announced rule in Oklahoma

1954Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okl. 277 , 190 P. 681 .” In Crowther v. Schoonover, 130 Okl. 249 , 266 P. 777 , this Court announced the rule in the first paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “The provision of the statute that a void judgment may be vacated at any time on motion applies only when the invalidity of the judgment appears on the face of the judgment roll.” In the last cited case, the Court quoted from B-R Electric & Telephone Mfg.

1954Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okl. 277 , 190 P. 681 .” In Crowther v. Schoonover, 130 Okl. 249 , 266 P. 777 , this Court announced the rule in the first paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “The provision of the statute that a void judgment may be vacated at any time on motion applies only when the invalidity of the judgment appears on the face of the judgment roll.” In the last cited case, the Court quoted from B-R Electric & Telephone Mfg.

1951It is an affirmative fact for the injured party to establish that the defendant has been guilty of negligence.’ Jenkins v. Davis, 111 Okla. 191 , 239 P. 135 ; New v. Bradshaw, 89 Okla. 205 , 214 P. 557 ; Chicago, R.

1951It is an affirmative fact for the injured party to establish that the defendant has been guilty of negligence.’ Jenkins v. Davis, 111 Okla. 191 , 239 P. 135 ; New v. Bradshaw, 89 Okla. 205 , 214 P. 557 ; Chicago, R.

1951It is an affirmative fact for the injured party to establish that the defendant has been guilty of negligence.’ Jenkins v. Davis, 111 Okla. 191 , 239 P. 135 ; New v. Bradshaw, 89 Okla. 205 , 214 P. 557 ; Chicago, R.

1951It is an affirmative fact for the injured party to establish that the defendant has been guilty of negligence.’ Jenkins v. Davis, 111 Okla. 191 , 239 P. 135 ; New v. Bradshaw, 89 Okla. 205 , 214 P. 557 ; Chicago, R.

1951Therein it is said: “In the case of Smith et al. v. Clark, 125 Okla. 18 , 256 P. 36 , this court announced the rule that: ‘A demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence in a personal injury action ought to be sustained, unless it is reasonably apparent that the injury suffered by the plaintiff is the causal effect from some wrongful act of the defendant, in violation of a legal duty owing to the plaintiff.’ “This court has repeatedly held: “ ‘The mere fact that an injury occurs carries with it no presumption of negligence.

1951Therein it is said: “In the case of Smith et al. v. Clark, 125 Okla. 18 , 256 P. 36 , this court announced the rule that: ‘A demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence in a personal injury action ought to be sustained, unless it is reasonably apparent that the injury suffered by the plaintiff is the causal effect from some wrongful act of the defendant, in violation of a legal duty owing to the plaintiff.’ “This court has repeatedly held: “ ‘The mere fact that an injury occurs carries with it no presumption of negligence.

1933S. 1921, which section reads in part as follows: “Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions, the Commission may at any time review any award, and. on such review, may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded. * * *” In the case of Lane & Wasson Co. v. Wright, 126 Okla. 53 , 258 P. 728 , this court announced the rule in the syllabus as follows : “AA’here the Industrial Commission has made an award to a claimant for temporary injuries and it later develops that instead of injuries being

1933S. 1921, which section reads in part as follows: “Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions, the Commission may at any time review any award, and. on such review, may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded. * * *” In the case of Lane & Wasson Co. v. Wright, 126 Okla. 53 , 258 P. 728 , this court announced the rule in the syllabus as follows : “AA’here the Industrial Commission has made an award to a claimant for temporary injuries and it later develops that instead of injuries being

1932In Hays v. Oity of Muskogee, supra, it was said: “In the case of Citizens’ State Bank of Vici v. Gettig, 77 Okla. 48 , 187 P. 217 , this court announced the rule that: “ ‘A statute which is enacted for the primary purpose of dealing with a particular subject, and which prescribes the terms and conditions of that particular subject-matter, supersedes a general statute which does not refer to the particular subject-matter, but does contain language which might be broad enough to cover the subject-matter if the special statute was not in existence’.” The provisions of section 9695, supra, are con

1926It is true that the publication of the ies-olution is required for the purpose of notifying property owners, who will be affected by the improvements in question, that such improvements are in contemplation, in order that they may be given an opportunity to be heard, and the mere fact that the resolution provided for in the 1923 act is termed a notice does not constitute the “necessity resolution” a legal notice within the meaning of section 3569, supra. In the case of Citizens’ State Bank of Vici v. Gettig, 77 Okla. 48 , 187 Pac. 217 , this court announced the rule that: “A statute which is e

