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23 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1936–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Bradleygreen1 sentence2022Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Bradley, 746 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Okla. 1987) (because of important purpose of regulating attorneys, ‘‘the fact that the plea entered was nolo contendere, and not admissible in a civil action would not preclude it from being admitted as evidence in a proceeding in a disciplinary matter against a member of the bar’’); Turton v. State Bar, 775 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App. 1989, writ denied) (despite rule prohibiting admission of plea of nolo contendere in civil cases against individual who entered plea, rule requiring suspension of attorney’s law license for com- mitting serious | 1 | 1 |
Turton v. State Bar of Texasgreen1 sentence2022Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. Bradley, 746 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Okla. 1987) (because of important purpose of regulating attorneys, ‘‘the fact that the plea entered was nolo contendere, and not admissible in a civil action would not preclude it from being admitted as evidence in a proceeding in a disciplinary matter against a member of the bar’’); Turton v. State Bar, 775 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App. 1989, writ denied) (despite rule prohibiting admission of plea of nolo contendere in civil cases against individual who entered plea, rule requiring suspension of attorney’s law license for com- mitting serious | 1 | 1 |
Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committeegreen2 sentences2014Since the early days of English common law, it has been widely recognized that courts possess the inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys who practice before them and to discipline or disbar such of those attorneys as are guilty of unprofessional conduct.’’ Id., 206; see also Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 234 Conn. 539 , 553–54, 663 A.2d 317 (1995) (‘‘Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regu- late attorney conduct and to discipline the member of the bar’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). 2014Since the early days of English common law, it has been widely recognized that courts possess the inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys who practice before them and to discipline or disbar such of those attorneys as are guilty of unprofessional conduct.’’ Id., 206; see also Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 234 Conn. 539 , 553–54, 663 A.2d 317 (1995) (‘‘Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regu- late attorney conduct and to discipline the member of the bar’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Novakgreen1 sentence2007Although, as the petitioner argues, Practice Book § 2-16 does require that “a member of the bar of this state must be present at all proceedings,” the mere fact that there has been noncompliance with this rule governing pro hac vice practice is not a denial *534 of counsel. 1 “[UJnlike serious substantive defects, mere technical defects need not result in per se [s]ixth [a]mendment violations.” United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 888 (2d Cir. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Parrish Cole v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007In fact, “[o]nly where the attorney has never been admitted to practice before any court at all, and thus should be considered a non-lawyer, have courts found per se violations of the right to counsel.” Cole v. United States, 162 F.3d 957, 958 (7th Cir. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academygreen1 sentence2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). | 1 | 1 |
Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academygreen1 sentence2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). | 1 | 1 |
Chicco v. Starecheskigreen2 sentences2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). 2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). | 1 | 1 |
Ullmann v. Stategreen2 sentences2000Mass. 1950), Judge Wyzanski stated the conditions under which the attorney-client privilege is applicable: "The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to CT Page 4074 become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on l 2000Accordingly it protects only those disclosures — necessary to obtain informed legal advice — which might not have been made absent the privilege." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ullmann v. State , supra, 713. | 1 | 1 |
| BROWN v. McGARRgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Plantamuragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roddy v. Civil Aeronautics Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morrissette v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Application of Plantamuragreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Daviesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cantrell v. California Adult Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bobbitt v. Ellisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garrity v. McCaskey
green
1 sentence2025The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court properly determined that the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evi- dence that the defendant, after serving his maximum term of commitment, presently constitutes a danger to himself or others.3 See, e.g., State v. Torell, 223 Conn. 1 General Statutes § 17a-580 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) ‘Acquittee’ means any person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . .’’ See also State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 405 , 645 A.2d 965 (1994). 2 ‘‘The board is an administrative body | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Metz
green
2 sentences2025The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court properly determined that the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evi- dence that the defendant, after serving his maximum term of commitment, presently constitutes a danger to himself or others.3 See, e.g., State v. Torell, 223 Conn. 1 General Statutes § 17a-580 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) ‘Acquittee’ means any person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . .’’ See also State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 405 , 645 A.2d 965 (1994). 2 ‘‘The board is an administrative body 2025The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the court properly determined that the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evi- dence that the defendant, after serving his maximum term of commitment, presently constitutes a danger to himself or others.3 See, e.g., State v. Torell, 223 Conn. 1 General Statutes § 17a-580 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) ‘Acquittee’ means any person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . .’’ See also State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 405 , 645 A.2d 965 (1994). 2 ‘‘The board is an administrative body | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Watkins v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2010In resolving the issue, the court properly observed that the plaintiff is not a member of the bar and that courts are to be solicitous of pro se parties. “[Although we are solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants . . . [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules . . . and procedure as those qualified to practice law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Watkins v. Thomas, 118 Conn. App. 452, 456 , 984 A.2d 106 (2009). 2010In resolving the issue, the court properly observed that the plaintiff is not a member of the bar and that courts are to be solicitous of pro se parties. “[Although we are solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants . . . [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules . . . and procedure as those qualified to practice law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Watkins v. Thomas, 118 Conn. App. 452, 456 , 984 A.2d 106 (2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Keehan
green
