92 California opinions name it 4 courts 1930–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cosenza v. Kramergreen2 sentences2008It is sufficient for our purposes to remind counsel that, when representing a client with a history of avoiding his obligations, it is important to remember that “[a]n attorney in a civil case is not a hired gun required to carry out every direction given by the client. [Citation.] As a professional, counsel has a professional responsibility not to pursue an appeal that is frivolous or taken for the purpose of delay, just because the client instructs him or her to do so. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, the high ethical and professional standards of a member of the bar and an officer of t 2008It is sufficient for our purposes to remind counsel that, when representing a client with a history of avoiding his obligations, it is important to remember that “[a]n attorney in a civil case is not a hired gun required to carry out every direction given by the client. [Citation.] As a professional, counsel has a professional responsibility not to pursue an appeal that is frivolous or taken for the purpose of delay, just because the client instructs him or her to do so. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, the high ethical and professional standards of a member of the bar and an officer of t | 4 | 5 |
In Re Andreanigreen2 sentences1987(Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 731 .) “ ‘Rehabilitation ... is a “state of mind” and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the opportunity to serve, one who has achieved “reformation and regeneration.” (In re Gaffney (1946) 28 Cal.2d 761, 764 [ 171 P.2d 873 ]; In re Andreani (1939) 14 Cal.2d 736, 749 [ 97 P.2d 456 ].)’ ” (Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 732 , Resner v. State Bar (1967) 67 Cal.2d 799, 811 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 740 , 433 1987(Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 731 .) “ ‘Rehabilitation ... is a “state of mind” and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the opportunity to serve, one who has achieved “reformation and regeneration.” (In re Gaffney (1946) 28 Cal.2d 761, 764 [ 171 P.2d 873 ]; In re Andreani (1939) 14 Cal.2d 736, 749 [ 97 P.2d 456 ].)’ ” (Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 732 , Resner v. State Bar (1967) 67 Cal.2d 799, 811 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 740 , 433 | 4 | 4 |
Smith v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1979In Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 561 [ 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] we emphasized the importance of the attorney-client relationship: "it involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. 1979In Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 561 [ 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 440 P.2d 65 ] we emphasized the importance of the attorney-client relationship: "it involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. | 3 | 3 |
McKinney v. State Bargreen2 sentences1976(See Cutler v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 241, 252-253 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 455 P.2d 108 ]; McKinney v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 194, 196 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 665 , 397 P.2d 425 ].) “An attorney’s practice of deceit involves moral turpitude.” (Cutler v. State Bar, supra; in accord, Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ].) Discipline Segretti, as we have seen, engaged in gross misconduct over a period of several months. 1976(See Cutler v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 241, 252-253 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 455 P.2d 108 ]; McKinney v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 194, 196 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 665 , 397 P.2d 425 ].) “An attorney’s practice of deceit involves moral turpitude.” (Cutler v. State Bar, supra; in accord, Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ].) Discipline Segretti, as we have seen, engaged in gross misconduct over a period of several months. | 3 | 3 |
Cutler v. State Bargreen2 sentences1976(See Cutler v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 241, 252-253 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 455 P.2d 108 ]; McKinney v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 194, 196 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 665 , 397 P.2d 425 ].) “An attorney’s practice of deceit involves moral turpitude.” (Cutler v. State Bar, supra; in accord, Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ].) Discipline Segretti, as we have seen, engaged in gross misconduct over a period of several months. 1976(See Cutler v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 241, 252-253 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 455 P.2d 108 ]; McKinney v. State Bar (1964) 62 Cal.2d 194, 196 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 665 , 397 P.2d 425 ].) “An attorney’s practice of deceit involves moral turpitude.” (Cutler v. State Bar, supra; in accord, Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ].) Discipline Segretti, as we have seen, engaged in gross misconduct over a period of several months. | 3 | 3 |
