member bar in Pennsylvania

1999Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.): “The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the

1999Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.): “The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the

2026See Yocabet, 119 A.3d at 1027 .

2026The attorney-client privilege applies when the moving party proves the following four elements: 1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client. 2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate. 3) The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client, without the presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter, and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort. 4) The privilege has been claimed and is not w

2022Dages v. Carbon Cnty., 44 A.3d 89, 92 (Pa. Cmwlth 2012). 7 (2.) The communication was made by a member of the bar of a court or his or subordinate, or to such a person by a client.

2018This Court, in Dages v. Carbon County , 44 A.3d 89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), explained: Previously, the following four elements were required to establish the attorney-client privilege: (1) that the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) that the person to whom the communication was made is a member of the bar of a court, or his or her subordinate; (3) that the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by the client, without the presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter;

2023Cal. Univ. of Pa., 168 A.3d at 421 (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Educ. v. Bagwell, 131 A.3d 638, 656 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).

2023Id. at 656 . “[A]fter an agency establishes the privilege was properly invoked under the first three prongs, the party challenging invocation of the privilege must prove waiver under the fourth prong.” Davis, 122 A.3d at 1192 .

1984The controlling definition of the attorney-client privilege was set forth in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C., Mass. 1950): “The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the lawyer was informed (a) by his client, (b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of secur

1984The controlling definition of the attorney-client privilege was set forth in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C., Mass. 1950): “The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the lawyer was informed (a) by his client, (b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of secur

2017Id. at 62-63 (emphases, added; citation omitted). 4 .

2016Red Vision Systems, Inc. [v. National Real Estate Information Services, L.P., 108 A.3d 54 , 62-63 (Pa.Super.2015) ] (citation omitted).

2025Carbis Walker, 930 A.2d at 579 (citation omitted). 15 We reiterate that the record in this case is 2,797 pages with discovery still ongoing.

2011Carbis Walker, LLP v. Hill, Barth and King, LLC, 2007 Pa. Super. 221, ¶ 10 , 930 A.2d 573, 579 (citing Nationwide Mutual Ins.

2025In contrast, an entry that generically states that counsel made a telephone call for a specific amount of time to the client is not information protected by the attorney-client privilege but, instead, is subject to disclosure under the specific provisions of the [RTK Law]. 24 Id. at 373 (citations omitted.) To establish the application of the attorney-client privilege, an agency must demonstrate the following: (1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate; (3) The

2023In contrast, an entry that generically states that counsel made a telephone call for a specific amount of time to the client is not information protected by the attorney-client privilege but, instead, is subject to disclosure under the specific provisions of the RTKL. the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.”). 11 Levy II, 65 A.3d at 373 (internal citation omitted).15 To establish the application of the attorney-client privilege, an agency must demonstrate the following: (1) The asserted holder of the privilege i

1987See Brennan v. Brennan, supra; Loutzenhiser v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512 , 260 A.2d 745 (1970); Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa. 420 , 105 A.2d 122 (1954); Nadler v. Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139 , 184 Atl. 3 (1936); Cridge’s Estate, 289 Pa. 331 , 137 Atl. 455 (1927); Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195 , 97 Atl. 1063 (1916); Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336 , 28 Atl. 781 (1894); Commonwealth v. Trolene, 263 Pa. Super. 263 , 397 A.2d 1200, 1204-5 (1979); Zimmerman v. Berrie, 10 D.&C.3d 110 (1979); Trzesniowski v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 59 D.&C.2d 44 (1973); and In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts L

1981See Brennan v. Brennan, supra; Com. v. Trolene, 263 Pa. Superior Ct. 263, 270-272 , 397 A. 2d 1200, 1204-5 (1979); Nadler v. Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139 , 184 Atl. 3 (1936); Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195 , 97 Atl. 1063 (1916); Cridge’s Estate, 289 Pa. 331 , 137 Atl. 455 (1927); Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336 , 28 Atl. 781 (1894); Loutzenhiser v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512 , 260 A. 2d 745 (1970); Tracy v. Tracy, 377Pa. 420, 105 A. 2d 122 (1954); In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 47, 56-7 (W.D.

1987See Brennan v. Brennan, supra; Loutzenhiser v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512 , 260 A.2d 745 (1970); Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa. 420 , 105 A.2d 122 (1954); Nadler v. Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139 , 184 Atl. 3 (1936); Cridge’s Estate, 289 Pa. 331 , 137 Atl. 455 (1927); Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195 , 97 Atl. 1063 (1916); Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336 , 28 Atl. 781 (1894); Commonwealth v. Trolene, 263 Pa. Super. 263 , 397 A.2d 1200, 1204-5 (1979); Zimmerman v. Berrie, 10 D.&C.3d 110 (1979); Trzesniowski v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 59 D.&C.2d 44 (1973); and In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts L