2 sentences2010For example, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Keehan, 311 Md. 161, 165 , 533 A.2d 278 (1987), the Court of Appeals of Maryland construed a rule that allowed a member of the bar of another state to seek admission to the Maryland bar if "for at least five of the seven years immediately preceding the filing of his petition [the petitioner] has been regularly engaged ... as a practitioner of law...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The rules defined "practitioner of law" as "a member of the [b]ar of another [s]tate ... who throughout the period specified in the petition has regularly engage 2010For example, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Keehan, 311 Md. 161, 165 , 533 A.2d 278 (1987), the Court of Appeals of Maryland construed a rule that allowed a member of the bar of another state to seek admission to the Maryland bar if "for at least five of the seven years immediately preceding the filing of his petition [the petitioner] has been regularly engaged ... as a practitioner of law...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The rules defined "practitioner of law" as "a member of the [b]ar of another [s]tate ... who throughout the period specified in the petition has regularly engage | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Abrams v. Lamone
green
2 sentences2010Given the [a]ttorney [g]eneral's responsibility for litigation and transactions on behalf of the [s]tate in state courts, coupled with his or her administrative duties, it was quite logical for the framers to require that candidates for the office of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral to have practiced law in the [s]tate for ten years, thereby ensuring that they are conversant and familiar with Maryland law and its practice." Id., at 206-207 , 919 A.2d 1223 . 2010Given the [a]ttorney [g]eneral's responsibility for litigation and transactions on behalf of the [s]tate in state courts, coupled with his or her administrative duties, it was quite logical for the framers to require that candidates for the office of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral to have practiced law in the [s]tate for ten years, thereby ensuring that they are conversant and familiar with Maryland law and its practice." Id., at 206-207 , 919 A.2d 1223 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Jarmuth
green
1 sentence2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gasser v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Face v. National Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n
green
1 sentence2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Gasser
green
2 sentences2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied 2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Presnick v. Goldblatt
green
1 sentence2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Figueroa v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence2007In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 “Practice Book § 2-16 [also] provides in relevant part: An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state . . . may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court, to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe in the presentation of a cause or appeal in any court of this state . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gasser, 74 Conn. App. 527 , 529 n.4, 812 A.2d 188 , cert. denied | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill
green
2 sentences2005In reaching this conclusion, he relied on the definition of justiciability set forth in Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, 245 Conn. 88 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). 2005In reaching this conclusion, he relied on the definition of justiciability set forth in Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O’Neill, 245 Conn. 88 , 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2005In State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 168 , 158 A.2d 166 (1960), the defendant, a member of the bar of this state, summarily was convicted of criminal contempt by a city court in Danbury for a contempt committed in the presence of the court. 2005In State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 168 , 158 A.2d 166 (1960), the defendant, a member of the bar of this state, summarily was convicted of criminal contempt by a city court in Danbury for a contempt committed in the presence of the court. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Daniels v. Alander
green
2 sentences2004This case is before us, pursuant to our grant of certification, 1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error Dennis Driscoll (plaintiff), who is a member of the bar of this state. 2 Daniels v. Alander, 75 Conn. App. 864 , 818 A.2d 106 (2003). 2004This case is before us, pursuant to our grant of certification, 1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing a writ of error brought by the plaintiff in error Dennis Driscoll (plaintiff), who is a member of the bar of this state. 2 Daniels v. Alander, 75 Conn. App. 864 , 818 A.2d 106 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department
green
1 sentence2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Transportation General, Inc. v. Department of Insurance
green
1 sentence2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department
green
1 sentence2001See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy , 199 Conn. 231 , 237 , appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 802 , 107 S.Ct. 42 , 93 L.Ed.2d 5 (1986) (appearance of impropriety that would disqualify a judge is insufficient for administrative officers); Transportation General, Inc. v. Insurance Department , 36 Conn. App. 587 , 593 , cert granted, 232 Conn. 920 (1995), cert. dismissed, 236 Conn. 75 (1996) (presumption of validity not overcome by movant). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Patricia Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559, Patricia Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559
green
1 sentence2000Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559 , 102 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1996). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Turner's Appeal From Probate
green
1 sentence2000Mass. 1950), Judge Wyzanski stated the conditions under which the attorney-client privilege is applicable: "The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to CT Page 4074 become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on l | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Pintavalle v. Valkanos green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Asso. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Breton green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Lauer v. Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences1999“If a statute . . . does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 246 Conn. 251, 257 , 716 A.2d 840 (1998). 1999“If a statute . . . does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 246 Conn. 251, 257 , 716 A.2d 840 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Kluczinsky
green
2 sentences1999In such a situation this court . . . so far as [it] properly can, will endeavor to see that such a plaintiff shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and, fairly heard, and will endeavor to aid a result, such as this case presents, brought about by plaintiff's lack of legal education and experience, rather than to deny him an opportunity to be heard through a too strict construction of a rule of practice, when this course does not interfere with the just rights of the defendant. . . ." Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Ass [n]. , 109 Conn. 690 , 692 , 145 A. 20 CT Page 13185 (1929); Conn 1999In such a situation this court . . . so far as [it] properly can, will endeavor to see that such a plaintiff shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and, fairly heard, and will endeavor to aid a result, such as this case presents, brought about by plaintiff's lack of legal education and experience, rather than to deny him an opportunity to be heard through a too strict construction of a rule of practice, when this course does not interfere with the just rights of the defendant. . . ." Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Ass [n]. , 109 Conn. 690 , 692 , 145 A. 20 CT Page 13185 (1929); Conn | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| In Re Application of Dimenstein neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Herrmann v. Summer Plaza Corp. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Grievance Committee of the Hartford County Bar v. Broder green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Peck green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Mangels v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re De Lucia green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Bump v. Barnett green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Jones green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Samuel W. Salus's Case green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.