Appellees motion in Georgia

2026See Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 434 (III)(C) ( 801 SE2d 867 ) (2017) (defining retrospective relief as “monetary damages and other relief for wrongs already done and injuries already sustained”). 7 waiver, no waiver can be shown.”).

2026See Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 434 (III)(C) ( 801 SE2d 867 ) (2017) (defining retrospective relief as “monetary damages and other relief for wrongs already done and injuries already sustained”). 7 waiver, no waiver can be shown.”).

2024See McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 18-19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017) (holding that “[t]he applicability of sovereign immunity to claims brought against the State is a jurisdictional issue” and “[t]herefore, the applicability of sovereign immunity is a threshold determination, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred”).

2024See McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 18-19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017) (holding that “[t]he applicability of sovereign immunity to claims brought against the State is a jurisdictional issue” and “[t]herefore, the applicability of sovereign immunity is a threshold determination, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the merits of a claim that is barred”).

2024See Bray v. Watkins, 370 Ga. App. 299 , 299 ( 896 SE2d 913 ) (2024) (trial court erred by granting summary judgment before addressing the threshold jurisdictional question of whether sovereign immunity barred plaintiff’s claims); First Center,, 318 Ga. at 272 (“the trial court should have first considered the jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity before reaching the other grounds raised in Appellees’ motion to dismiss”).

2024Appellants filed an application for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which was transferred to this Court on the basis that the appeal raises a novel constitutional question left unanswered by this Court’s decision in State v. SASS Group, 315 Ga. 893, 904 (2) (d) (885 SE2d 761) (2023) — that is, whether Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (2) of the Georgia Constitution requires the dismissal of an action seeking declaratory relief from acts of any county or county officer or employee that names as a defendant the county officer or employee in his or her official capacity.

2024Appellants filed an application for discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which was transferred to this Court on the basis that the appeal raises a novel constitutional question left unanswered by this Court’s decision in State v. SASS Group, 315 Ga. 893, 904 (2) (d) ( 885 SE2d 761 ) (2023) — that is, whether Article I, Section II, Paragraph V (b) (2) of the Georgia Constitution requires the dismissal of an action seeking declaratory relief from acts of any county or county officer or employee that names as a defendant the county officer or employee in his or her official capacity.

2023Elliott, 305 Ga. at 187 (II) (C). 37 We therefore reverse the trial court’s determination that Sections 4 and 11 of the LIFE Act were void ab initio; reverse the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and denial of the State’s motion to dismiss on that basis; and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2023Because the allegations of Hamon’s complaint do not disclose with certainty that she would not be entitled under Brown to pursue her wrongful death claim “under any state of provable facts,” Hinson v. Roberts, 256 Ga. 396, 397 ( 349 SE2d 454 ) (1986), the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.11 See, e.g., Brown, 261 Ga. at 214 (applying equity to allow decedent’s children to pursue a wrongful death claim where children represented that surviving spouse “has abandoned them; cannot be located; and would not, in any event,

2023Because the allegations of Hamon’s complaint do not disclose with certainty that she would not be entitled under Brown to pursue her wrongful death claim “under any state of provable facts,” Hinson v. Roberts, 256 Ga. 396, 397 ( 349 SE2d 454 ) (1986), the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.11 See, e.g., Brown, 261 Ga. at 214 (applying equity to allow decedent’s children to pursue a wrongful death claim where children represented that surviving spouse “has abandoned them; cannot be located; and would not, in any event,

2023Because the allegations of Hamon’s complaint do not disclose with certainty that she would not be entitled under Brown to pursue her wrongful death claim “under any state of provable facts,” Hinson, 256 Ga. at 397, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.11 See, e.g., Brown, 261 Ga. at 214 (applying equity to allow decedent’s children to pursue a wrongful death claim where children represented that surviving spouse “has abandoned them; cannot be located; and would not, in any event, pursue the claim for wrongful death,

2023Because the allegations of Hamon’s complaint do not disclose with certainty that she would not be entitled under Brown to pursue her wrongful death claim “under any state of provable facts,” Hinson v. Roberts, 256 Ga. 396, 397 ( 349 SE2d 454 ) (1986), the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.11 See, e.g., Brown, 261 Ga. at 214 (applying equity to allow decedent’s children to pursue a wrongful death claim where children represented that surviving spouse “has abandoned them; cannot be located; and would not, in any event,