Trusty v. State Bargreen2 sentences1944I have heretofore stated my *141 position on this proposition and I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinions in the cases of Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [ 107 P.2d 10 ], and In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 612 [ 107 P.2d 258 ]. 1944I have heretofore stated my *141 position on this proposition and I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinions in the cases of Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [ 107 P.2d 10 ], and In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 612 [ 107 P.2d 258 ]. | 2 | 3 |
In Re McKennagreen2 sentences1944I have heretofore stated my *141 position on this proposition and I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinions in the cases of Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [ 107 P.2d 10 ], and In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 612 [ 107 P.2d 258 ]. 1944I have heretofore stated my *141 position on this proposition and I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinions in the cases of Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [ 107 P.2d 10 ], and In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 612 [ 107 P.2d 258 ]. | 2 | 3 |
Pickering v. State Bargreen2 sentences2025(Lady v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497, 504 ; see Pickering v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [Business and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. or harmed]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172, 178 [no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts].) Our independent findings mirror the facts the hearing judge found to support culpability under count one. 1946(Pickering v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [ 148 P.2d 1 ]; Utz v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 100, 105 [ 130 P.2d 377 ].) [2b] It is our conclusion that under the circumstances petitioner should be disciplined by a public reprimand and this opinion shall constitute such reprimand. | 2 | 2 |
Gordon v. Justice Courtgreen2 sentences1992(See, e.g., People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667-668 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ] [legal and practical reasons supporting rule withholding collateral estoppel effect from magistrate’s order dismissing criminal action].) Indeed, as Uhlemann observes, at the time section 1538.5, subdivision (d), was drafted, a magistrate was not required to be a member of the bar to qualify for that position, and his rulings were subject to relitigation in superior court. (9 Cal.3d. at pp. 667-668; see Gordon v. Justice Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 323, 326, & fn. 2 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 632 , 525 P.2d 72 , 7 1992(See, e.g., People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667-668 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ] [legal and practical reasons supporting rule withholding collateral estoppel effect from magistrate’s order dismissing criminal action].) Indeed, as Uhlemann observes, at the time section 1538.5, subdivision (d), was drafted, a magistrate was not required to be a member of the bar to qualify for that position, and his rulings were subject to relitigation in superior court. (9 Cal.3d. at pp. 667-668; see Gordon v. Justice Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 323, 326, & fn. 2 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 632 , 525 P.2d 72 , 7 | 2 | 2 |
Maxwell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client’s life or liberty.’ [Citation.]” (Boulas v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 430 ; see also Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 613 .) Here the trial court prematurely granted the motion to recuse counsel. 1988This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client's life or liberty.' [Citation.]" ( Boulas v. Superior Court, supra, 188 Cal. App.3d at p. 430 ; see also Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 613 .) Here the trial court prematurely granted the motion to recuse counsel. | 2 | 2 |
Resner v. State Bargreen2 sentences1987(Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 731 .) “ ‘Rehabilitation ... is a “state of mind” and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the opportunity to serve, one who has achieved “reformation and regeneration.” (In re Gaffney (1946) 28 Cal.2d 761, 764 [ 171 P.2d 873 ]; In re Andreani (1939) 14 Cal.2d 736, 749 [ 97 P.2d 456 ].)’ ” (Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 732 , Resner v. State Bar (1967) 67 Cal.2d 799, 811 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 740 , 433 1987(Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 731 .) “ ‘Rehabilitation ... is a “state of mind” and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the opportunity to serve, one who has achieved “reformation and regeneration.” (In re Gaffney (1946) 28 Cal.2d 761, 764 [ 171 P.2d 873 ]; In re Andreani (1939) 14 Cal.2d 736, 749 [ 97 P.2d 456 ].)’ ” (Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 732 , Resner v. State Bar (1967) 67 Cal.2d 799, 811 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 740 , 433 | 2 | 2 |
