member bar in Ohio

2020Id. {¶33} In addition, the Supreme Court, in Gonzalez–Lopez, explicitly upheld its previous holding in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 , 11–12, 103 S.Ct. 1610 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), where the Court “recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 .

2013Id. {¶40} In addition, the Supreme Court, in Gonzalez–Lopez, explicitly upheld its previous holding in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 , 11–12, 103 S.Ct. 1610 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), where the Court “recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to Stark County, Case No. 2012CA00061 14 counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 .

2020Id. {¶33} In addition, the Supreme Court, in Gonzalez–Lopez, explicitly upheld its previous holding in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 , 11–12, 103 S.Ct. 1610 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), where the Court “recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 .

2020Id. {¶33} In addition, the Supreme Court, in Gonzalez–Lopez, explicitly upheld its previous holding in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 , 11–12, 103 S.Ct. 1610 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983), where the Court “recognized a trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar.” Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152 .

2016Stark No. 2012CA00061, 2013-Ohio-2884, 39 , citing Wheat at 159 . {¶6} Under this assigned error, Jones argues that he did not “consent” to the presence of “stand-in” counsel and that “stand-in” counsel failed to file a notice of appearance.

2015Stark No. 2012CA00061, 2013-Ohio-2884, ¶ 39 , citing Wheat at 159 .

1999The classic statement of the privilege is found in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. (Mass. D.C. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 357 in which it was stated that the privilege applies only if 1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be a client; 2) the person to whom the communication was made a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; 3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in formed a) by his client b) without the presence of strangers c) for the purposes of securing primaril

1991Appellants point to the following language from Collins in support of their contention that corporate counsel owes a duty to the directors: “As a member of the bar and attorney for the corporation, defendant had a legal duty to the corporation and to the other members of the board to determine whether the notes he drafted were subject to the provisions of ORS Chapter 59 and were required to be registered before sale.” Id. at 406 , 560 P.2d at 1077 .

1991Appellants point to the following language from Collins in support of their contention that corporate counsel owes a duty to the directors: “As a member of the bar and attorney for the corporation, defendant had a legal duty to the corporation and to the other members of the board to determine whether the notes he drafted were subject to the provisions of ORS Chapter 59 and were required to be registered before sale.” Id. at 406 , 560 P.2d at 1077 .

1977International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales (1958), 356 U. S. 617 . 2 Relying on Gonzales, supra, appellee contends the present action is not preempted by the NLRA.

1977International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales (1958), 356 U. S. 617 . 2 Relying on Gonzales, supra, appellee contends the present action is not preempted by the NLRA.

1974By stipulation, thirty additional letters of the same import, from highly reputable persons, were admitted in evidence. ‘ ‘ There is no question but that the respondent, prior to these convictions, possessed and enjoyed the fine character and reputation indicated and was a highly respected and competent member of the bar and the Dayton community, and the board so finds.” Howver, in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Bowman, supra, a case which is essentially indistinguishable from this case, this court said, at page 223: “In determining the degree of discipline appropriate in this case, we must consider

1957As stated in Mahoney v. Coliman, 293 Pa. 478, 482 , in some counties the rules of court require the original note to be filed; but in Clarion County there is no such requirement, and its rule does not run counter to any of our decisions.” A court is obligated to follow a general statute, but not its own rule.

1945The court held: “In regard to matters of discipline, the courts will not interfere against the decision of the club professing to act under its rules unless it can be shown either that the rules were contrary to natural justice or that what has been done is contrary to the rules or that there has been mala fides, or malice, in arriving at the decision or refusal to give the member a hearing.” Richards v Morrison, 229 Mass. 458 .