d 994, 997 . {¶ 115} Moreover, it is worth noting that the United States Supreme Court has already undermined the notion that a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention can be deemed structural error.

2001Hibbett v. Cincinnati (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 128 , 132 , citing Keaton Co. v. Kolby (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 234 .

2001Hibbett v. Cincinnati (1982), 4 Ohio App.3d 128 , 132 , citing Keaton Co. v. Kolby (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 234 .

2001And because a violation of the Vienna Convention is not a constitutional error, see Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100 , it therefore cannot be deemed “structural error.” Accord Garcia v. State (Nev.2001), 17 P.3d 994, 997 . {¶ 115} Moreover, it is worth noting that the United States Supreme Court has already undermined the notion that a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention can be deemed structural error.

1988Rather, the notion that defense counsel should have attempted to exclude women from the venire systematically runs afoul of the spirit of the mandate against the exclusion from jury service of members of an identifiable group, which the United States Supreme Court enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 .