1932In Hays v. Oity of Muskogee, supra, it was said: “In the case of Citizens’ State Bank of Vici v. Gettig, 77 Okla. 48 , 187 P. 217 , this court announced the rule that: “ ‘A statute which is enacted for the primary purpose of dealing with a particular subject, and which prescribes the terms and conditions of that particular subject-matter, supersedes a general statute which does not refer to the particular subject-matter, but does contain language which might be broad enough to cover the subject-matter if the special statute was not in existence’.” The provisions of section 9695, supra, are con

1926It is true that the publication of the ies-olution is required for the purpose of notifying property owners, who will be affected by the improvements in question, that such improvements are in contemplation, in order that they may be given an opportunity to be heard, and the mere fact that the resolution provided for in the 1923 act is termed a notice does not constitute the “necessity resolution” a legal notice within the meaning of section 3569, supra. In the case of Citizens’ State Bank of Vici v. Gettig, 77 Okla. 48 , 187 Pac. 217 , this court announced the rule that: “A statute which is e

2002The court referred to the committee as a "subordinate entity" because it was created by a governmental body and "was not established by statute and had no statutory authority and whatever authority it did have, actual or de facto, was through its parent-entity, the Board of Corrections." Id. ¶ 4 The court announced the rule for determining whether subordinate entities are subject to the Act as follows: Where a parent-entity, coming within the purview of [the Act] as a matter of law, establishes a subordinate entity and such subordinate entity's authority is derived solely through its parent-en

1983In Johnson v. State, 620 P.2d 1311 , (Okl.Cr.1980), this Court announced that the standard for determining whether a criminal defendant has been afforded effective counsel is whether the defense attorney has demonstrated the skill of a reasonably competent attorney.

1963The remaining Oklahoma case relied upon, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Glazier, 192 Okl. 516 , 137 P.2d 584 , involved a fall by plaintiff on a linoleum which defendant had “carelessly and negligently oiled,” etc. So in all of these cases there was evidence of either actual or constructive notice of the condition.

1963The remaining Oklahoma case relied upon, Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Glazier, 192 Okl. 516 , 137 P.2d 584 , involved a fall by plaintiff on a linoleum which defendant had “carelessly and negligently oiled,” etc. So in all of these cases there was evidence of either actual or constructive notice of the condition.

1962Generalizations beyond that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on its special facts.” *935 In Tapedo v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 165 , 245 P. 897 , this Court announced the rule applicable herein: “The action of the juror was misconduct, and in capital cases where, after the case is finally submitted to the jury, and there is a showing of misconduct, the presumption is that it is prejudicial, and the burden is on the state to show that no injury could have resulted therefrom to the defendant.

1962Generalizations beyond that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on its special facts.” *935 In Tapedo v. State, 34 Okl.Cr. 165 , 245 P. 897 , this Court announced the rule applicable herein: “The action of the juror was misconduct, and in capital cases where, after the case is finally submitted to the jury, and there is a showing of misconduct, the presumption is that it is prejudicial, and the burden is on the state to show that no injury could have resulted therefrom to the defendant.

1958A variance is not material unless it is such as might mislead the defense or expose a defendant to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” In the case of Sykes v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 9 , 246 P.2d 379, 382 , as a harbinger to applying the above announced rule, the court asked itself the following question: Applying the test (supra) was the variance material?

1958A variance is not material unless it is such as might mislead the defense or expose a defendant to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” In the case of Sykes v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 9 , 246 P.2d 379, 382 , as a harbinger to applying the above announced rule, the court asked itself the following question: Applying the test (supra) was the variance material?

1954Co. v. Town of Wewoka, 113 Okl. 225 , 239 P. 919 , as follows: “If it be necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence to show the invalidity of a judgment, the motion to vacate must be presented within three years following the rendition of the judgment or order, as provided for in section 817, Comp.St. 1921 [12 O.S.1951 § 1038].” The divorce decree sought to be set aside was rendered more than 10 years prior to the time it was sought to be vacated.

1954Co. v. Town of Wewoka, 113 Okl. 225 , 239 P. 919 , as follows: “If it be necessary to resort to extrinsic evidence to show the invalidity of a judgment, the motion to vacate must be presented within three years following the rendition of the judgment or order, as provided for in section 817, Comp.St. 1921 [12 O.S.1951 § 1038].” The divorce decree sought to be set aside was rendered more than 10 years prior to the time it was sought to be vacated.

1954Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okl. 277 , 190 P. 681 .” In Crowther v. Schoonover, 130 Okl. 249 , 266 P. 777 , this Court announced the rule in the first paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “The provision of the statute that a void judgment may be vacated at any time on motion applies only when the invalidity of the judgment appears on the face of the judgment roll.” In the last cited case, the Court quoted from B-R Electric & Telephone Mfg.

1954Pettis v. Johnston, 78 Okl. 277 , 190 P. 681 .” In Crowther v. Schoonover, 130 Okl. 249 , 266 P. 777 , this Court announced the rule in the first paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “The provision of the statute that a void judgment may be vacated at any time on motion applies only when the invalidity of the judgment appears on the face of the judgment roll.” In the last cited case, the Court quoted from B-R Electric & Telephone Mfg.