In Re Gaffneygreen2 sentences1987(Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 731 .) “ ‘Rehabilitation ... is a “state of mind” and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the opportunity to serve, one who has achieved “reformation and regeneration.” (In re Gaffney (1946) 28 Cal.2d 761, 764 [ 171 P.2d 873 ]; In re Andreani (1939) 14 Cal.2d 736, 749 [ 97 P.2d 456 ].)’ ” (Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 732 , Resner v. State Bar (1967) 67 Cal.2d 799, 811 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 740 , 433 1987(Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 731 .) “ ‘Rehabilitation ... is a “state of mind” and the law looks with favor upon rewarding with the opportunity to serve, one who has achieved “reformation and regeneration.” (In re Gaffney (1946) 28 Cal.2d 761, 764 [ 171 P.2d 873 ]; In re Andreani (1939) 14 Cal.2d 736, 749 [ 97 P.2d 456 ].)’ ” (Hightower v. State Bar, supra, 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 ; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, supra, 67 Cal.2d 718, 732 , Resner v. State Bar (1967) 67 Cal.2d 799, 811 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 740 , 433 | 2 | 2 |
Petersen v. State Bargreen2 sentences1987We have previously held, however, “that participation by two members of a three-member panel constitutes a valid hearing for purposes of disciplinary action against a member of the bar.” (Baranowski v. State Bar (1979) 24 Cal.3d 153, 165 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 593 P.2d 613 ]; Petersen v. State Bar (1943) 21 Cal.2d 866, 870-871 [ 136 P.2d 561 ]; see also Code Civ. 1987We have previously held, however, “that participation by two members of a three-member panel constitutes a valid hearing for purposes of disciplinary action against a member of the bar.” (Baranowski v. State Bar (1979) 24 Cal.3d 153, 165 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 752 , 593 P.2d 613 ]; Petersen v. State Bar (1943) 21 Cal.2d 866, 870-871 [ 136 P.2d 561 ]; see also Code Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Barreiro v. State Bargreen2 sentences1983(Rule 562, Rules Proc. of State Bar.) As we observed in Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 447 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ], “A member of the bar has a duty to present any evidence he deems favorable to himself and a failure to do so may justify a denial of a motion for a rehearing for the purpose of presenting additional evidence.” (See also Barreiro v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912, 925 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 192 , 471 P.2d 992 ].) *43 Petitioner’s hearings were conducted over a period of several months. 1983(Rule 562, Rules Proc. of State Bar.) As we observed in Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 447 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ], “A member of the bar has a duty to present any evidence he deems favorable to himself and a failure to do so may justify a denial of a motion for a rehearing for the purpose of presenting additional evidence.” (See also Barreiro v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912, 925 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 192 , 471 P.2d 992 ].) *43 Petitioner’s hearings were conducted over a period of several months. | 2 | 2 |
Lewis v. State Bargreen2 sentences1974(Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713-714 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ]; Bernstein v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d 909, 916 ; Eschwig v. State Bar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 8, 18 .) A member of the State Bar has an obligation to appear at his disciplinary hearing and the hearing can properly proceed in his absence. (§ 6111; rule 32, Rules of Proc. of the State Bar; see Alkow v. State Bar (1971) 3 Cal.3d 924, 933-934 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 278 , 479 P.2d 638 ]; Wilson v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 509, 510-511 [ 326 P.2d 849 ].) A member of the bar has a duty to present any evidence he deems favora 1974(Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713-714 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ]; Bernstein v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d 909, 916 ; Eschwig v. State Bar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 8, 18 .) A member of the State Bar has an obligation to appear at his disciplinary hearing and the hearing can properly proceed in his absence. (§ 6111; rule 32, Rules of Proc. of the State Bar; see Alkow v. State Bar (1971) 3 Cal.3d 924, 933-934 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 278 , 479 P.2d 638 ]; Wilson v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 509, 510-511 [ 326 P.2d 849 ].) A member of the bar has a duty to present any evidence he deems favora | 2 | 2 |
March v. Committee of Bar Examinersgreen2 sentences1989(Ibid.; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1967) 67 Cal.2d. 718, 731 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 399 , 433 P.2d 191 ].) In making this determination we give great weight to both the hearing panel’s factual findings and the review department’s recommendation. 1989(Ibid.; March v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1967) 67 Cal.2d. 718, 731 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 399 , 433 P.2d 191 ].) In making this determination we give great weight to both the hearing panel’s factual findings and the review department’s recommendation. | 1 | 3 |
