location test in Illinois

2019See Town & Country Utilities, Inc., 225 Ill. 2d at 120 ; Kane County Defenders, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 139 Ill.

2018See Town & Country Utilities, Inc. , 225 Ill. 2d at 120 , 310 Ill.Dec. 416 , 866 N.E.2d 227 ; Kane County Defenders, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board , 139 Ill.

2019See Town & Country Utilities, Inc., 225 Ill. 2d at 120 ; Kane County Defenders, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 139 Ill.

2018See Town & Country Utilities, Inc. , 225 Ill. 2d at 120 , 310 Ill.Dec. 416 , 866 N.E.2d 227 ; Kane County Defenders, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board , 139 Ill.

1999Ed. 2d 383, 387 , 92 S. Ct. 418, 421 (1971) (tort occurs at the locality of the accident); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 3 F.3d at 229 (concluding that tort occurred when defendant drove piling into underground tunnel even though damage to victims occurred on land, away from river); see also Lauritzen A/S v. Dashwood Shipping, Ltd., 65 F.3d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1995); Butler, 887 F.2d at 21 ; Drake, 772 F.2d at 1012 .

1999The Supreme Court as well as many federal courts continue to follow this approach, interpreting the location of the tort as where it "took effect." See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 , 115 S.Ct. at 1049 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 1035 (Supreme Court focussed on where the accident or incident took place and not on where the damage occurred when it determined that Great Lakes' alleged tort must have been done on navigable water); *1127 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 254, 266 , 93 S.Ct. at 497, 503 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 459, 466 (reiterated the location test, asserting that the tort or wrong occurs where th

1999Ed. 2d at 459, 466 , 93 S. Ct. at 497, 503 (reiterated the location test, asserting that the tort or wrong occurs where the alleged negligence “took effect” while also restating the location test as where the “accident” occurs); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 , 30 L.

1999Ed. 2d at 459, 466 , 93 S. Ct. at 497, 503 (reiterated the location test, asserting that the tort or wrong occurs where the alleged negligence “took effect” while also restating the location test as where the “accident” occurs); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 , 30 L.

1999Ed. 2d at 459, 466 , 93 S. Ct. at 497, 503 (reiterated the location test, asserting that the tort or wrong occurs where the alleged negligence “took effect” while also restating the location test as where the “accident” occurs); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 , 30 L.

1999The Supreme Court as well as many federal courts continue to follow this approach, interpreting the location of the tort as where it "took effect." See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 , 115 S.Ct. at 1049 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 1035 (Supreme Court focussed on where the accident or incident took place and not on where the damage occurred when it determined that Great Lakes' alleged tort must have been done on navigable water); *1127 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 254, 266 , 93 S.Ct. at 497, 503 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 459, 466 (reiterated the location test, asserting that the tort or wrong occurs where th

1999Ed. 2d 383, 387 , 92 S. Ct. 418, 421 (1971) (tort occurs at the locality of the accident); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 3 F.3d at 229 (concluding that tort occurred when defendant drove piling into underground tunnel even though damage to victims occurred on land, away from river); see also Lauritzen A/S v. Dashwood Shipping, Ltd., 65 F.3d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1995); Butler, 887 F.2d at 21 ; Drake, 772 F.2d at 1012 .

1999The Supreme Court as well as many federal courts continue to follow this approach, interpreting the location of the tort as where it "took effect." See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 , 115 S.Ct. at 1049 , 130 L.Ed.2d at 1035 (Supreme Court focussed on where the accident or incident took place and not on where the damage occurred when it determined that Great Lakes' alleged tort must have been done on navigable water); *1127 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., 409 U.S. at 254, 266 , 93 S.Ct. at 497, 503 , 34 L.Ed.2d at 459, 466 (reiterated the location test, asserting that the tort or wrong occurs where th

2018People v. Sanders , 182 Ill. 2d 524 , 534, 231 Ill.Dec. 573 , 696 N.E.2d 1144 (1998). ¶ 60 As explained earlier, to convict a defendant of the Class 3 form of section 24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) of the UUW statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements set forth in section 24-1(a)(4) and one of the several specific location factors in section 24-1(c) (1.5). 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) (West 2012).

2018People v. Sanders , 182 Ill. 2d 524 , 534, 231 Ill.Dec. 573 , 696 N.E.2d 1144 (1998). ¶ 60 As explained earlier, to convict a defendant of the Class 3 form of section 24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) of the UUW statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements set forth in section 24-1(a)(4) and one of the several specific location factors in section 24-1(c) (1.5). 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) (West 2012).

1999In Grubart, the Supreme Court found the weakening of the tunnel wall and subsequent flooding of the buildings’ sub-basements must have been done “by a vessel.” The Court reasoned: “Even though the barge was fastened to the river bottom and was in use as a work platform at the times in question, at other times it was used for transportation. [Citation.] Petitioners do not here seriously dispute the conclusion of each court below that the Great Lakes barge is, for admiralty tort purposes, a ‘vessel.’ The fact that the pile driving was done with a crane makes no difference under the location test

1999In Grubart, the Supreme Court found the weakening of the tunnel wall and subsequent flooding of the buildings’ sub-basements must have been done “by a vessel.” The Court reasoned: “Even though the barge was fastened to the river bottom and was in use as a work platform at the times in question, at other times it was used for transportation. [Citation.] Petitioners do not here seriously dispute the conclusion of each court below that the Great Lakes barge is, for admiralty tort purposes, a ‘vessel.’ The fact that the pile driving was done with a crane makes no difference under the location test

2021See Hadley, 224 Ill. 2d at 377 - 16 - (rules adopted by agency may not limit the statutory scope).

2021Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill. 2d 365, 371 (2007). ¶ 32 To resolve the issue on appeal, we apply principles of statutory construction to the question of the DOA’s interpretation of the location requirement in the Administrative Rules in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Zoning Ordinance regarding the zoning of the R-1 and R-5 districts, as applied to the location of Curative’s cultivation center.

2021Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 551-52 (2009).

2021Medponics distinguishes zoning amendments from special uses, asserting that a zoning amendment changes the original zoning ordinance (Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 89 (1991)), while a special use is permitted within a zoning district by the zoning ordinance so long as the use satisfies certain criteria (City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2001)).

2021Medponics distinguishes zoning amendments from special uses, asserting that a zoning amendment changes the original zoning ordinance (Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 89 (1991)), while a special use is permitted within a zoning district by the zoning ordinance so long as the use satisfies certain criteria (City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2001)).

2018See Tolbert , 2016 IL 117846 , ¶ 14, 401 Ill.Dec. 1 , 49 N.E.3d 389 . ¶ 18 Although no case has addressed the precise issue, several older appellate-court cases, in interpreting a former version of the Syringes Act, have held that other categories of persons similar to those identified in the current Syringes Act are exceptions to, as opposed to descriptions of, the offense.

2018See Tolbert , 2016 IL 117846 , ¶ 14, 401 Ill.Dec. 1 , 49 N.E.3d 389 . ¶ 18 Although no case has addressed the precise issue, several older appellate-court cases, in interpreting a former version of the Syringes Act, have held that other categories of persons similar to those identified in the current Syringes Act are exceptions to, as opposed to descriptions of, the offense.