announced rule in Arkansas

2017Id.

1984State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 794 , 178 S.W.2d 77 (1944).

1984State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 794 , 178 S.W.2d 77 (1944).

1980Powell, 258 Ark. 166 , 523 S.W. 2d 909 (1975), the court announced the rule that when a contractor has been prevented by the owner from completing the work, the plaintiff may recover the agreed price less what it would have cost him to complete construction or may recover on a quantum meruit basis.

1980Powell, 258 Ark. 166 , 523 S.W. 2d 909 (1975), the court announced the rule that when a contractor has been prevented by the owner from completing the work, the plaintiff may recover the agreed price less what it would have cost him to complete construction or may recover on a quantum meruit basis.

1968Appellant cites Robertson v. Evans, 180 Ark. 420 , 21 S. W. 2d 610 , as holding: “The test in determining a plea of res judicata is not alone whether the matters presented in a subsequent suit were litigated in a former suit between the same parties, but whether such matters were necessarily within the issues and might have been litigated in the former suit.” Conceding the announced rule to be correct, appellant fails to point out, and we fail to find, where the issues here “were necessarily within the issues” in the prior chancery proceedings.

1968Appellant cites Robertson v. Evans, 180 Ark. 420 , 21 S. W. 2d 610 , as holding: “The test in determining a plea of res judicata is not alone whether the matters presented in a subsequent suit were litigated in a former suit between the same parties, but whether such matters were necessarily within the issues and might have been litigated in the former suit.” Conceding the announced rule to be correct, appellant fails to point out, and we fail to find, where the issues here “were necessarily within the issues” in the prior chancery proceedings.

1966State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Baker, 239 Ark. 298 , 388 S. W. 2d 920 (1965).

1966State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Baker, 239 Ark. 298 , 388 S. W. 2d 920 (1965).

1962The Court said: “It is now the settled doctrine of the courts that alteration of an instrument by a stranger (an act commonly called spoliation) has no effect on the rights or liability of the parties.” In Woods v. Spann, 190 Ark. 1085 , 82 S. W. 2d 850 , it is stated: “An alteration, to have the effect of avoiding an instrument, must not only be material, but must be made by a party or privy to the instrument, or with his knowledge or consent.” In Robertson v. Southwestern Company, 136 Ark. 417 , 206 S. W. 755 , the Court quoted with approval from 2 Corpus Juris 1200 as follows: “Where the ch

1962The Court said: “It is now the settled doctrine of the courts that alteration of an instrument by a stranger (an act commonly called spoliation) has no effect on the rights or liability of the parties.” In Woods v. Spann, 190 Ark. 1085 , 82 S. W. 2d 850 , it is stated: “An alteration, to have the effect of avoiding an instrument, must not only be material, but must be made by a party or privy to the instrument, or with his knowledge or consent.” In Robertson v. Southwestern Company, 136 Ark. 417 , 206 S. W. 755 , the Court quoted with approval from 2 Corpus Juris 1200 as follows: “Where the ch

1962In Andrews v. Calloway, 50 Ark. 358 , 7 S. W. 449 , the Court announced the rule that is in accord with the great weight of authority.

1962The Court said: “It is now the settled doctrine of the courts that alteration of an instrument by a stranger (an act commonly called spoliation) has no effect on the rights or liability of the parties.” In Woods v. Spann, 190 Ark. 1085 , 82 S. W. 2d 850 , it is stated: “An alteration, to have the effect of avoiding an instrument, must not only be material, but must be made by a party or privy to the instrument, or with his knowledge or consent.” In Robertson v. Southwestern Company, 136 Ark. 417 , 206 S. W. 755 , the Court quoted with approval from 2 Corpus Juris 1200 as follows: “Where the ch

1962The Court said: “It is now the settled doctrine of the courts that alteration of an instrument by a stranger (an act commonly called spoliation) has no effect on the rights or liability of the parties.” In Woods v. Spann, 190 Ark. 1085 , 82 S. W. 2d 850 , it is stated: “An alteration, to have the effect of avoiding an instrument, must not only be material, but must be made by a party or privy to the instrument, or with his knowledge or consent.” In Robertson v. Southwestern Company, 136 Ark. 417 , 206 S. W. 755 , the Court quoted with approval from 2 Corpus Juris 1200 as follows: “Where the ch

1960In the case of Mackintosh et al v. Stewart, 181 Ala. 328 , 61 So. 956 , where a similar issue was under consideration, the Court said: “A recovery in an action on a covenant for title works a rescission pro tanto by revesting in the convenantor the title, such as it is, which he has conveyed.” Apparently appellees concede the above announced principle because in their brief and in the oral argument here, they disclaim all right, title and interest in the subject property, and they further agree that a court order to that effect may be entered.

1960In the case of Mackintosh et al v. Stewart, 181 Ala. 328 , 61 So. 956 , where a similar issue was under consideration, the Court said: “A recovery in an action on a covenant for title works a rescission pro tanto by revesting in the convenantor the title, such as it is, which he has conveyed.” Apparently appellees concede the above announced principle because in their brief and in the oral argument here, they disclaim all right, title and interest in the subject property, and they further agree that a court order to that effect may be entered.

1960See: Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675 , 182 S. W. 2d 671 ; Coffer v. State, 211 Ark. 1010 , 204 S. W. 2d 376 ; and Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809 , 286 S. W. 2d 17 .

