Appellees motion in Arizona

2024Azore, LLC v. Bassett, 236 Ariz. 424, 427, ¶ 7 (App. 2014). ¶12 Fitzhugh did not argue subject matter jurisdiction in his opening brief or in his response to Appellees’ motion to dismiss.

2019Flori Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 167 Ariz. 601, 602 (App. 1990).

2016Baron is incorrect; the order dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice was not a final judgment because the issue of attorneys’ fees had not yet been resolved and because the dismissal order was not certified as final under Rule 54(b).4 See Fields v. Oates, 230 Ariz. 411, 414, ¶ 10 (App. 2012) (“The superior court ordinarily should not enter judgment until claims for attorneys’ fees are resolved.”).

2011Accordingly, “[o]nly when the arbitration provision is enforceable will the court compel arbitration.” Stevens, 165 Ariz. at 30 , 795 P.2d at 1313 ; see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2847 , 2856, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010) (reemphasizing that an arbitration agreement may only be enforced when the court is satisfied that there are no issues challenging the formation or applicability of the arbitration clause at bar). ¶ 12 WB contends that Appellees’ challenge relates only to the underlying contract, and not the arbitration agreement itself.

2011Accordingly, “[o]nly when the arbitration provision is enforceable will the court compel arbitration.” Stevens, 165 Ariz. at 30 , 795 P.2d at 1313 ; see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2847 , 2856, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010) (reemphasizing that an arbitration agreement may only be enforced when the court is satisfied that there are no issues challenging the formation or applicability of the arbitration clause at bar). ¶ 12 WB contends that Appellees’ challenge relates only to the underlying contract, and not the arbitration agreement itself.

2009On March 5, 2007, the trial court granted Appellees' motion. ¶ 8 Appellants timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003). [1] ANALYSIS ¶ 9 "In reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and determine if the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any theory of law." Sensing v. Harris, 217 Ariz. 261, 262, ¶ 2 , 172 P.3d 856, 857 (App.2007). [2] We apply a de novo standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation.

2009On March 5, 2007, the trial court granted Appellees' motion. ¶ 8 Appellants timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003). [1] ANALYSIS ¶ 9 "In reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and determine if the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any theory of law." Sensing v. Harris, 217 Ariz. 261, 262, ¶ 2 , 172 P.3d 856, 857 (App.2007). [2] We apply a de novo standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation.

2009City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 214 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 6 , 150 P.3d 245, 248 (App.2006). ¶ 10 Appellants urge four bases for finding A.R.S. § 43-1183 unconstitutional, arguing that the tax credit violates: (1) the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) Article 2, Section 12, of the Arizona Constitution; (3) Article 9, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution; and (4) Sections 20 and 26 of the Arizona Enabling Act, Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 .

2009City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 214 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 6 , 150 P.3d 245, 248 (App.2006). ¶ 10 Appellants urge four bases for finding A.R.S. § 43-1183 unconstitutional, arguing that the tax credit violates: (1) the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) Article 2, Section 12, of the Arizona Constitution; (3) Article 9, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution; and (4) Sections 20 and 26 of the Arizona Enabling Act, Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 .

1982We begin our consideration of the question by first comparing Richards Development Company v. Sligh, 89 Ariz. 100, 102 , 358 P.2d 329, 330 (1961) (“parol evidence is not admissible to aid in the interpretation of the parties’ intentions until the four corners of the writing itself have been searched to determine whether the document itself affords a reasonably clear understanding of what the parties have agreed to do.”) with McCormack v. Kirtley, 115 Ariz. 25, 29 , 563 P.2d 280, 284 (1977) (“[t]he circumstances under which a writing was made may always be shown,” quoting Williston).

1982We begin our consideration of the question by first comparing Richards Development Company v. Sligh, 89 Ariz. 100, 102 , 358 P.2d 329, 330 (1961) (“parol evidence is not admissible to aid in the interpretation of the parties’ intentions until the four corners of the writing itself have been searched to determine whether the document itself affords a reasonably clear understanding of what the parties have agreed to do.”) with McCormack v. Kirtley, 115 Ariz. 25, 29 , 563 P.2d 280, 284 (1977) (“[t]he circumstances under which a writing was made may always be shown,” quoting Williston).

1982We begin our consideration of the question by first comparing Richards Development Company v. Sligh, 89 Ariz. 100, 102 , 358 P.2d 329, 330 (1961) (“parol evidence is not admissible to aid in the interpretation of the parties’ intentions until the four corners of the writing itself have been searched to determine whether the document itself affords a reasonably clear understanding of what the parties have agreed to do.”) with McCormack v. Kirtley, 115 Ariz. 25, 29 , 563 P.2d 280, 284 (1977) (“[t]he circumstances under which a writing was made may always be shown,” quoting Williston).

1982We begin our consideration of the question by first comparing Richards Development Company v. Sligh, 89 Ariz. 100, 102 , 358 P.2d 329, 330 (1961) (“parol evidence is not admissible to aid in the interpretation of the parties’ intentions until the four corners of the writing itself have been searched to determine whether the document itself affords a reasonably clear understanding of what the parties have agreed to do.”) with McCormack v. Kirtley, 115 Ariz. 25, 29 , 563 P.2d 280, 284 (1977) (“[t]he circumstances under which a writing was made may always be shown,” quoting Williston).