announced rule in Iowa

2018Id. year later—the court announced it was hearing the motion in connection with the possession case.

1983In Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School Dist. v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1979), this court announced the rule that on appeals from action of the adjudicator and the trial court in teachers’ termination cases, we review the record in the manner specified in Iowa Code section 279.18 and make anew the judicial determinations specified in that section. 282 N.W.2d at 679-80.

1983In Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School Dist. v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1979), this court announced the rule that on appeals from action of the adjudicator and the trial court in teachers' termination cases, we review the record in the manner specified in Iowa Code section 279.18 and make anew the judicial determinations specified in that section. 282 N.W.2d at 679-80.

1970Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., supra, 232 Iowa at 345-346 , 5 N.W.2d at 655 .

1970Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., supra, 232 Iowa at 345-346 , 5 N.W.2d at 655 .

1966Bartels v. Cair-Dem Inc., 255 Iowa 834 , 124 N.W.2d 514 .) I do not believe the facts here are within the announced rule. *553 I am unable to understand how we can say defendant in the exercise of reasonable care should have known plaintiff would have no reason to anticipate the icy condition, appreciate its hazard or guard against it.

1966Bartels v. Cair-Dem Inc., 255 Iowa 834 , 124 N.W.2d 514 .) I do not believe the facts here are within the announced rule. *553 I am unable to understand how we can say defendant in the exercise of reasonable care should have known plaintiff would have no reason to anticipate the icy condition, appreciate its hazard or guard against it.

1947The announced rule in this state is that: “ ‘ * * * acts for which a court of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds, extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered. ’ ’ ’ Tucker v. Stewart, 121 Iowa 714, 716 , 97 N. W. 148, 149 , quoting from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 , 25 L.

1947The announced rule in this state is that: “ ‘ * * * acts for which a court of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds, extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered. ’ ’ ’ Tucker v. Stewart, 121 Iowa 714, 716 , 97 N. W. 148, 149 , quoting from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 , 25 L.

1947The announced rule in this state is that: “ ‘ * * * acts for which a court of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds, extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered. ’ ’ ’ Tucker v. Stewart, 121 Iowa 714, 716 , 97 N. W. 148, 149 , quoting from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 , 25 L.

1947The announced rule in this state is that: “ ‘ * * * acts for which a court of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds, extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered. ’ ’ ’ Tucker v. Stewart, 121 Iowa 714, 716 , 97 N. W. 148, 149 , quoting from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 , 25 L.

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1939We are not unmindful of the rules of law called to our attention by the appellant as laid down in the cases of Ellis v. Soper, 111 Iowa 631 , 82 N. W. 1041 ; Witt v. Day, 112 Iowa 110 , 83 N. W. 797 ; Van Rees v. Witzenburg, 112 Iowa 30 , 83 N. W. 787 ; and Tucke v. Bucholz, 43 Iowa 415 , wherein the court announced the principle that, to sustain a private settlement between guardian and his wards, it must appear that there was a full disclosure by the guardian of the condition of the estate and that the settlement was fair and equitable and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the facts re

1934Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show the perjury independently of the declarations or testimony of the accused.” In People v. Kennedy, 221 Mich. 1 , 190 N. W. 749 , the court announced the rule in the following language: “There being no oral evidence of perjury other than the contradictory statements made to the officers, the conviction cannot be sustained unless there are some corroborating facts and circum stances(Italics are ours.) In Richardson v. State, 45 Ohio App. 46 , 186 N. E. 510 , the court held: “There should be at least one witness to t

1934Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show the perjury independently of the declarations or testimony of the accused.” In People v. Kennedy, 221 Mich. 1 , 190 N. W. 749 , the court announced the rule in the following language: “There being no oral evidence of perjury other than the contradictory statements made to the officers, the conviction cannot be sustained unless there are some corroborating facts and circum stances(Italics are ours.) In Richardson v. State, 45 Ohio App. 46 , 186 N. E. 510 , the court held: “There should be at least one witness to t

1934Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show the perjury independently of the declarations or testimony of the accused.” In People v. Kennedy, 221 Mich. 1 , 190 N. W. 749 , the court announced the rule in the following language: “There being no oral evidence of perjury other than the contradictory statements made to the officers, the conviction cannot be sustained unless there are some corroborating facts and circum stances(Italics are ours.) In Richardson v. State, 45 Ohio App. 46 , 186 N. E. 510 , the court held: “There should be at least one witness to t

1934Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show the perjury independently of the declarations or testimony of the accused.” In People v. Kennedy, 221 Mich. 1 , 190 N. W. 749 , the court announced the rule in the following language: “There being no oral evidence of perjury other than the contradictory statements made to the officers, the conviction cannot be sustained unless there are some corroborating facts and circum stances(Italics are ours.) In Richardson v. State, 45 Ohio App. 46 , 186 N. E. 510 , the court held: “There should be at least one witness to t

1916Stanley v. Epperson, 45 Tex. 644 ; Tabor v. Tabor, 136 Mich. 255 ( 99 N. W. 4 ); 9 Am. & Eng.

1916Stanley v. Epperson, 45 Tex. 644 ; Tabor v. Tabor, 136 Mich. 255 ( 99 N. W. 4 ); 9 Am. & Eng.

1916Stanley v. Epperson, 45 Tex. 644 ; Tabor v. Tabor, 136 Mich. 255 ( 99 N. W. 4 ); 9 Am. & Eng.

1905The only damages allowed were such as resulted from the supposed injury to plaintiff’s credit Was this a proper element of damages to be taken into consideration ?' In the early case of Campbell v. Chamberlain, 10 Iowa, 337 , this court announced the rule that in an action on an attachment bond “ injuries to credit o,r character or business are too remote and speculative to be considered in an action of this kind.” This rule has since prevailed' in this State.

1901In Harshey v. Blackmarr„ 20 Iowa, 161 -186, this court announced a principle directly applicable to the matter under discussion in these words: “We wish to emphasize another thought, which is this: That the conclusion reached does not excuse, but in view of public policy, requires, a party who had been represented by an unauthorized attorney to disavow and disaffirm his action promptly upon receiving knowledge thereof.

1899But it has been overruled, in effect, in this respect, by Shipley v. Reasoner, 87 Iowa, 555 , in which this court held that it will not assume, as matter of evidence, knowledge even of the contents of a pleading in the case on trial, when it has been superseded by another pleading.

1892In Brown v. Ransey, 74 Ga. 210 , the court announced the rule that such contracts are to be liberally construed to carry into effect the intention of the parties, and no' want or form of technical expression will invalidate them; that the intention of the parties is the cardinal rule of construction; that attendant and surrounding circumstances may always be resorted to, and proof of local usage or understanding of words is held admissible to arrive at the meaning of the parties.