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16 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1903–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. El Paso Countygreen2 sentences2015See id.; Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). 2015See id.; Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Florida v. Jardinesgreen2 sentences2015See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417 ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 2015See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417 ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). | 2 | 2 |
Young Refining Corp. v. Pennzoil Co.green2 sentences2011Young Refining Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 46 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). [2]Moreover, while we may not rewrite the agreement of the parties, we note that if we find the location of the test well to be a nonessential term, Aurora could earn $50,000, obtain the return of its leases, and possibly obtain additional leases by refusing to agree on a location. [3]There is no summary judgment evidence that Aurora ever owned the fifth lease specified in the exploration agreement. 2007Young Refining Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 46 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Tex. App .– Houston [1 st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). [2] Moreover, while we may not rewrite the agreement of the parties, we note that if we find the location of the test well to be a nonessential term, Aurora could earn $50,000, obtain the return of its leases, and possibly obtain additional leases by refusing to agree on a location. [3] There is no summary judgment evidence that Aurora ever owned the fifth lease specified in the exploration agreement. | 2 | 2 |
Knisley v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See id. at 879 (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when officer observed defendant speeding, responding slowly to officer requests, smelling of alcohol, and officer administered only three field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand)); Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when defendant admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and officer could detect odor of alcohol on or about defendant’s person); Knisley v. State, 81 S.W.3d 478, 483-84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d) ( 2009See id . at 879 (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when officer observed defendant speeding, responding slowly to officer requests, smelling of alcohol, and officer administered only three field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand)); Washburn v. State , 235 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when defendant admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and officer could detect odor of alcohol on or about defendant's person); Knisley v. State , 81 S.W.3d 478, 483-84 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2002, pet. ref | 2 | 2 |
Washburn v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See id. at 879 (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when officer observed defendant speeding, responding slowly to officer requests, smelling of alcohol, and officer administered only three field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand)); Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when defendant admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and officer could detect odor of alcohol on or about defendant’s person); Knisley v. State, 81 S.W.3d 478, 483-84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d) ( 2009See id . at 879 (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when officer observed defendant speeding, responding slowly to officer requests, smelling of alcohol, and officer administered only three field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand)); Washburn v. State , 235 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when defendant admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and officer could detect odor of alcohol on or about defendant's person); Knisley v. State , 81 S.W.3d 478, 483-84 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2002, pet. ref | 2 | 2 |
Reynolds v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See id. at 879 (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when officer observed defendant speeding, responding slowly to officer requests, smelling of alcohol, and officer administered only three field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand)); Washburn v. State, 235 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when defendant admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and officer could detect odor of alcohol on or about defendant’s person); Knisley v. State, 81 S.W.3d 478, 483-84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d) ( 2009See id . at 879 (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when officer observed defendant speeding, responding slowly to officer requests, smelling of alcohol, and officer administered only three field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand)); Washburn v. State , 235 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (finding probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI when defendant admitted drinking, had slurred speech, and officer could detect odor of alcohol on or about defendant's person); Knisley v. State , 81 S.W.3d 478, 483-84 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2002, pet. ref | 1 | 2 |
Pettigrew v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Although the location where the inquiry takes place is not dispositive, it is clear from this record that only appellant = s flight placed him outside the vehicle at the time he was confronted by Davis. [2] See Pettigrew , 908 S.W.2d at 570 (noting that A [a]bandoning the > recent occupant = provision would create an incentive for suspects to attempt to flee the scene to avoid a search . . . . @ ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Luna
green
2 sentences2015Fee–Splitting Provision The arbitration agreements provide that, in the event of a claim, all fees related to arbitration— including but not limited to mediation fees, the arbitrators' fees, costs of procuring a location for a hearing, and court reporter fees—will be split equally between the employer and the employee, with the employee's contribution capped at an amount equal to “the gross compensation earned by the Employee in Employee's highest earning month in the twelve months prior to the time the arbitrator issues his award.” The court of appeals held that this provision “weigh[ed] heav 2008Fee-Splitting Provision The arbitration agreements provide that, in the event of a claim, all fees related to arbitration — including but not limited to mediation fees, the arbitrators’ fees, costs of procuring a location for a hearing, and court reporter fees — will be split equally between the employer and the employee, with the employee’s contribution capped at an amount equal to “the gross compensation earned by the Employee in Employee’s highest earning month in the twelve months prior to the time the arbitrator issues his award.” The court of appeals held that this provision “weighted] h | 3 | 2008–2015 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences2015See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417 ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 2015See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1417 ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2007In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish State v. Kelly , 963 S.W.2d at 870 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Boyett v. State
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Memet v. State
green
1 sentence1982Memet v. State, supra. The ground of error is overruled. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Gilbreath v. Yarbrough
green
2 sentences1977However, whether or not the location test as set out in the foregoing authorities, Gilbreath v. Yarbrough, supra, [ 472 S.W.2d 185 , Tex.Civ.App.] etc., was met is a fact question to be determined by the Court, Walker v. Maynard, 31 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1930, no writ hist.), and, here, the trial court properly found that the test was met and passed.” We agree the location of the disputed land on the ground was a fact question. 1977However, whether or not the location test as set out in the foregoing authorities, Gilbreath v. Yarbrough, supra, [ 472 S.W.2d 185 , Tex.Civ.App.] etc., was met is a fact question to be determined by the Court, Walker v. Maynard, 31 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1930, no writ hist.), and, here, the trial court properly found that the test was met and passed.” We agree the location of the disputed land on the ground was a fact question. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Walker v. Maynard
green
1 sentence1977However, whether or not the location test as set out in the foregoing authorities, Gilbreath v. Yarbrough, supra, [ 472 S.W.2d 185 , Tex.Civ.App.] etc., was met is a fact question to be determined by the Court, Walker v. Maynard, 31 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin, 1930, no writ hist.), and, here, the trial court properly found that the test was met and passed.” We agree the location of the disputed land on the ground was a fact question. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Abbey
neutral
1 sentence1903State v. Abbey, 29 Vt., 60 , 67 Am. | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.