Wheat v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023(See Wheat v. United States (1988) 486 U.S. 153 , 162–163 [a defendant has the right to assistance of counsel free of actual conflicts]; Strickland v. 15 Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 .) To determine the existence of a disabling conflict, the court must acknowledge that a defendant’s relationship with counsel “involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. 2014Therefore, at a minimum, “Regardless of his persuasive powers, an advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent clients (other than himself) in court. [Fn. omitted.]” (Wheat v. United States, supra, 486 U.S. 153, 159 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 149 ].) Another limitation on the right to counsel of one’s choice is reflected in the differential treatment of retained, as opposed to appointed, counsel. | 1 | 2 |
Hightower v. State Bargreen2 sentences1989Discussion “The fundamental question [is] whether petitioner is a fit and proper person to be permitted to practice, and that question usually turns upon whether he committed or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude.” (Hightower v. State Bar (1983) 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 153 , 666 P.2d 10 ].) When the applicant has previously committed acts of moral turpitude, he must demonstrate that he is rehabilitated and currently possesses the moral qualifications to be a member of the bar. 1989Discussion “The fundamental question [is] whether petitioner is a fit and proper person to be permitted to practice, and that question usually turns upon whether he committed or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude.” (Hightower v. State Bar (1983) 34 Cal.3d 150, 157 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 153 , 666 P.2d 10 ].) When the applicant has previously committed acts of moral turpitude, he must demonstrate that he is rehabilitated and currently possesses the moral qualifications to be a member of the bar. | 1 | 2 |
Bernstein v. State Bargreen2 sentences1987(Tarver v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 688 P.2d 911 ]; Chefsky v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 116, 132 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 349 , 680 P.2d 82 ].) It is clear that petitioner violated the standards of conduct for a member of the bar and rule 8-101 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by commingling his funds with those of his client (Jackson v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal.3d 372, 382 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 540 P.2d 25 ]), allowing his trust account balance to decline to zero while funds were still owing to his client (Giovanazzi v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 465, 474 [ 169 Ca 1987(Tarver v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 122, 132 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 688 P.2d 911 ]; Chefsky v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 116, 132 [ 202 Cal.Rptr. 349 , 680 P.2d 82 ].) It is clear that petitioner violated the standards of conduct for a member of the bar and rule 8-101 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by commingling his funds with those of his client (Jackson v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal.3d 372, 382 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 185 , 540 P.2d 25 ]), allowing his trust account balance to decline to zero while funds were still owing to his client (Giovanazzi v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 465, 474 [ 169 Ca | 1 | 2 |
Alkow v. State Bargreen2 sentences1974(Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713-714 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ]; Bernstein v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d 909, 916 ; Eschwig v. State Bar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 8, 18 .) A member of the State Bar has an obligation to appear at his disciplinary hearing and the hearing can properly proceed in his absence. (§ 6111; rule 32, Rules of Proc. of the State Bar; see Alkow v. State Bar (1971) 3 Cal.3d 924, 933-934 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 278 , 479 P.2d 638 ]; Wilson v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 509, 510-511 [ 326 P.2d 849 ].) A member of the bar has a duty to present any evidence he deems favora 1974(Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 713-714 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 511 P.2d 1173 ]; Bernstein v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d 909, 916 ; Eschwig v. State Bar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 8, 18 .) A member of the State Bar has an obligation to appear at his disciplinary hearing and the hearing can properly proceed in his absence. (§ 6111; rule 32, Rules of Proc. of the State Bar; see Alkow v. State Bar (1971) 3 Cal.3d 924, 933-934 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 278 , 479 P.2d 638 ]; Wilson v. State Bar (1958) 50 Cal.2d 509, 510-511 [ 326 P.2d 849 ].) A member of the bar has a duty to present any evidence he deems favora | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Gordon J.green | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. State Bargreen1 sentence2025(Lady v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497, 504 ; see Pickering v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [Business and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. or harmed]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172, 178 [no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts].) Our independent findings mirror the facts the hearing judge found to support culpability under count one. | 1 | 1 |