1960See: Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675 , 182 S. W. 2d 671 ; Coffer v. State, 211 Ark. 1010 , 204 S. W. 2d 376 ; and Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809 , 286 S. W. 2d 17 .

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960See: Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675 , 182 S. W. 2d 671 ; Coffer v. State, 211 Ark. 1010 , 204 S. W. 2d 376 ; and Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809 , 286 S. W. 2d 17 .

1960See: Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675 , 182 S. W. 2d 671 ; Coffer v. State, 211 Ark. 1010 , 204 S. W. 2d 376 ; and Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809 , 286 S. W. 2d 17 .

1960See: Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675 , 182 S. W. 2d 671 ; Coffer v. State, 211 Ark. 1010 , 204 S. W. 2d 376 ; and Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809 , 286 S. W. 2d 17 .

1960See: Massey v. State, 207 Ark. 675 , 182 S. W. 2d 671 ; Coffer v. State, 211 Ark. 1010 , 204 S. W. 2d 376 ; and Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809 , 286 S. W. 2d 17 .

1959In the case of Higgins v. State, 204 Ark. 233 , 161 S. W. 2d 400 , we stated the rule for review of evidence in this court to he “It is a well-settled rule that the evidence admitted at the trial, or on appeal, be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, and if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury it will be sustained. ’ ’ Measured by the above announced rule the testimony shows that the appellant entered a hunting lodge owned by T.

1959In the case of Higgins v. State, 204 Ark. 233 , 161 S. W. 2d 400 , we stated the rule for review of evidence in this court to he “It is a well-settled rule that the evidence admitted at the trial, or on appeal, be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, and if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury it will be sustained. ’ ’ Measured by the above announced rule the testimony shows that the appellant entered a hunting lodge owned by T.

1957In the early case of Garvin v. Linton, 62 Ark. 370 , 35 S. W. 430 , 37 S. W. 569 (on rehearing), this court announced this rule: “There can be no usury when the amount taken in the contract for interest in excess of ten per cent per annum Avas reserved through a mistake or ignorance of the fact that it was in such excess.

1957In the early case of Garvin v. Linton, 62 Ark. 370 , 35 S. W. 430 , 37 S. W. 569 (on rehearing), this court announced this rule: “There can be no usury when the amount taken in the contract for interest in excess of ten per cent per annum Avas reserved through a mistake or ignorance of the fact that it was in such excess.

1957In the early case of Garvin v. Linton, 62 Ark. 370 , 35 S. W. 430 , 37 S. W. 569 (on rehearing), this court announced this rule: “There can be no usury when the amount taken in the contract for interest in excess of ten per cent per annum Avas reserved through a mistake or ignorance of the fact that it was in such excess.

1953Doniphan Lumber Company v. Cleburne County, 138 Ark. 449 , 212 S. W. 308 , was an appeal from the Circuit Court involving assessments and this Court there announced the rule applicable here as follows: “Unless the undisputed facts in the case establish that the findings and judgment of the circuit court are erroneous, this court cannot reverse on appeal.

1953Doniphan Lumber Company v. Cleburne County, 138 Ark. 449 , 212 S. W. 308 , was an appeal from the Circuit Court involving assessments and this Court there announced the rule applicable here as follows: “Unless the undisputed facts in the case establish that the findings and judgment of the circuit court are erroneous, this court cannot reverse on appeal.

1953The above announced principle of law has also been recognized by this Court in the case of McDonald v. Fort Smith & Western Railroad Company, 105 Ark. 5 , 150 S. W. 135 .

1953The above announced principle of law has also been recognized by this Court in the case of McDonald v. Fort Smith & Western Railroad Company, 105 Ark. 5 , 150 S. W. 135 .

1950In Glover v. Bullard, 170 Ark. 58 , 278 S. W. 645 , this court thus announced the rule: ‘ ‘ The general rule on this question is clearly stated in Weart v. Rose, 16 N. J.

1950In Glover v. Bullard, 170 Ark. 58 , 278 S. W. 645 , this court thus announced the rule: ‘ ‘ The general rule on this question is clearly stated in Weart v. Rose, 16 N. J.

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In the comparatively recent case of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. People’s Loan & Investment Company, 191 Ark. 982 , 88 S. W. 2d 831 , this court announced the rule in this language: “When a claim is disputed or unliquidated, and the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof is of such character as to give the creditor notice that it must be accepted in full satisfaction of the claim or not at all, the retention and use thereof by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 1 C.

1944In the comparatively recent case of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. People’s Loan & Investment Company, 191 Ark. 982 , 88 S. W. 2d 831 , this court announced the rule in this language: “When a claim is disputed or unliquidated, and the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof is of such character as to give the creditor notice that it must be accepted in full satisfaction of the claim or not at all, the retention and use thereof by the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 1 C.

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2

1944In Venable v. State, 156 Ark. 564 , 246 S.W. 860 , this court held: (Headnote 4) "Evidence procured through the means of a search warrant is admissible in a criminal case, regardless of the validity of the warrant," and in Woolem v. State, 179 Ark. 1119 , 20 S.W.2d 185 , this court said: "Even though the warrant were illegally issued and void, evidence discovered by the search, tending to show appellant's guilt, was admissible under the rule announced by this court in Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538 , 36 S.W. 940 , and reiterated and adhered to in the cases of Benson v. State, 149 Ark. 633 , 2