1954It cites Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Hester, 188 Okl. 394 , 109 P.2d 820 , and related cases in which this court announced the rule that in reviewing an award of a trial commissioner on appeal the State Industrial Commission cannot hear further evidence but must decide the cause upon the record furnished by the trial commissioners.

1954It cites Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Hester, 188 Okl. 394 , 109 P.2d 820 , and related cases in which this court announced the rule that in reviewing an award of a trial commissioner on appeal the State Industrial Commission cannot hear further evidence but must decide the cause upon the record furnished by the trial commissioners.

1953Pure Oil Co. et al. v. Quarles, 183 Okla. 418 , 82 P. 2d 970 , and Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 143 , 45 P. 2d 121 .

1953Pure Oil Co. et al. v. Quarles, 183 Okla. 418 , 82 P. 2d 970 , and Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 143 , 45 P. 2d 121 .

1953In Pancoast, Adm'r v. Eldridge, 134 Okl. 247 , 273 P. 255 , and in Paull v. Earlywine, 195 Okl. 486 , 159 P.2d 556, 559 , this court announced the rule as follows: "Before a court of equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to devise *310 property, the proof of the contract must be so cogent, clear, and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its terms and character." With reference to plaintiffs' contention that the joint will of Ben and Henrietta was made in recognition of certain claims of the defendants against Ben, the proof discloses that Ben and his brothers and sisters

1953In Pancoast, Adm'r v. Eldridge, 134 Okl. 247 , 273 P. 255 , and in Paull v. Earlywine, 195 Okl. 486 , 159 P.2d 556, 559 , this court announced the rule as follows: "Before a court of equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to devise *310 property, the proof of the contract must be so cogent, clear, and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its terms and character." With reference to plaintiffs' contention that the joint will of Ben and Henrietta was made in recognition of certain claims of the defendants against Ben, the proof discloses that Ben and his brothers and sisters

1953Pure Oil Co. et al. v. Quarles, 183 Okla. 418 , 82 P. 2d 970 , and Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 143 , 45 P. 2d 121 .

1953Pure Oil Co. et al. v. Quarles, 183 Okla. 418 , 82 P. 2d 970 , and Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 143 , 45 P. 2d 121 .

1953In Pancoast, Adm'r v. Eldridge, 134 Okl. 247 , 273 P. 255 , and in Paull v. Earlywine, 195 Okl. 486 , 159 P.2d 556, 559 , this court announced the rule as follows: "Before a court of equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to devise *310 property, the proof of the contract must be so cogent, clear, and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its terms and character." With reference to plaintiffs' contention that the joint will of Ben and Henrietta was made in recognition of certain claims of the defendants against Ben, the proof discloses that Ben and his brothers and sisters

1953In Pancoast, Adm'r v. Eldridge, 134 Okl. 247 , 273 P. 255 , and in Paull v. Earlywine, 195 Okl. 486 , 159 P.2d 556, 559 , this court announced the rule as follows: "Before a court of equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to devise *310 property, the proof of the contract must be so cogent, clear, and forcible as to leave no reasonable doubt as to its terms and character." With reference to plaintiffs' contention that the joint will of Ben and Henrietta was made in recognition of certain claims of the defendants against Ben, the proof discloses that Ben and his brothers and sisters

1952S., Criminal Law, § 30, page 85, and the long line of cases supporting the announced rule: *204 “ * * * the legislature may forbid the doing of or the failure to do an act and make its commission or omission criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer, and-if such legislative intention appears the courts must give it effect, and in such cases, the doing of the inhibited act constitutes the crime, and the moral turpitude or purity of the motive by which it was prompted, and knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character, are immaterial circumstances on the question of guilt

1952S., Criminal Law, § 30, page 85, and the long line of cases supporting the announced rule: *204 “ * * * the legislature may forbid the doing of or the failure to do an act and make its commission or omission criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer, and-if such legislative intention appears the courts must give it effect, and in such cases, the doing of the inhibited act constitutes the crime, and the moral turpitude or purity of the motive by which it was prompted, and knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character, are immaterial circumstances on the question of guilt

1952Ed. 48 , it is said: “In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.” .In the recent case of Morissette v. United States, 1952, 342 U. S. 246 , 72 S. Ct. 240, 242 , 96 L.

1952Ed. 48 , it is said: “In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.” .In the recent case of Morissette v. United States, 1952, 342 U. S. 246 , 72 S. Ct. 240, 242 , 96 L.

1952In Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla. 684 , 102 P. 79 , it is said: *213 “ . . .But it is well settled that one proprietor cannot for his benefit change or obstruct the ordinary course of water in a water course or stream to the injury of other proprietors. ...” Under such circumstances, the evidence reflects that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.

