member bar in Washington

2013Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 486 .

2013Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 486 .

2010"The court denied the motion, expressing concern for the `thousands upon thousands upon thousands of dollars' Asotin County would have to pay if experienced counsel was appointed." Id. at 178, 181 P.3d 887 (quoting Report of Proceedings at 7). ¶ 53 Later in the proceeding, the appointed attorney filed a motion to withdraw based largely on the court's denial of her motion for co-counsel.

2010“The court denied the motion, expressing concern for the ‘thousands upon thousands upon thousands of dollars’ Asotin County would have to pay if experienced counsel was appointed.” Id. at 178 (quoting Report of Proceedings at 7). ¶45 Later in the proceeding, the appointed attorney filed a motion to withdraw based largely on the court’s denial of her motion for cocounsel.

2009Id. at 54-56 . ¶21 We discern significant obvious differences between removing a member of the bar from a civil case and revoking an attorney’s permissive pro hac vice status.

2009Id. at 54-56 , 639 P.2d 805 . ¶ 21 We discern significant obvious differences between removing a member of the bar from a civil case and revoking an attorney's permissive pro hac vice status.

2001App. 132 , 856 P.2d 746 (1993) (juror’s association with a member of defense counsel’s law firm, not disclosed at voir dire, could not have been challenged for cause and did not entitle plaintiff to new trial); State v. Tigano, 63 Wn.

2001And this is why this is sometimes referred to as the Oprah Winfrey or Phil Donahue method of jury selection." Report of Proceedings at 22, January 10, 2000. [2] Report of Proceedings at 19, January 10, 2000. [3] Report of Proceedings at 30-31, January 10, 2000. [4] See, e.g., State v. Carlson, 61 Wash.App. 865 , 812 P.2d 536 (1991) (juror's failure to reveal her knowledge of the subject of sexual abuse at voir dire did not warrant a new trial for a rape defendant because such knowledge would not have supported a challenge for cause), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1022 , 844 P.2d 1017 (1993); Hill

2001App. 132 , 856 P.2d 746 (1993) (juror’s association with a member of defense counsel’s law firm, not disclosed at voir dire, could not have been challenged for cause and did not entitle plaintiff to new trial); State v. Tigano, 63 Wn.

2001And this is why this is sometimes referred to as the Oprah Winfrey or Phil Donahue method of jury selection." Report of Proceedings at 22, January 10, 2000. [2] Report of Proceedings at 19, January 10, 2000. [3] Report of Proceedings at 30-31, January 10, 2000. [4] See, e.g., State v. Carlson, 61 Wash.App. 865 , 812 P.2d 536 (1991) (juror's failure to reveal her knowledge of the subject of sexual abuse at voir dire did not warrant a new trial for a rape defendant because such knowledge would not have supported a challenge for cause), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1022 , 844 P.2d 1017 (1993); Hill

1994McCrillis, 15 Wn.2d at 354 .

1994McCrillis, 15 Wn.2d at 354 .

1964In re Sherman, 58 Wn. (2d) 1, 354 P. (2d) 888 ; In re Little, 40 Wn. (2d) 421, 244 P. (2d) 255 . (2) Admission to the practice of law before the courts of record of this state is a prerequisite to holding the office of judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Seattle (RCW 35.20.170), and a judge thereof, although prohibited by statute (RCW 35.20.170) from the practice of law during his tenure, remains a member of the bar of this state (RCW 2.48.021). (3) The Municipal Court of the City of Seattle is not a court of record, and the office of judge of such court is subject to forfeiture.

1964In re Sherman, 58 Wn. (2d) 1, 354 P. (2d) 888 ; In re Little, 40 Wn. (2d) 421, 244 P. (2d) 255 . (2) Admission to the practice of law before the courts of record of this state is a prerequisite to holding the office of judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Seattle (RCW 35.20.170), and a judge thereof, although prohibited by statute (RCW 35.20.170) from the practice of law during his tenure, remains a member of the bar of this state (RCW 2.48.021). (3) The Municipal Court of the City of Seattle is not a court of record, and the office of judge of such court is subject to forfeiture.

2026A defendant cannot “insist on representation by a person who is not a member of the bar, [nor can they] demand that a court honor his waiver of conflict-free representation.” United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 , 126 S. Ct. 2557 , 165 L.

2026A defendant cannot “insist on representation by a person who is not a member of the bar, [nor can they] demand that a court honor his waiver of conflict-free representation.” United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 , 126 S. Ct. 2557 , 165 L.

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2011A writ may issue if the attorney general fails to make any decision or if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion—i.e. a "`willful and unreasoning action, [taken] without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances.'" Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 774-75 , 567 P.2d 197 (quoting Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633 , 289 P.2d 203 (1955)); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 117-18 , 727 P.2d 644 (quoting Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761-62 , 567 P.2d 187 ).

2006Fray, 134 Wash.2d at 643-44 , 952 P.2d 601 (footnotes omitted).

