stage analysis in Massachusetts

2023Although we have no doubt that the motion judge engaged in a good faith effort to weigh the interests involved, as presented to her by the parties, we conclude that the judge erred in finding that the defendant made a sufficient showing of materiality to satisfy her burden in the initial stage of the analysis under Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847 , and accordingly, the judge abused her discretion in ruling that disclosure was warranted, whether for pretrial or trial purposes.

2023Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the county court for entry of a judgment reversing the motion judge's order allowing the defendant's motion for discovery and remanding the matter to 13Because we find that the defendant has failed to meet her burden, albeit a "relatively undemanding" one, at the initial stage of the analysis under Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 847 , "[w]e need not speculate about what the results of a second-stage Roviaro balancing exercise might have been." Id. at 850 . 23 the Boston Municipal Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.14 So ordered. 14On remand

2018See Butler , 464 Mass. at 717 , 985 N.E.2d 377 . 12 Prejudice to the defendant "should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect," which include the interests "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Barker , 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . "[A]lthough the defendant is not entirely absolved of responsibility to present some particularized prejudice at this stage of the analysis, he is entitled

2018See Butler , 464 Mass. at 717 , 985 N.E.2d 377 . 12 Prejudice to the defendant "should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect," which include the interests "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Barker , 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . "[A]lthough the defendant is not entirely absolved of responsibility to present some particularized prejudice at this stage of the analysis, he is entitled

2023At this stage in the analysis, we apply "'substantial deference' to the expertise and statutory 'interpretation of [the] agency charged with primary responsibility' for administering a statute. . . . [A] '[S]tate administrative agency in Massachusetts has considerable leeway in interpreting a statute it is charged with enforcing,' unless a statute unambiguously bars the agency's approach." Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury, supra, quoting Goldberg, supra. The fact that the word "debilitating," in the statute, is modified by the phrase "that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk" does

2023Compare Douzanis, 384 Mass. at 436 n.4; John, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 706-707 . 19 something roughly akin thereto," Dias, 451 Mass. at 469 , quoting Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 571 (1990).

2023Compare Douzanis, 384 Mass. at 436 n.4; John, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 706-707 . 19 something roughly akin thereto," Dias, 451 Mass. at 469 , quoting Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 571 (1990).

2023To be entitled to a Franks/Amral hearing, a defendant must "by affidavit assert[] facts which cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant concerning a confidential informant." Amral, 407 Mass. at 522 .

2023At this stage in the analysis, we apply "'substantial deference' to the expertise and statutory 'interpretation of [the] agency charged with primary responsibility' for administering a statute. . . . [A] '[S]tate administrative agency in Massachusetts has considerable leeway in interpreting a statute it is charged with enforcing,' unless a statute unambiguously bars the agency's approach." Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury, supra, quoting Goldberg, supra. The fact that the word "debilitating," in the statute, is modified by the phrase "that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk" does

2021At this stage in the analysis, where I have considered all the trial evidence about the impact of the Tower on views from Plaintiffs’ property, “Standing essentially becomes a question of fact for the judge.” Kenner, 459 Mass. at 119 .

2018See Butler , 464 Mass. at 717 , 985 N.E.2d 377 . 12 Prejudice to the defendant "should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect," which include the interests "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Barker , 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . "[A]lthough the defendant is not entirely absolved of responsibility to present some particularized prejudice at this stage of the analysis, he is entitled

2018See Butler , 464 Mass. at 717 , 985 N.E.2d 377 . 12 Prejudice to the defendant "should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect," which include the interests "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Barker , 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . "[A]lthough the defendant is not entirely absolved of responsibility to present some particularized prejudice at this stage of the analysis, he is entitled

2017At this stage of the inquiry, "the motive behind the petitioning activity is irrelevant," and "[t]he focus solely is on the conduct complained of." Office One , supra , citing Fabre v. Walton , 436 Mass. 517 , 523-524, 781 N.E.2d 780 (2002).

2017At this stage of the inquiry, "the motive behind the petitioning activity is irrelevant," and "[t]he focus solely is on the conduct complained of." Office One , supra , citing Fabre v. Walton , 436 Mass. 517 , 523-524, 781 N.E.2d 780 (2002).

2017Because the first stage of the Duracraft analysis is, like the analysis of an ordinary motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), directed to examining the allegations of the complaint, our review is "fresh and independent," i.e., *797 de novo. 14 Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc ., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97 , 103, 46 N.E.3d 79 (2016), S .

2017Because the first stage of the Duracraft analysis is, like the analysis of an ordinary motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), directed to examining the allegations of the complaint, our review is "fresh and independent," i.e., *797 de novo. 14 Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc ., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97 , 103, 46 N.E.3d 79 (2016), S .

2010Cf. Commonwealth v. Doucette, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 662 (1986), S.C., 400 Mass. 1005 (1987) (at hearing on witness’s competency to testify, trial judge has discretion “to conduct the voir dire alone, without the assistance of any questioning by counsel”).

2005We note that at this stage of the analysis, we do not consider whether the affirmative act in question was or was not negligent; rather, the public employer’s affirmative act “must have materially contributed to creating the specific ‘condition or situation’ that resulted in the harm.” Jacome v. Commonwealth, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 489 , quoting from Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. at 319 .

2005We note that at this stage of the analysis, we do not consider whether the affirmative act in question was or was not negligent; rather, the public employer’s affirmative act “must have materially contributed to creating the specific ‘condition or situation’ that resulted in the harm.” Jacome v. Commonwealth, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 489 , quoting from Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. at 319 .

1982The plaintiffs concede that “the matters discussed at the two executive sessions certainly implicated par. (3) of § 23B.” The judge ruled that § 23B (3) did not eliminate the need for an open meeting subsequent to the executive session because “[tjhere is no showing that there would have been ‘a detrimental effect on the bargaining or litigating position if the School Committee had reconvened in open session to vote to authorize the sending of the notice letters.” 6 The judge expressly found that “[t]he plain purpose of the meetings was to set the stage for a challenge to the legal validity of