| Ramirez v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Uber Techs., Inc. v. Google LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Carsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Slobodiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Jordangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Humphreygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pearlin v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donald E. Mortell v. Mortell Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Elconin v. Yalengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Seide v. Committee of Bar Examinersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Atherton v. Board of Supervisorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Uhlemanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Strickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Koven
green
2 sentences2021Nevertheless, we do not purge Koven of the contempts . . . .” (In re Koven, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) Unlike the Koven court, which dealt with an attorney who had conceded her statements were “both improper and inexcusable on their face,” and who “apologizes for the improper statements in the petitions, [and] expresses deep regret for impugning the [integrity of this] Court, and accepts the embarrassment she has brought upon herself,” (id. at p. 264) we are confronted with a member of the bar who, after 52 years of practice, believes this is legitimate argument. 2021Nevertheless, we do not purge Koven of the contempts . . . .” (In re Koven, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 .) Unlike the Koven court, which dealt with an attorney who had conceded her statements were “both improper and inexcusable on their face,” and who “apologizes for the improper statements in the petitions, [and] expresses deep regret for impugning the [integrity of this] Court, and accepts the embarrassment she has brought upon herself,” (id. at p. 264) we are confronted with a member of the bar who, after 52 years of practice, believes this is legitimate argument. | 3 | 2021–2024 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1979Even this exception, however, is carefully qualified: the applicant must (1) be a member of the bar of a federal court or the highest court of another state or a possession of the United States, and (2) not be a resident of California or "regularly engaged in substantial business, professional, or other activities in the State of California." Further, "Absent special circumstances, repeated appearances ... shall be a cause for denial of an application." ( Id., subd. (a).) (Compare Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ] [rule in criminal cases].) [13] Moreo 1979Even this exception, however, is carefully qualified: the applicant must (1) be a member of the bar of a federal court or the highest court of another state or a possession of the United States, and (2) not be a resident of California or "regularly engaged in substantial business, professional, or other activities in the State of California." Further, "Absent special circumstances, repeated appearances ... shall be a cause for denial of an application." ( Id., subd. (a).) (Compare Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ] [rule in criminal cases].) [13] Moreo | 2 | 1979–2025 |
Quintero v. City of Santa Ana
green
2 sentences2009Citing the then recent Court of Appeal decision in Quintero v. City of Santa Ana (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 810 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 ], the Morongo Band asserted that these dual prosecutorial and advisory roles of the enforcement team members had created “an inappropriate and impermissible appearance of unfairness and bias sufficient to compel their removal.” In support of the petition, the Morongo Band submitted a declaration stating that during the pendency of the license revocation proceeding, in which Samantha Olson was acting in a prosecutorial capacity as a member of the enforcement team, she 2009Citing the then recent Court of Appeal decision in Quintero v. City of Santa Ana (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 810 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 896 ], the Morongo Band asserted that these dual prosecutorial and advisory roles of the enforcement team members had created “an inappropriate and impermissible appearance of unfairness and bias sufficient to compel their removal.” In support of the petition, the Morongo Band submitted a declaration stating that during the pendency of the license revocation proceeding, in which Samantha Olson was acting in a prosecutorial capacity as a member of the enforcement team, she | 2 | 2007–2009 |
In Re Mark L.