1987See Brennan v. Brennan, supra; Loutzenhiser v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512 , 260 A.2d 745 (1970); Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa. 420 , 105 A.2d 122 (1954); Nadler v. Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139 , 184 Atl. 3 (1936); Cridge’s Estate, 289 Pa. 331 , 137 Atl. 455 (1927); Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195 , 97 Atl. 1063 (1916); Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336 , 28 Atl. 781 (1894); Commonwealth v. Trolene, 263 Pa. Super. 263 , 397 A.2d 1200, 1204-5 (1979); Zimmerman v. Berrie, 10 D.&C.3d 110 (1979); Trzesniowski v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 59 D.&C.2d 44 (1973); and In Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts L

1980In Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Ag new, 271 Md. 543, 550 , 318 A. 2d 811, 815 (1974), Judge Digges, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, stated: “The professional ethical obligations of an attorney, as long as he remains a member of the bar, are not affected by a decision to pursue his livelihood by practicing law, entering the business world, becoming a public servant, or embarking upon any other endeavor.

1980In Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Ag new, 271 Md. 543, 550 , 318 A. 2d 811, 815 (1974), Judge Digges, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, stated: “The professional ethical obligations of an attorney, as long as he remains a member of the bar, are not affected by a decision to pursue his livelihood by practicing law, entering the business world, becoming a public servant, or embarking upon any other endeavor.

2014Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9 , 171 A. 883, 885-86 (1934) (emphasis added).

1969While the drafting and execution of legal instruments is a necessary concomitant of many businesses and cannot be considered unlawful, such practices will be prohibited when the documents are drawn in relation to matters in no manner connected with the immediate business of the person preparing them, and when the person so drafting them is not a member of the bar and holds himself out as specially qualified and competent to do that type of work: Childs v. Smeltzer, supra. The primary purpose of the practice of law statute is to protect the public from the injurious consequences of entrusting i

1988In Foley Brothers , although the Supreme Court said that the power to decide after giving consideration to the evidence does not require that the decision-maker be present to receive every word spoken in evidence, the Court significantly also stated: But the important thing is that they who decide must consider all of the evidence, and in the event of a member of the hearing body dying, it should suffice that his successor consider, by reading from, the record what he has not heard, in order to avoid the practical and expensive difficulty of requiring a full rehearing. *590 400 Pa. at 591 , 16

1988In Foley Brothers , although the Supreme Court said that the power to decide after giving consideration to the evidence does not require that the decision-maker be present to receive every word spoken in evidence, the Court significantly also stated: But the important thing is that they who decide must consider all of the evidence, and in the event of a member of the hearing body dying, it should suffice that his successor consider, by reading from, the record what he has not heard, in order to avoid the practical and expensive difficulty of requiring a full rehearing. *590 400 Pa. at 591 , 16

2026See Lehman, 275 A.3d at 525 n.8 (noting that the attorney-client privilege can apply to an attorney licensed to practice in another jurisdiction at the relevant time). - 13 - J-A24002-25 (2) Selection, drafting, or completion of legal documents or agreements which affect the legal rights of an entity or person(s). (3) Representation of another entity or person(s) in a court, or in a formal administrative adjudicative proceeding or other formal dispute resolution process or in an administrative adjudicative proceeding in which legal pleadings are filed or a record is established as the basis fo

2025Lehman, 275 A.3d at 523 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mrozek, 657 A.2d 997, 998 (Pa. Super. 1995)).

2025Of N. Am., LLC., 229 A.3d 984 , 990 n.7 (Pa. Super 2020). 4 The analogous provision for criminal cases is codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5916. - 11 - J-A23040-24 (1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client. (2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of the bar of a court or his subordinate. (3) The communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client, without the presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance in a legal matter, and not for the purpose of committing

2022Ford-Bey, 229 A.3d at 990-91 (citation omitted).4 Establishing that the privilege applies “often entails an affidavit, statement, or testimony clarifying the circumstances under which the communication was made.” Id. at 991 .

2019Id. at 1264 (citations omitted). [Where] the attorney-client privilege has been invoked by a corporate client[,] our Commonwealth Court has previously recognized "this privilege attaches to communications made by corporate as well as individual clients." Maleski v. Corporate Life Insurance Co. , 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 36 , 641 A.2d 1 , 3 (1994) (citing Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) ).

2019Id. at 1264 (citations omitted). [Where] the attorney-client privilege has been invoked by a corporate client[,] our Commonwealth Court has previously recognized "this privilege attaches to communications made by corporate as well as individual clients." Maleski v. Corporate Life Insurance Co. , 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 36 , 641 A.2d 1 , 3 (1994) (citing Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) ).

1977Specter v. Dennis, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 439 , 308 A.2d 915 (1973). 3 The inherent power of the State Supreme Court to supervise the conduct of officers of its judicial system has been recognized in other jurisdictions. 4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the case of In the Matter of DeSaulnier, 274 N.E.2d 454, 456 (1971), found that it *59 had the authority to consider disciplinary action against superior court associate justices: “We now rule that this court has jurisdiction to impose appropriate discipline upon a member of the bar, who is also a judge, for misconduct or acts of impropriet

1973This, we hold, even though, because he is a judge, he is not permitted to engage in the practice of law.” 274 N.E. 2d at 456 .