44 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1967–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Colsongreen2 sentences2018This court has distinguished "between offenses which manifestly involve moral turpitude by virtue of their underlying elements, and those which do not." In re Colson , 412 A.2d 1160 , 1164 (D.C. 1979). 1979See 412 A.2d at 1164-1169 . [*] Judge Yeagley was an Associate Judge of this court at the time of oral argument; his status changed to Associate Judge, Retired, on April 20, 1979. [1] Section 2503(a) mandates disbarment of a lawyer so convicted and the record reflects that subsequent to this enactment the member of the bar here pleaded guilty to the charge of "obstructing justice in connection with the criminal prosecution" of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 . [1] As the dissenting opinion points out, this court was created under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. | 4 | 6 |
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Weinsteingreen2 sentences2005Id. at 797 (citing In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970) (other citations omitted)). 21 . 2005Id. at 797 (citing In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970) (other citations omitted)). 21 . | 2 | 2 |
Purcell v. District Attorney for Suffolk Districtgreen2 sentences2022The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged this in Purcell v. District Attorney for Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436, 441 (Mass. 1997), 35 where the appellant informed a legal aid attorney of “his intention to commit arson.” The court concluded that the privilege applied to the communication because it was undisputed that “[the appellant] consulted [the lawyer] concerning his impending eviction,” the lawyer “is a member of the bar, and [the appellant] either was or sought to become [the lawyer’s] client.” Id. (“This is not a case in which our traditional view that testimonial privil 2022The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged this in Purcell v. District Attorney for Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436, 441 (Mass. 1997), 35 where the appellant informed a legal aid attorney of “his intention to commit arson.” The court concluded that the privilege applied to the communication because it was undisputed that “[the appellant] consulted [the lawyer] concerning his impending eviction,” the lawyer “is a member of the bar, and [the appellant] either was or sought to become [the lawyer’s] client.” Id. (“This is not a case in which our traditional view that testimonial privil | 1 | 1 |
In Re Corizzigreen1 sentence2022We clarified, however, that a “lawyer need not actually be convicted of a crime of moral turpitude in order to be disbarred on the basis of the underlying conduct.” In re Corizzi, 803 A.2d at 442 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Spiridongreen2 sentences2018Code § 11-2503 (a) (2012 Repl.) provides that “[w]hen a member of the bar . . . is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, . . . [his] name . . . shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member.” “Whether [respondent’s] offense constitute[d] moral turpitude within the meaning of the statute is a question of law . . . committed to this court[’s judgment].” In re Spiridon, 755 A.2d 463, 468 (D.C. 2000). 2018Code § 11-2503 (a) (2012 Repl.) provides that "[w]hen a member of the bar ... is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, ... [his] name ... shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and such person shall thereafter cease to be a member." "Whether [respondent's] offense constitute[d] moral turpitude within the meaning of the statute is a question of law ... committed to this court['s judgment]." In re Spiridon , 755 A.2d 463 , 468 (D.C. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Discipline of Scallengreen2 sentences2013In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn.1978), was a disciplinary proceeding brought against a member of the bar of Minnesota on the basis of his 1973 conviction in Canada of “theft and publishing and circulating a false prospectus.” As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted: “[I]t is undisputed that when Scallen was convicted [by the Canadian court] there was nothing in either the [Minnesota] Code of Professional Responsibility or [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] rules governing disciplinary proceedings which was specifically addressed to criminal convictions in other countries.” Id. at 839 . 23 T 2013In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn.1978), was a disciplinary proceeding brought against a member of the bar of Minnesota on the basis of his 1973 conviction in Canada of “theft and publishing and circulating a false prospectus.” As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted: “[I]t is undisputed that when Scallen was convicted [by the Canadian court] there was nothing in either the [Minnesota] Code of Professional Responsibility or [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] rules governing disciplinary proceedings which was specifically addressed to criminal convictions in other countries.” Id. at 839 . 23 T | 1 | 1 |
In Re Richardsongreen1 sentence2010In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427, 430 (D.C.1997). 6 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Untalangreen1 sentence2010“As the term is applied in our disciplinary cases, moral turpitude has been held to include acts of intentional dishonesty for personal gain.” Id.; see also In re Untalan, 619 A.2d 978, 979 (D.C.1993) (per curiam) (“Our prior cases hold that crimes involving theft or fraud generally have been found to be crimes of moral turpitude.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Berrymangreen2 sentences2010We hold no more; no less. [1] In Addams , this court held that "[w]hen a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbarment should ordinarily follow as a matter of course." Addams, 579 A.2d at 193 . [2] See In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing that "[o]ur misappropriation rule `does not require scienter; rather, it is essentially a per se offense'") (citation omitted). [3] If the panel majority's opinion represents only a fact-specific holding (see footnote 13, supra ), then the sanction it impose 2010See In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C.2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing that "[o]ur misappropriation rule 'does not require scienter; rather, it is essentially a per se offense' ") (citation omitted). . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Cleaver-Bascombegreen1 sentence2010We hold no more; no less. [1] In Addams , this court held that "[w]hen a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbarment should ordinarily follow as a matter of course." Addams, 579 A.2d at 193 . [2] See In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing that "[o]ur misappropriation rule `does not require scienter; rather, it is essentially a per se offense'") (citation omitted). [3] If the panel majority's opinion represents only a fact-specific holding (see footnote 13, supra ), then the sanction it impose | 1 | 1 |
