Appellees motion in Ohio

2020For the reasons provided, Appellees’ motion for reconsideration and en banc consideration is denied. {¶2} The standard for reviewing an application for reconsideration pursuant to App.R. 26(A) is whether the application “calls to the attention of the court an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for consideration that was either not considered at all or Case No. 19 HA 0010 –3– was not fully considered by the court when it should have been.” Columbus v. Hodge, 37 Ohio App.3d 68 , 523 N.E.2d 515 (10th Dist.1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2020For the reasons provided, Appellees’ motion for reconsideration and en banc consideration is denied. {¶2} The standard for reviewing an application for reconsideration pursuant to App.R. 26(A) is whether the application “calls to the attention of the court an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for consideration that was either not considered at all or Case No. 19 HA 0010 –3– was not fully considered by the court when it should have been.” Columbus v. Hodge, 37 Ohio App.3d 68 , 523 N.E.2d 515 (10th Dist.1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2012Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0007 4 Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 , 506 N.E.2d 212 .

2012Muskingum County, Case No. CT2012-0007 4 Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 , 506 N.E.2d 212 .

2003Rather, Appellants have mischaracterized Appellees' challenge to the proximate cause and damages elements of their malpractice claim as imposing a requirement that Appellants prove liability in the underlying case. {¶ 12} Appellants rely on Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , appeal not allowed (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1492 , for their argument that testimony concerning the probability of Appellants' recovery on their claims in the underlying case should not have been admitted in their malpractice action against Appellees.

1999The Supreme Court of Ohio in Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 421 set forth the appropriate standard which the moving party must meet to be entitled to summary judgment under Civ.R. 56.

1996Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 , 18 OBR 151, 152, 480 N.E.2d 412, 414 .

1996Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 , 18 OBR 151, 152, 480 N.E.2d 412, 414 .

2026Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. {¶22} Defendants/Appellees’, citing Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-4154 , argued that since all claims against the 200 John Does had failed, on the merits due to all of their claims having been dismissed and time barred as the statute of limitations had expired, as the employer of any of the John Does they cannot be held liable for any claims against them.

2024Trumbull No. 2022-T-0004, 2022-Ohio-4468, ¶ 28 , citing Utz v. Stovall, 11th Dist.

2024The judgment entry stated the trial court adopted the Appellees’ rationale as argued in their reply, which raised the self- protection exception to the attorney-client privilege. [Cite as Rehm v. Eckinger, 2024-Ohio-1860 .] {¶15} On September 6, 2023, Appellant filed his notice of appeal of the trial court’s August 29, 2023 judgment entry.

2023(October 29, 2020 Judgment.) A flurry of summary judgment filings resumed in July of 2021 based on the Supreme Court’s then recent decisions in Gerrity v. Chervenak, 162 Ohio St.3d 694 , 2020-Ohio- 6705, 166 N.E.3d 1230 , and West v. Bode, 162 Ohio St.3d 293 , 2020-Ohio-5473 , 165 N.E.3d 298 . {¶26} The trial court held a summary judgment hearing and a hearing on all pending motions in August of 2022.

2023(October 29, 2020 Judgment.) A flurry of summary judgment filings resumed in July of 2021 based on the Supreme Court’s then recent decisions in Gerrity v. Chervenak, 162 Ohio St.3d 694 , 2020-Ohio- 6705, 166 N.E.3d 1230 , and West v. Bode, 162 Ohio St.3d 293 , 2020-Ohio-5473 , 165 N.E.3d 298 . {¶26} The trial court held a summary judgment hearing and a hearing on all pending motions in August of 2022.

2023(October 29, 2020 Judgment.) A flurry of summary judgment filings resumed in July of 2021 based on the Supreme Court’s then recent decisions in Gerrity v. Chervenak, 162 Ohio St.3d 694 , 2020-Ohio- 6705, 166 N.E.3d 1230 , and West v. Bode, 162 Ohio St.3d 293 , 2020-Ohio-5473 , 165 N.E.3d 298 . {¶26} The trial court held a summary judgment hearing and a hearing on all pending motions in August of 2022.

2023(October 29, 2020 Judgment.) A flurry of summary judgment filings resumed in July of 2021 based on the Supreme Court’s then recent decisions in Gerrity v. Chervenak, 162 Ohio St.3d 694 , 2020-Ohio- 6705, 166 N.E.3d 1230 , and West v. Bode, 162 Ohio St.3d 293 , 2020-Ohio-5473 , 165 N.E.3d 298 . {¶26} The trial court held a summary judgment hearing and a hearing on all pending motions in August of 2022.