2023Because the allegations of Hamon’s complaint do not disclose with certainty that she would not be entitled under Brown to pursue her wrongful death claim “under any state of provable facts,” Hinson, 256 Ga. at 397, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.11 See, e.g., Brown, 261 Ga. at 214 (applying equity to allow decedent’s children to pursue a wrongful death claim where children represented that surviving spouse “has abandoned them; cannot be located; and would not, in any event, pursue the claim for wrongful death,

2023Because the allegations of Hamon’s complaint do not disclose with certainty that she would not be entitled under Brown to pursue her wrongful death claim “under any state of provable facts,” Hinson v. Roberts, 256 Ga. 396, 397 ( 349 SE2d 454 ) (1986), the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.11 See, e.g., Brown, 261 Ga. at 214 (applying equity to allow decedent’s children to pursue a wrongful death claim where children represented that surviving spouse “has abandoned them; cannot be located; and would not, in any event,

2023The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari review and, in Stanley v. Patterson, 314 Ga. 582 ( 878 SE2d 529 ) (2022), reversed our decision and directed this Court to remand this matter to the trial court to consider Appellees’ claim of official immunity.

2023The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari review and, in Stanley v. Patterson, 314 Ga. 582 ( 878 SE2d 529 ) (2022), reversed our decision and directed this Court to remand this matter to the trial court to consider Appellees’ claim of official immunity.

2022However, as the parties apparently recognize,1 the trial court did not rule on that claim.2 “In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final 1 The Appellants state in their brief that “[t]he trial court never ruled on [their] request for a permanent injunction.” Similarly, the Appellees acknowledge in their brief that “[t]he Order does not expressly rule on Appellees’ claim for injunctive relief . . . , nor does it make any findings of fact specific to th[at] cla

2022However, as the parties apparently recognize,1 the trial court did not rule on that claim.2 “In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final 1 The Appellants state in their brief that “[t]he trial court never ruled on [their] request for a permanent injunction.” Similarly, the Appellees acknowledge in their brief that “[t]he Order does not expressly rule on Appellees’ claim for injunctive relief . . . , nor does it make any findings of fact specific to th[at] cla

2022See Smith v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 302 Ga. 517, 530 (1) ( 807 SE2d 909 ) (2017) (remanding case to trial court for application of correct standard); Rowe Dev.

2022See Smith v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 302 Ga. 517, 530 (1) ( 807 SE2d 909 ) (2017) (remanding case to trial court for application of correct standard); Rowe Dev.

2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic

2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic

2022However, as the parties apparently recognize,1 the trial court did not rule on that claim.2 “In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final 1 The Appellants state in their brief that “[t]he trial court never ruled on [their] request for a permanent injunction.” Similarly, the Appellees acknowledge in their brief that “[t]he Order does not expressly rule on Appellees’ claim for injunctive relief . . . , nor does it make any findings of fact specific to th[at] cla

2022However, as the parties apparently recognize,1 the trial court did not rule on that claim.2 “In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties is not a final 1 The Appellants state in their brief that “[t]he trial court never ruled on [their] request for a permanent injunction.” Similarly, the Appellees acknowledge in their brief that “[t]he Order does not expressly rule on Appellees’ claim for injunctive relief . . . , nor does it make any findings of fact specific to th[at] cla

2022See OCGA § 53-2-25 (“Any individual claiming to be an heir or any person in any way interested as a distributee and who is not named as such in any petition filed and pending under this article may file a motion to intervene in the proceeding.”). 11 Baker, 306 Ga. App. at 328 (1) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 6 properly took judicial notice of the filing in probate court,12 this acknowledgment was not a judicial admission.13 According to the exhibit attached to the Appellees’ brief in opposition to West’s motion to intervene, West’s son had filed the petition for letters of administratio

2022See Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 778 (784 SE2d 775) (2016) (explaining that a trial court may receive evidence and make relevant factual findings to decide the threshold issue of whether a defendant’s entitlement to sovereign immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction). 21 In this case, the Appellees claim that the State waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the Agreement as memorialized in the e-mail exchange between Arceneaux, Burton, Graham, and others.

2022See Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 778 (784 SE2d 775) (2016) (explaining that a trial court may receive evidence and make relevant factual findings to decide the threshold issue of whether a defendant’s entitlement to sovereign immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction). 21 In this case, the Appellees claim that the State waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the Agreement as memorialized in the e-mail exchange between Arceneaux, Burton, Graham, and others.

