announced rule in Missouri

1993The court held that the Miranda warning is required only where the suspect is under arrest or there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 , 97 S.Ct. at 714 .

1993The court held that the Miranda warning is required only where the suspect is under arrest or there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 , 97 S.Ct. at 714 .

1988In McGinnis v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Railway, 200 Mo. 347 , 98 S.W. 590 (1906), the court announced the rule that where the cause of action against the employer is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior and the wrongful act of the employee, exoneration of the employee operates to exonerate the employer.

1988In McGinnis v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Railway, 200 Mo. 347 , 98 S.W. 590 (1906), the court announced the rule that where the cause of action against the employer is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior and the wrongful act of the employee, exoneration of the employee operates to exonerate the employer.

1988Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.1969), the court announced that the rule of strict liability was appropriate to insure that the cost of injuries from defective products be borne by manufacturers, not by the injured persons.

1984In Graves v. Stewart, 642 S.W.2d 649 (Mo.1982) (en banc), the court announced the rule that findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court in a jury-waived case provide a proper basis for assignment of error even when the parties made no request for them.

1983In Greer v. State, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.App.1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 , 101 S.Ct. 1735 , 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981), the court announced the rule that the fact that a witness’ memory had been refreshed by pre-trial hypnosis was a matter of the witness’ credibility, not competency.

1983In Greer v. State, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.App.1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 , 101 S.Ct. 1735 , 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981), the court announced the rule that the fact that a witness’ memory had been refreshed by pre-trial hypnosis was a matter of the witness’ credibility, not competency.

1983In Greer v. State, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.App.1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 , 101 S.Ct. 1735 , 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981), the court announced the rule that the fact that a witness’ memory had been refreshed by pre-trial hypnosis was a matter of the witness’ credibility, not competency.

1983In Greer v. State, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.App.1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 , 101 S.Ct. 1735 , 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981), the court announced the rule that the fact that a witness’ memory had been refreshed by pre-trial hypnosis was a matter of the witness’ credibility, not competency.

1975In Ray v. Wooster, 270 S.W.2d 743 (Mo.1954), l.c. 753, the court announced the rule to be that: “[i]n an action on a contract by one of the parties thereto, the only parties defendant who may be necessary are the other parties to the contract sued on, and those who have an interest in the dispute which will be affected by the action.” In State ex rel.

1972There the court announced the standard as follows : “Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, * * * the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [things to be searched for] were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant whose identity need not be disclosed * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” See also, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 ,

1972There the court announced the standard as follows : “Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, * * * the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [things to be searched for] were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant whose identity need not be disclosed * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” See also, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 ,

1972The magistrate was entitled to make “a common-sense reading” of the entire complaint, Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 1 . c. 415, 89 S.Ct. 1 . c. 588, and in doing so it was reasonably certain to the magistrate that the undisclosed informant spoke with personal knowledge of the facts related to the complainants.

1972There the court announced the standard as follows : “Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, * * * the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [things to be searched for] were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant whose identity need not be disclosed * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” See also, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 ,

1972There the court announced the standard as follows : “Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, * * * the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [things to be searched for] were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant whose identity need not be disclosed * * * was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” See also, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 ,

1972The magistrate was entitled to make “a common-sense reading” of the entire complaint, Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. 1 . c. 415, 89 S.Ct. 1 . c. 588, and in doing so it was reasonably certain to the magistrate that the undisclosed informant spoke with personal knowledge of the facts related to the complainants.

1969In State v. Caffey, supra, the court announced the rule that the constitutional right to speedy trial commences with the filing of the information, There, in a felony case, slightly over three months elapsed from information to trial.

1957In Renfro v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 235 Mo.App. 226 , 130 S.W.2d 165 , the court announced the rule stated above with reference to the beginning of the time for the filing of a claim in an occupational disease case.

1957In Renfro v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 235 Mo.App. 226 , 130 S.W.2d 165 , the court announced the rule stated above with reference to the beginning of the time for the filing of a claim in an occupational disease case.

1943Co. (Mo. App.), 14 S. W. (2d) 470, 472 ] ” The evidence in the instant case brings it within that doctrine.

1916The accused must make the exemption a ground of defense.’ ” [Citing State v. O’Brien, 74 Mo. 549 .] The proviso in the case at bar merely exempted a class from the operation of the statute and falls clearly within the above announced rule.

1916We do not deem that .anything herein stated conflicts in any manner with the holding in State v. Carson, 231 Mo. 1 .

1909In Hall v. Wesster, 7 Mo. App. 56 , decided in 1879, in a carefully considered opinion, delivered by Judge Bakewell, this court announced the rule to be (1. c. 60), “that a party will not be permitted to use land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into with his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased.

1901In State v. Emery, 78 Mo. 77 , this court announced the doctrine, that in order to find a person- guilty of manslaughter in the fourth degree under section 1834, Revised Statutes 1899, it was sufficient to show that the'shooting though unintentionally done was the result of negligence in handling the firearm in such a manner as indicated a carelessness or recklessness of human life.

1870(State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464 ; State v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 531 .) But in the more recent case of The State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 , the question was again considered, and we hold that the most reasonable rule was, that as the law presumed every person who had reached the age of discretion to be ] of sufficient capacity to be responsible for his crimes, the burden 1 of establishing the insanity of the accused affirmatively to the * satisfaction of the jury, on the trial of a criminal caso, rested upon f the defense ; but that it was not necessary that the defense should' be established beyond a reas

1870(State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464 ; State v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 531 .) But in the more recent case of The State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 , the question was again considered, and we hold that the most reasonable rule was, that as the law presumed every person who had reached the age of discretion to be ] of sufficient capacity to be responsible for his crimes, the burden 1 of establishing the insanity of the accused affirmatively to the * satisfaction of the jury, on the trial of a criminal caso, rested upon f the defense ; but that it was not necessary that the defense should' be established beyond a reas

1870(State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464 ; State v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 531 .) But in the more recent case of The State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 , the question was again considered, and we hold that the most reasonable rule was, that as the law presumed every person who had reached the age of discretion to be ] of sufficient capacity to be responsible for his crimes, the burden 1 of establishing the insanity of the accused affirmatively to the * satisfaction of the jury, on the trial of a criminal caso, rested upon f the defense ; but that it was not necessary that the defense should' be established beyond a reas