green
2 sentences2002As such, the commissioner was clothed with "full judicial powers," and her orders were "as final and nonreviewable as those of a permanent judge." ( In re Mark L., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 178 , italics added; see also § 250.) Indeed, just as California law makes a clear distinction between referees and temporary judges, it differentiates between the powers of a superior court commissioner sitting as a temporary judge and those of an ordinary member of the bar sitting as such. 2002As such, the commissioner was clothed with “full judicial powers,” and her orders were “as final and nonreviewable as those of a permanent judge.” (In re Mark L., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 178 , italics added; see also § 250.) Indeed, just as California law makes a clear distinction between referees and temporary judges, it differentiates between the powers of a superior court commissioner sitting as a temporary judge and those of an ordinary member of the bar sitting as such. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
The PEOPLE v. Cox
green
2 sentences1979The intern program requires a degree of supervision far beyond that which a Public Defender would be expected to maintain over his professional staff.” ( 337 So.2d 400, 403 .) In People v. Cox (1957) 12 Ill.2d 265 [ 146 N.E.2d 19 , 68 A.L.R.2d 1134 ], People v. Washington (1976) 87 Misc.2d 103 [ 384 N.Y.S.2d 691 ], and Baker v. State (1912) 9 Okla.Crim. 62 [ 130 P. 820 ], the person who represented the defendant acted without supervision from qualified counsel; moreover, those decisions rest on the fact that defendant did not know that his representative was not a member of the bar. 1979The intern program requires a degree of supervision far beyond that which a Public Defender would be expected to maintain over his professional staff.” ( 337 So.2d 400, 403 .) In People v. Cox (1957) 12 Ill.2d 265 [ 146 N.E.2d 19 , 68 A.L.R.2d 1134 ], People v. Washington (1976) 87 Misc.2d 103 [ 384 N.Y.S.2d 691 ], and Baker v. State (1912) 9 Okla.Crim. 62 [ 130 P. 820 ], the person who represented the defendant acted without supervision from qualified counsel; moreover, those decisions rest on the fact that defendant did not know that his representative was not a member of the bar. | 2 | 1979–1992 |
Baker v. State
green
2 sentences1992Cir.1967) 387 F.2d 203 [ 128 App.D.C. 245 ] [representation by layman, Daniel Jackson Oliver Wendel Homes Morgan, impersonating a member of the bar]; Baker v. State (1912) 9 Okla. 1992Cir. 1967) 387 F.2d 203 [ 128 App.D.C. 245 ] [representation by layman, Daniel Jackson Oliver Wendel Homes Morgan, impersonating a member of the bar]; Baker v. State (1912) 9 Okla. | 2 | 1979–1992 |
In Re Marriage of Gong & Kwong
green
1 sentence2026If the client continues to press the attorney to raise the claim in court, “the high ethical and professional standards of a member of the bar and an officer of the court require the attorney to inform the client that the attorney’s professional responsibility precludes him or her from pursuing such [a claim].” (In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 521 .) Phillips fell far short of his professional duties by filing a petition with a one-document record and a single record citation that makes unsupported accusations against the trial judge. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sarracino v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026VI, § 21), a party in default is not considered a “party litigant.” (See Sarracino v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 1, 10 , fn. omitted [petitioner’s default meant that he “was not a party litigant, and the stipulations executed by the applicants for temporary support were sufficient to empower the commissioner to act as a temporary judge”].) As such, Jose’s consent to the appointment was not required. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Lady v. State Bar
green
1 sentence2025(Lady v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497, 504 ; see Pickering v. State Bar (1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [Business and Professions Code denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived 18 In re BRADSHAW Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. or harmed]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172, 178 [no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts].) Our independent findings mirror the facts the hearing judge found to support culpability under count one. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Yari v. PRODUCERS GUILD OF AMERICA, INC. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Martinez v. O'Hara neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Marriage of Pollard green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Chatman green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re Marriage of Assemi green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Krantz v. Bt Visual Images, L.L.C green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Roldan green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Torres v. Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Haas v. County of San Bernardino green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Mitchell A. KRAMER and David C. Harrison v. SCIENTIFIC CONTROL CORP. Et Al. Appeal of ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re California Micro Devices Securities Litigation green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Hardy v. San Fernando Valley Chamber of Commerce green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Arditto v. Security Pacific National Bank green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Attorney Walter F. KELLY green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Morton M. Hill, Jr. v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Batcheller v. Whittier green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Johnson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Hummel v. First National Bank of Nevada green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Young v. Rosenthal green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Eddie M. Harrison v. United States of America, Orson G. White v. United States green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Nottingham Partners v. Dana green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Friedman v. State Bar green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.