2023Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37 Ohio St.2d 150 , 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974). {¶34} Appellants did not respond to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

2023Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37 Ohio St.2d 150 , 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974). {¶34} Appellants did not respond to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

2023We disagree. {¶64} The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Mr. Montgomery’s claim for loss of consortium because the loss of consortium claim is derivative of Jean Montgomery’s tort claim. “[A] claim for loss of consortium is derivative in that the claim is dependent upon the defendants having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily injury.” Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 84 , 585 N.E.2d 384 (1992).

2023We disagree. {¶64} The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Mr. Montgomery’s claim for loss of consortium because the loss of consortium claim is derivative of Jean Montgomery’s tort claim. “[A] claim for loss of consortium is derivative in that the claim is dependent upon the defendants having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily injury.” Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 84 , 585 N.E.2d 384 (1992).

2023See Vogel, supra; Wick, supra. While this Court has not expressly rejected the notion that the savings statute contains no limiting language, our sister district has considered, and rejected, this same argument.

2022“Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes a penalty to its commission, it is true that the act is made unlawful, but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the act was meant by the legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention of it.” Fischer-Liemann Const. Co. v. Haase, 64 Ohio App. 473, 476 , 29 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist.1940), quoting Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. 79 , 12 How. 79 . {¶34} Moreover, like the contract in McCullough, the underlying purpose of the agreement of providing insurance is not one that violates public policy.

2022“Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes a penalty to its commission, it is true that the act is made unlawful, but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the act was meant by the legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention of it.” Fischer-Liemann Const. Co. v. Haase, 64 Ohio App. 473, 476 , 29 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist.1940), quoting Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. 79 , 12 How. 79 . {¶34} Moreover, like the contract in McCullough, the underlying purpose of the agreement of providing insurance is not one that violates public policy.

2022“Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes a penalty to its commission, it is true that the act is made unlawful, but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the act was meant by the legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention of it.” Fischer-Liemann Const. Co. v. Haase, 64 Ohio App. 473, 476 , 29 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist.1940), quoting Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. 79 , 12 How. 79 . {¶34} Moreover, like the contract in McCullough, the underlying purpose of the agreement of providing insurance is not one that violates public policy.

2022“Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes a penalty to its commission, it is true that the act is made unlawful, but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the act was meant by the legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention of it.” Fischer-Liemann Const. Co. v. Haase, 64 Ohio App. 473, 476 , 29 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist.1940), quoting Harris v. Runnels, 53 U.S. 79 , 12 How. 79 . {¶34} Moreover, like the contract in McCullough, the underlying purpose of the agreement of providing insurance is not one that violates public policy.

2022So, educate me.” Id. at 359 . {¶28} Appellant’s first assignment of error plainly states that the trial court failed to consider her opposition to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. {¶29} Appellant makes no actual argument (and certainly cites nothing in the record to show) that the trial court failed to consider her opposition to summary judgment.

2022Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352 , 2008–Ohio–938, ¶ 38. {¶16} Regardless of whether we apply the abuse of discretion or de novo standard of review, for the reasons set forth below, we find the trial court did not err in granting Appellees’ motion to compel arbitration.

2021We apply the plain and unambiguous language of the R.C. 2305.113(C) and the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson v. Durrani, -- Ohio St.3d --, 2020-Ohio-6827 , -- N.E.3d --, to answer that the Estate’s wrongful death action is time barred as a matter of law. [Cite as Mercer v. Keane, 2021-Ohio-1576 .] Standards of Review {¶12} This appeal comes to this Court after the trial court granted the Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating the Estate’s action for wrongful death was time barred by the statute of repose. {¶13} We refer to Civ.R.

2021Cuyahoga No. 109142, 2021-Ohio-580 , this court recently held that a trial court commits reversible error when it fails to properly advise a violent offender of the presumption established under R.C. 2903.42(A)(1), the offender’s right to file a motion to rebut the presumption, of the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the effect of a rebuttal and post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcome.

2021We apply the plain and unambiguous language of the R.C. 2305.113(C) and the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson v. Durrani, -- Ohio St.3d --, 2020-Ohio-6827 , -- N.E.3d --, to answer that the Estate’s wrongful death action is time barred as a matter of law. [Cite as Mercer v. Keane, 2021-Ohio-1576 .] Standards of Review {¶12} This appeal comes to this Court after the trial court granted the Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating the Estate’s action for wrongful death was time barred by the statute of repose. {¶13} We refer to Civ.R.