1952In Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla. 684 , 102 P. 79 , it is said: *213 “ . . .But it is well settled that one proprietor cannot for his benefit change or obstruct the ordinary course of water in a water course or stream to the injury of other proprietors. ...” Under such circumstances, the evidence reflects that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.

1952Thus, where with knowledge of the unauthorized acts of the agent there is a silence or acquiescence for an unreasonable time, without objection on the part of the principal, he will be presumed to have ratified such unauthorized acts.” In Walker Valley Oil & Gas Co. v. Parks & Palmer, 128 Okla. 286 , 262 P. 672 , this court announced the rule in the second syllabus as follows: “In addition to the express authority granted an agent, there exists certain authority implied from the existence of the express authority to do a particular act or thing, and this authority will be implied when it appea

1952Thus, where with knowledge of the unauthorized acts of the agent there is a silence or acquiescence for an unreasonable time, without objection on the part of the principal, he will be presumed to have ratified such unauthorized acts.” In Walker Valley Oil & Gas Co. v. Parks & Palmer, 128 Okla. 286 , 262 P. 672 , this court announced the rule in the second syllabus as follows: “In addition to the express authority granted an agent, there exists certain authority implied from the existence of the express authority to do a particular act or thing, and this authority will be implied when it appea

1952Cr. 188 , 62 P. 2d 662 , Judge Doyle, who also wrote the opinion in the Sneed case, in the syllabus, had for the court announced the rule as to ownership of stolen animals, as follows: “2.

1952In Gee et al. v. Security Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 186 Okla. 477 , 98 P.2d 922 , this court announced the rule in the second syllabus as follows: "An application filed in a civil case to obtain a change of venue or disqualify the judge on the ground of prejudice or bias is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, and the ruling thereon will not be reversed on appeal, unless there appears to have been a clear abuse of such discretion." A careful search of the record convinces us that contestants had a fair and impartial trial, and we find no error in the judge's refusal to disqualify.

1952In Gee et al. v. Security Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 186 Okla. 477 , 98 P.2d 922 , this court announced the rule in the second syllabus as follows: "An application filed in a civil case to obtain a change of venue or disqualify the judge on the ground of prejudice or bias is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, and the ruling thereon will not be reversed on appeal, unless there appears to have been a clear abuse of such discretion." A careful search of the record convinces us that contestants had a fair and impartial trial, and we find no error in the judge's refusal to disqualify.

1951In Bridwell v. Goeske, 200 Okla. 244 , 192 P. 2d 656 , this court announced the rule in the body of the opinion as follows: “In plaintiff’s petition it is recognized that but for the tax deed the title to the land is vested in defendant Goeske and it is therein alleged that plaintiff’s claim of title is based upon the tax deed.

1951In Bridwell v. Goeske, 200 Okla. 244 , 192 P. 2d 656 , this court announced the rule in the body of the opinion as follows: “In plaintiff’s petition it is recognized that but for the tax deed the title to the land is vested in defendant Goeske and it is therein alleged that plaintiff’s claim of title is based upon the tax deed.

1951S. p. 887, §188, the author says: “It is not necessary to make a master liable for a negligent omission or act that he should have contemplated or should have been able to anticipate the particular consequences, the form of the accident, or the nature of the injury, and where the act or omission of the master threatens danger, the fact that the accident itself was unusual, extraordinary, or even unheard of does not relieve him from liability.” We followed the above announced rule in Black Gold Petroleum Co. v. Webb, 186 Okla. 584 , 99 P. 2d 868 , citing 45 C.J. p. 918, §484.

1951S. p. 887, §188, the author says: “It is not necessary to make a master liable for a negligent omission or act that he should have contemplated or should have been able to anticipate the particular consequences, the form of the accident, or the nature of the injury, and where the act or omission of the master threatens danger, the fact that the accident itself was unusual, extraordinary, or even unheard of does not relieve him from liability.” We followed the above announced rule in Black Gold Petroleum Co. v. Webb, 186 Okla. 584 , 99 P. 2d 868 , citing 45 C.J. p. 918, §484.

1951In Janeway v. Vandeventer, 172 Okla. 379 , 45 P. 2d 79 , this court announced the rule in regard to tender as follows: (Syl. 2): “Where a tender is necessary to the establishment of any right against another party, it is waived or becomes unnecessary when it appears that such tender, if made, would have been refused.” Here, the tender was admittedly refused by Alma.

1951In Janeway v. Vandeventer, 172 Okla. 379 , 45 P. 2d 79 , this court announced the rule in regard to tender as follows: (Syl. 2): “Where a tender is necessary to the establishment of any right against another party, it is waived or becomes unnecessary when it appears that such tender, if made, would have been refused.” Here, the tender was admittedly refused by Alma.