14 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc.green2 sentences2019Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc. , 2007 OK 12 , ¶ 17, 160 P.3d 936 , 943. 2019Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc. , 2007 OK 12, ¶ 17, 160 P.3d 936, 943. | 1 | 2 |
Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology PC v. US Oncology, Inc.green2 sentences2019Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc. , 2007 OK 12 , ¶ 17, 160 P.3d 936 , 943. 2019Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc. , 2007 OK 12, ¶ 17, 160 P.3d 936, 943. | 1 | 2 |
Osprey L.L.C v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co.green2 sentences2017Section 4(e) uses the term "may." Because the term "'[s]hall' is ordinarily construed as mandatory and 'may' is ordinarily construed as permissive," Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co. Inc. , 1999 OK 50, ¶ 14, 984 P.2d 194, it was well within the trial court's discretion to decide the validity of Appellants' § 306 dismissal arguments and the sufficiency of Appellees' response to those arguments. ¶17 "District Court Rule 4 is not self-executing. 2017Section 4(e) uses the term "may." Because the term "'[s]hall' is ordinarily construed as mandatory and 'may' is ordinarily construed as permissive," Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co. Inc. , 1999 OK 50, ¶ 14, 984 P.2d 194, it was well within the trial court's discretion to decide the validity of Appellants' § 306 dismissal arguments and the sufficiency of Appellees' response to those arguments. ¶17 "District Court Rule 4 is not self-executing. | 1 | 1 |
Flanders v. Crane Co.green1 sentence1990See Flanders v. Crane, 693 P.2d 602 (Okla.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Wear v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Las Crucesgreen1 sentence1987Wear v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, etc., 605 P.2d 27, 30 (A1.1980), citing as authority, General American Life Insurance Co. v. Roach, supra. Appellees’ brief argues on the one hand that the UELIC policies were so unprofitable that no insurer could be found to assume them, and they had to be non-renewed in accordance with their terms. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pinkley v. State
green
2 sentences2018Pinkley v. State , 2002 OK CR 26 , 49 P.3d 756 . 2018Pinkley v. State , 2002 OK CR 26 , 49 P.3d 756 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
OSAGE NATION v. BD. OF COMMISSIONERS OF OSAGE COUNTY and OSAGE NATION v. OSAGE COUNTY BD. OF ADJUSTMENT
green
2 sentences2017Osage Nation v. Board of Commissioners of Osage County, 2017 OK 34 , 394 P.3d 1224 . 2017Osage Nation v. Board of Commissioners of Osage County, 2017 OK 34 , 394 P.3d 1224 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Taylor v. State & Education Employees Group Insurance Program
green
2 sentences2016Program, 1995 OK 51 , 897 P.2d 275 , gives them a cognizable interest in the actuarial soundness of their pension funds. ¶ 9 In Appellees’ motion for summary judgment they argued OPLAAA ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3105) grants the Legislative Actuary sole authority for determining whether a retirement bill is fiscal or noikfiscal and his certification was correct for the following reasons: 1) OPLAAA’s definition of “retirement system” ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3103 (9)) is focused on the body corporate (OPERS) and not on the individual plans of a retirement system (defined contribution system); and 2) HB 2630 2016Program, 1995 OK 51 , 897 P.2d 275 , gives them a cognizable interest in the actuarial soundness of their pension funds. ¶9 In Appellees' motion for summary judgment they argued OPLAAA ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3105 ) grants the Legislative Actuary sole authority for determining whether a retirement bill is fiscal or non-fiscal and his certification was correct for the following reasons: 1) OPLAAA's definition of "retirement system" ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3103 (9)) is focused on the body corporate (OPERS) and not on the individual plans of a retirement system (defined contribution system); and 2) HB 2630 | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Taylor v. ST. & EDUC. EMPLOYEES GROUP INS. PROGRAM
green
2 sentences2016Program, 1995 OK 51 , 897 P.2d 275 , gives them a cognizable interest in the actuarial soundness of their pension funds. ¶ 9 In Appellees’ motion for summary judgment they argued OPLAAA ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3105) grants the Legislative Actuary sole authority for determining whether a retirement bill is fiscal or noikfiscal and his certification was correct for the following reasons: 1) OPLAAA’s definition of “retirement system” ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3103 (9)) is focused on the body corporate (OPERS) and not on the individual plans of a retirement system (defined contribution system); and 2) HB 2630 2016Program, 1995 OK 51 , 897 P.2d 275 , gives them a cognizable interest in the actuarial soundness of their pension funds. ¶9 In Appellees' motion for summary judgment they argued OPLAAA ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3105 ) grants the Legislative Actuary sole authority for determining whether a retirement bill is fiscal or non-fiscal and his certification was correct for the following reasons: 1) OPLAAA's definition of "retirement system" ( 62 O.S. 2011 , § 3103 (9)) is focused on the body corporate (OPERS) and not on the individual plans of a retirement system (defined contribution system); and 2) HB 2630 | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Green Bay Packaging v. Preferred Packaging, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Preferred Packaging, Inc., 932 P.2d at 1097 . ¶22 Those portions of the trial court’s order denying Dyer’s motion to .compel Ap-pellees to pay Bartlow’s expert witness fees, and granting Appellees’ motion to compel Dyer to pay Billings’ expert witness fees, are REVERSED. 2004Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Preferred Packaging, Inc., 932 P.2d at 1097 . ¶ 22 Those portions of the trial court's order denying Dyer's motion to compel Appellees to pay Bartlow's expert witness fees, and granting Appellees' motion to compel Dyer to pay Billings' expert witness fees, are REVERSED. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Whitley v. Oologah Independent School District No. I-4 of Rogers County
green
1 sentence1994Also, Whitley, supra, involved not only the partial settlement but promises to settle the remainder of the claim.” Upon remand, Appellees’ motion to dismiss was granted at a hearing at which Appellants did not appear or respond. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Stillwater Milling Co. v. First National Bank of Wewoka
green
1 sentence1977Both arguments must be rejected. 12 O.S.1971, § 698, effective October 27, 1961, provides: “When a motion for a directed verdict which was made at the close of all of the evidence should have been granted, the court shall, at the request of the moving party, render judgment in his favor though a verdict has been found against him, ...” In Stillwater Milling Co. v. First National Bank of Wewoka, 391 P.2d 807 (Okl.1964), in interpreting § 698, supra, this Court said: “The former statute as quoted made no explicit provision for consideration by the trial court of the effect of the evidence when, | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.