2001And this is why this is sometimes referred to as the Oprah Winfrey or Phil Donahue method of jury selection." Report of Proceedings at 22, January 10, 2000. [2] Report of Proceedings at 19, January 10, 2000. [3] Report of Proceedings at 30-31, January 10, 2000. [4] See, e.g., State v. Carlson, 61 Wash.App. 865 , 812 P.2d 536 (1991) (juror's failure to reveal her knowledge of the subject of sexual abuse at voir dire did not warrant a new trial for a rape defendant because such knowledge would not have supported a challenge for cause), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1022 , 844 P.2d 1017 (1993); Hill

2001And this is why this is sometimes referred to as the Oprah Winfrey or Phil Donahue method of jury selection." Report of Proceedings at 22, January 10, 2000. [2] Report of Proceedings at 19, January 10, 2000. [3] Report of Proceedings at 30-31, January 10, 2000. [4] See, e.g., State v. Carlson, 61 Wash.App. 865 , 812 P.2d 536 (1991) (juror's failure to reveal her knowledge of the subject of sexual abuse at voir dire did not warrant a new trial for a rape defendant because such knowledge would not have supported a challenge for cause), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1022 , 844 P.2d 1017 (1993); Hill

2001Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

2001Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , 102 S.Ct. 940 , 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

1997RCW 31.12.295 does not define "cause,” 13 nor is legislative guidance provided elsewhere. 14 Galbraith urges this court to adopt the definition of "just cause” applied in employment termination cases, as set forth in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 139 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989): "just cause” is a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power.

1997RCW 31.12.295 does not define "cause,” 13 nor is legislative guidance provided elsewhere. 14 Galbraith urges this court to adopt the definition of "just cause” applied in employment termination cases, as set forth in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 139 , 769 P.2d 298 (1989): "just cause” is a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power.

1988In re Woodward, supra at 393-94 .

1988In re Woodward, supra at 393-94 .

1982State v. Piche, 71 Wn.2d 583, 591 , 430 P.2d 522 (1967); see also State v. Griffin, 205 Kan. 370 , 469 P.2d 417 (1970); Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972).

1982State v. Piche, 71 Wn.2d 583, 591 , 430 P.2d 522 (1967); see also State v. Griffin, 205 Kan. 370 , 469 P.2d 417 (1970); Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972).

1982State v. Piche, 71 Wn.2d 583, 591 , 430 P.2d 522 (1967); see also State v. Griffin, 205 Kan. 370 , 469 P.2d 417 (1970); Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972).

1981Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193 , 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961). 3 RCW 2.48.170 provides: "No person shall practice law in this state subsequent to the first meeting of the state bar unless he shall he an active member thereof as hereinbefore defined: Provided, That a member of the bar in good standing in any other state or jurisdiction shall be entitled to appear in the courts of this state under such rules as the board of governors may prescribe." RCW 2.48.180 provides: "Any person who, not being an active member of the state bar, or who after he had been disbarred or while suspended from members

1981Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193 , 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961). 3 RCW 2.48.170 provides: "No person shall practice law in this state subsequent to the first meeting of the state bar unless he shall he an active member thereof as hereinbefore defined: Provided, That a member of the bar in good standing in any other state or jurisdiction shall be entitled to appear in the courts of this state under such rules as the board of governors may prescribe." RCW 2.48.180 provides: "Any person who, not being an active member of the state bar, or who after he had been disbarred or while suspended from members

1979While declining to do so, the court also stated at page 465: Thus we join with the impressive array of United States Courts of Appeals that have uniformly rejected the contention that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be represented by a friend who is neither a law school graduate nor a member of the bar. [Cases cited.] Defendant relies heavily on United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), which she contends recognized an accountant as "counsel." However, United States v. Tarlowski, supra is clearly distinguishable.

1979While declining to do so, the court also stated at page 465: Thus we join with the impressive array of United States Courts of Appeals that have uniformly rejected the contention that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be represented by a friend who is neither a law school graduate nor a member of the bar. [Cases cited.] Defendant relies heavily on United States v. Tarlowski, 305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), which she contends recognized an accountant as "counsel." However, United States v. Tarlowski, supra is clearly distinguishable.

1979See Code of 1881, § 3276, p. 570; Laws of 1891, § 9, p. 96; In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472 , 172 P. 1152 (1918).

1975In re Livesey, 85 Wn.2d 189, 193 , 532 P.2d 274 (1975).

1975In re Livesey, 85 Wn.2d 189, 193 , 532 P.2d 274 (1975).

1964In re Sherman, 58 Wn. (2d) 1, 354 P. (2d) 888 ; In re Little, 40 Wn. (2d) 421, 244 P. (2d) 255 . (2) Admission to the practice of law before the courts of record of this state is a prerequisite to holding the office of judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Seattle (RCW 35.20.170), and a judge thereof, although prohibited by statute (RCW 35.20.170) from the practice of law during his tenure, remains a member of the bar of this state (RCW 2.48.021). (3) The Municipal Court of the City of Seattle is not a court of record, and the office of judge of such court is subject to forfeiture.

1964In re Sherman, 58 Wn. (2d) 1, 354 P. (2d) 888 ; In re Little, 40 Wn. (2d) 421, 244 P. (2d) 255 . (2) Admission to the practice of law before the courts of record of this state is a prerequisite to holding the office of judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Seattle (RCW 35.20.170), and a judge thereof, although prohibited by statute (RCW 35.20.170) from the practice of law during his tenure, remains a member of the bar of this state (RCW 2.48.021). (3) The Municipal Court of the City of Seattle is not a court of record, and the office of judge of such court is subject to forfeiture.

1958A majority of the court, however, are unwilling to overrule State v. Canutt (1901), 26 Wash. 68 , 66 P. (2d) 130 .

1945The supreme court of Arizona, In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368 , 101 P. (2d) 790 , held that a member of the bar of that state who left Arizona prior to the enactment of the state bar act (the statute being very similar to our own) and thereafter returned to Arizona was entitled to resume the practice of law in that state upon again taking up his residence therein.

1945The supreme court of Arizona, In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368 , 101 P. (2d) 790 , held that a member of the bar of that state who left Arizona prior to the enactment of the state bar act (the statute being very similar to our own) and thereafter returned to Arizona was entitled to resume the practice of law in that state upon again taking up his residence therein.