Appellees claim in Illinois

1951(Ryan v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 607 .) Appellees’ motion to transfer the cause is allowed, and it is, accordingly, transferred to the Appellate Court for the Second District.

1951In speaking of similar grounds which were raised in City of Chicago v. Openheim, 229 Ill. 313 , we said: “If the controversy related only to the power of the city, under the statute, to pass the ordinance, or to the question whether the ordinance is invalid as being an unreasonable and oppressive exercise of that power, this court would have no jurisdiction to entertain these writs of error.” Appellees’ motion to dismiss raised only the issue of whether the complaint was sufficient to justify their being penalized under the ordinance.

1947In the case of People v. Mulvaney, 286 Ill. 114, 117 , it is stated: “Whenever it becomes important to show, upon the trial of a cause, the occurrence of any fact or event, it is competent and proper also to show any accompanying act, declaration or exclamation which relates to or is explanatory of such fact or event.

1934Duncan Lumber Co. v. Leonard Lumber Co., 332 Ill. 104 .

1934Truman v. Reiss, 175 Ill.

1934(Chicago Legal News Co. v. Browne, 103 Ill. 317 ; Barrett v. Boddie, 158 id. 479; Keating v. Springer, 146 id. 481.)” Appellees’ claim for damages for breach of appellants’ covenant to keep the water system in good repair was, therefore, a proper matter in recoupment to mitigate the amount of rent claimed by appellants to be due, but could not be made the basis of a judgment in favor of appellees for damages in excess of the appellants’ claim for rent.

1933The appellees cite People v. Conway, 253 Ill. 140 , in support of their contention that the order approving and confirming the certificate is void and subject to collateral attack.

1930The appellees claim that Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188, 192 , governs the present case and that under the decision in that case it was the duty of the appellant to inquire of the appellees if there was any reason why the mortgage should not be paid, and that “if Mr. Guerten had gone either to Mr. Zachas or Mrs. Zachas with a competent interpreter and made them understand that he was inquiring if there was any reason why they should not pay the mortgage, and that, if not, he would purchase it, there would have been an immediate effective protestation against any liability on the notes.” In Conn

1930The appellees claim that Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill. 188, 192 , governs the present case and that under the decision in that case it was the duty of the appellant to inquire of the appellees if there was any reason why the mortgage should not be paid, and that “if Mr. Guerten had gone either to Mr. Zachas or Mrs. Zachas with a competent interpreter and made them understand that he was inquiring if there was any reason why they should not pay the mortgage, and that, if not, he would purchase it, there would have been an immediate effective protestation against any liability on the notes.” In Conn

1920People v. Leinecke, 290 Ill. 560 .

1908(Gage v. People, 200 Ill. 432 .) The cause was remanded for another hearing in the county court, and upon said hearing said court sustained the objections and denied judgment for said installment of said assessment, and it is this judgment of the county court that is relied upon by the appellees as a bar to judgment being rendered for the seventh installment.

1906Appellees’ instruction No. 4 reads as follows: “The court instructs the jury that the capacity to comprehend a few simple details, if the estate be small, might qualify a person, in that case, to intelligently dispose of his property by will, while if the estate be large, requiring the remembrance of many facts and the comprehension of many details, and the disposition to be made is complicated, the same mental capacity may be wholly insufficient to the intelligent understanding of the business requisite to the making of a valid will.” It is said that this violates the law laid down in the cas

1906Appellees’ instruction No. 4 reads as follows: “The court instructs the jury that the capacity to comprehend a few simple details, if the estate be small, might qualify a person, in that case, to intelligently dispose of his property by will, while if the estate be large, requiring the remembrance of many facts and the comprehension of many details, and the disposition to be made is complicated, the same mental capacity may be wholly insufficient to the intelligent understanding of the business requisite to the making of a valid will.” It is said that this violates the law laid down in the cas

1906In Campbell v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466 , it is said (p. 480) : “The capacity to comprehend a few simple details may in one case suffice to enable the party to intelligently dispose of his property by contract or will, while in another case, if the estate be large, requiring the remembrance of many facts and the comprehension of many details, and the disposition to be made is complicated, the same mental capacity may be wholly insufficient to that intelligent understanding of the business requisite to the making of a valid will.” To the same effect are Campbell v. Campbell, 138 Ill. 612 , and Ta

1906In Campbell v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466 , it is said (p. 480) : “The capacity to comprehend a few simple details may in one case suffice to enable the party to intelligently dispose of his property by contract or will, while in another case, if the estate be large, requiring the remembrance of many facts and the comprehension of many details, and the disposition to be made is complicated, the same mental capacity may be wholly insufficient to that intelligent understanding of the business requisite to the making of a valid will.” To the same effect are Campbell v. Campbell, 138 Ill. 612 , and Ta

1894In the case of Wright v. Brosseau, 73 Ill. 381 , it was said that “ it is the cleai’ly established doctrine that a new partner coming into an existing firm will not be liable in respect to debts contracted by the firm previously to his entering it, unless he expressly assumes them.” It is not denied that this is the rule, but it is urged by appellees that the facts above stated are tantamount to a deposit by said Joseph as an individual.

1889The facts are more fully stated in Chaplin v. Commissioners, etc. 126 Ill. 264 .

1867In support of their positions, appellants rely upon the cases of Hinman v. Pope, 1 Gilm., 131 ; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 ib., 437; Vance v. Schuyler, 1 ib., 160; Thompson v. Schuyler, 2 ib. 279, and Irving v. Brownell, 11 Ill., 402 .