In Re Sneedgreen1 sentence2010D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) says that “when a member of our bar has been ‘convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude,’ that attorney must be disbarred.” In re Sneed, 673 A.2d 591, 594 (D.C.1996). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Templegreen2 sentences2010In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C.1993). 2010In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethicsgreen1 sentence2005See Saboorian, supra note 1, 770 A.2d at 79. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. United Shoe MacHinery Corporationgreen1 sentence2003For another formulation of the attorney-client privilege, see United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358-359 (D.Mass.1950) (Wyzanski, J.): The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of sec | 1 | 1 |
In Re McBridegreen2 sentences2002In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1993); see also, e.g., In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1992) (en banc). [2] By contrast, the same section states that, "[u]pon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment" (emphasis added). 2002In re Hopmayer, 625 A.2d 290, 292 (D.C.1993); see also, e.g., In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C.1992) (en banc). 2 By contrast, the same section states that, “[u]pon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment” (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Meyersongreen2 sentences2002Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment. [2] In McBride , on the other hand, we recognized that the statutory language (specifically the word "thereafter") was ambiguous with respect to the length of disbarment, 602 A.2d at 637-38 , and applying by analogy the rule of lenity in criminal cases, we interpreted that ambiguity to mean that an attorney disbarred under the statute, "like all others who have been disbarred, [is] entitled to petition for reinstatement ... after five years of disbarment." Id. at 641 . [3] The court 2002Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment. [2] In McBride , on the other hand, we recognized that the statutory language (specifically the word "thereafter") was ambiguous with respect to the length of disbarment, 602 A.2d at 637-38 , and applying by analogy the rule of lenity in criminal cases, we interpreted that ambiguity to mean that an attorney disbarred under the statute, "like all others who have been disbarred, [is] entitled to petition for reinstatement ... after five years of disbarment." Id. at 641 . [3] The court | 1 | 1 |
In Re Clearygreen1 sentence2002Taking both California proceedings into consideration, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommends that virtually identical reciprocal discipline be imposed, and that respondent be suspended for a period of five years with the requirement that she prove fitness before being reinstated. 1 See In re Cleary, 777 A.2d 786, 787 (D.C.2001); In re Wechsler, 719 A.2d 100 , (D.C.1998). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Gandygreen1 sentence2002Inc., 450 A.2d 896, 896 (D.C.1982) (Newman, C.J., dissenting), nor do we think that a member of the bar acting as an officer of the court should have continued to prosecute this appeal. | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Hopmayergreen | 1 | 1 |
In Re Banksgreen2 sentences2002In re Banks, 561 A.2d 158, 163 (D.C.1987) (Banks I). 2 Accordingly, the judge enjoined Banks, among other things, from: (1)Representing any person, other than himself, or any corporation, association, partnership, organization, or other entity in any court in the District of Columbia unless he is a member of the bar of the court in which such representation takes place; (2) Using ... any ... term or description which reasonably denotes that [he] is licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia; (3) Using ... any ... term or description ... which reasonably denotes that [his] former empl 2002In re Banks, 561 A.2d 158, 163 (D.C.1987) (Banks I). 2 Accordingly, the judge enjoined Banks, among other things, from: (1)Representing any person, other than himself, or any corporation, association, partnership, organization, or other entity in any court in the District of Columbia unless he is a member of the bar of the court in which such representation takes place; (2) Using ... any ... term or description which reasonably denotes that [he] is licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia; (3) Using ... any ... term or description ... which reasonably denotes that [his] former empl | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Hopkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Solerwitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Rosenbleetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Sealed Casegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Roundtreegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re O'Haragreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Oxmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacKinnon v. Ferbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Addams
green
2 sentences2010We hold no more; no less. [1] In Addams , this court held that "[w]hen a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbarment should ordinarily follow as a matter of course." Addams, 579 A.2d at 193 . [2] See In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing that "[o]ur misappropriation rule `does not require scienter; rather, it is essentially a per se offense'") (citation omitted). [3] If the panel majority's opinion represents only a fact-specific holding (see footnote 13, supra ), then the sanction it impose 2010In Addams , this court held that "[w]hen a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbannent should ordinarily follow as a matter of course.” Addams, 579 A.2d at 193 . . | 2 | 2007–2010 |