2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic

2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic

2022And we conclude that “the injunction is not overly broad, but is tailored to the facts and law of this case.” Bd. of Commrs. of Spalding County v. Stewart, 284 Ga. 573, 575 (3) (668 SE2d 644) (2008). (f) For all of the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Appellees’ motion for an interlocutory injunction.

2022And we conclude that “the injunction is not overly broad, but is tailored to the facts and law of this case.” Bd. of Commrs. of Spalding County v. Stewart, 284 Ga. 573, 575 (3) (668 SE2d 644) (2008). (f) For all of the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Appellees’ motion for an interlocutory injunction.

2022Simply put, there is no attorney fee ruling for our review, and we do not reach Johnson’s arguments on this subject.7 See, e. g., Gilbert v. Montlick & Assocs., 248 Ga. App. 535, 537 (4) ( 546 SE2d 895 ) (2001) (holding that an enumeration “is not ripe for appellate consideration” where it challenges an attorney fees award that “has not yet been determined by the trial court”).

2022Simply put, there is no attorney fee ruling for our review, and we do not reach Johnson’s arguments on this subject.7 See, e. g., Gilbert v. Montlick & Assocs., 248 Ga. App. 535, 537 (4) ( 546 SE2d 895 ) (2001) (holding that an enumeration “is not ripe for appellate consideration” where it challenges an attorney fees award that “has not yet been determined by the trial court”).

2021Any decision on Appellees’ motion to dismiss should have been resolved on the content and sufficiency of the pleadings, see Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Forsyth County Bd. of Commrs., 302 Ga. 284, 286 (2) ( 806 SE2d 561 ) (2017), and, in this case, it was not. 4 Further, given that the trial court’s ruling was based solely on the mischaracterization of Appellant’s claims, we need not consider the claims actually raised in Appellant’s complaint.4 See City of Rincon v. Ernest Communities, LLC, 356 Ga. App. 84 , 93 (5) ( 846 SE2d 250 ) (2020).

2021Any decision on Appellees’ motion to dismiss should have been resolved on the content and sufficiency of the pleadings, see Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Forsyth County Bd. of Commrs., 302 Ga. 284, 286 (2) ( 806 SE2d 561 ) (2017), and, in this case, it was not. 4 Further, given that the trial court’s ruling was based solely on the mischaracterization of Appellant’s claims, we need not consider the claims actually raised in Appellant’s complaint.4 See City of Rincon v. Ernest Communities, LLC, 356 Ga. App. 84 , 93 (5) ( 846 SE2d 250 ) (2020).

2020Stendahl v. Cobb County, 284 Ga. 525, 526 (1) n.2 ( 668 SE2d 723 ) (2008) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes and, if incorporated into the pleadings, may be considered when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2020Stendahl v. Cobb County, 284 Ga. 525, 526 (1) n.2 ( 668 SE2d 723 ) (2008) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes and, if incorporated into the pleadings, may be considered when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2019The Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss because the Appellees had sufficient minimum contact with Georgia under Georgia’s Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91.10 We note that the Appellants failed to argue the application of OCGA § 9-10-91 in the trial court and 9 See Hawthorn Suites Golf Resorts, 282 Ga. at 557 (3). 10 See OCGA § 9-10-91 (lists the ways in which “[a] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions

2017Auth. of DeKalb Cty., 250 Ga. App. 771, 772 ( 552 SE2d 133 ) (2001) (vacating a summary-judgment order and remanding for the trial court to reconsider the summary-judgment motion with depositions that were relied upon by the trial court but never filed with the clerk’s office as if they were filed at the time of the motion); Custom Lighting & Decorating, Ltd. v. Hampshire Co., 204 Ga. App. 293, 295 (1) ( 418 SE2d 811 ) (1992) (allowing the trial court to supplement the record with depositions that were given to the judge but not filed with the clerk’s office); Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 259 Ga.

2017Auth. of DeKalb Cty., 250 Ga. App. 771, 772 ( 552 SE2d 133 ) (2001) (vacating a summary-judgment order and remanding for the trial court to reconsider the summary-judgment motion with depositions that were relied upon by the trial court but never filed with the clerk’s office as if they were filed at the time of the motion); Custom Lighting & Decorating, Ltd. v. Hampshire Co., 204 Ga. App. 293, 295 (1) ( 418 SE2d 811 ) (1992) (allowing the trial court to supplement the record with depositions that were given to the judge but not filed with the clerk’s office); Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 259 Ga.