Atlantic City Electric Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 797 (citing In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970) (other citations omitted)). 21 . 1986In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392, 394 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970); see also In re O’Hara, 63 A.D.2d 500, 501 , 408 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (1978) (per curiam); In re Oxman, 437 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa.1981). 2 We might hold differently if respondent had shown that the undue delay impaired his defense. | 2 | 1986–2005 |
Emerson Electric Co. v. Fulton
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 797 (citing In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970) (other citations omitted)). 21 . 1986In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392, 394 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970); see also In re O’Hara, 63 A.D.2d 500, 501 , 408 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (1978) (per curiam); In re Oxman, 437 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa.1981). 2 We might hold differently if respondent had shown that the undue delay impaired his defense. | 2 | 1986–2005 |
In Re Ruffalo
green
2 sentences1997In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1225-1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). 1997In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 , 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1225-1226 , 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). | 2 | 1995–1997 |
In Re Cleaver-Bascombe
green
1 sentence2011As such, “we are always mindful that the solemn obligation and responsibility for determining and imposing disciplinary sanctions on a member of our bar rest upon this court.” Cleaver-Bascombe II, 986 A.2d at 1195 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
In re Uscinski
neutral
2 sentences2009The New York Court also ordered that respondent "(1) refrain[] from practicing or attempting to practice law, (2) fully compl[y] with this opinion and order and with the terms and provisions of the written rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended, and resigned attorneys, (3) compl[y] with the continuing legal education requirements ..., and (4) otherwise properly conduct[] himself.” Uscinski, supra, 36 A.D.3d at 310-11 , 826 N.Y.S.2d 375 (citations omitted). 9 .Section 1 l-2503(a) provides that "[w]hen a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of 2009The New York Court also ordered that respondent "(1) refrain[] from practicing or attempting to practice law, (2) fully compl[y] with this opinion and order and with the terms and provisions of the written rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended, and resigned attorneys, (3) compl[y] with the continuing legal education requirements ..., and (4) otherwise properly conduct[] himself.” Uscinski, supra, 36 A.D.3d at 310-11 , 826 N.Y.S.2d 375 (citations omitted). 9 .Section 1 l-2503(a) provides that "[w]hen a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Bielec
green
2 sentences2006In In re Bielec, 755 A.2d 1018 (D.C.2000), we said that due process “includes fair notice of the charges” against a member of the bar. 2006Id. at 1024 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Schlemmer
green
1 sentence2005Based upon our review of the record and the cases cited by the Board in its Order, we are satisfied that the Board followed our remand directions to give “reasoned consideration to such admonitions that are brought to its attention, in order to avoid inconsistent dispositions for similar conduct.” 5 Schlemmer I, 840 A.2d at 664 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In re Ponds
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 797 (citing In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392 , 459 P.2d 548, 549 (1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 , 90 S.Ct. 1689 , 26 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970) (other citations omitted)). 21 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Marshall
green
1 sentence2004Id. at 536 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| In Re Wechsler green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Matter of Milton
green
1 sentence2002If a member of our bar can be automatically disbarred for stealing more than $100 from the government, see In re Milton, 642 A.2d 839 (D.C.1994) (per cu-riam)(violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft of more than $100 from the United States government) is moral turpitude per se), we see no reason why a lawyer should not receive the same sanction for unlawfully taking or transmitting his or her country’s national defense secrets. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| In Re Snyder green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Ball green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Franey v. United States green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Towles v. United States green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| In Re a Member of the State Bar of Arizona, Moore green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Barrett green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Matter of Hunt green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. David R. Schrimsher, in Re Charles D. Butts, Attorney at Law green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Ford green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In re Hunt green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Slodov v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Shelton v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Faretta v. California green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| McKinney v. State Bar green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Sodikoff v. State Bar green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Boone v. Boone green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Mazur v. Lazarus green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Brown v. Brown green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Kirk v. Kirk green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| cluster 267062 green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Randall v. Commissioner green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| District of Columbia ex rel. Capital Lighting & Supply Inc. v. Merando Inc. green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Krum v. Michigan green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.