announced rule in Nebraska

1997FirsTier Bank v. Buckley, 244 Neb. at 45 , 503 N.W.2d at 844 , this court expanded the rule announced in State ex rel.

1997FirsTier Bank v. Buckley, 244 Neb. at 45 , 503 N.W.2d at 844 , this court expanded the rule announced in State ex rel.

1995The Court announced a rule to be applied in rare cases such as this one, “where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused.” Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 .

1995Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as “punishment” in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government’s damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment. 490 U.S. at 449-50 .

1987More than a hundred years ago, in Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545 , 11 N.W. 732 (1882), this court announced the rule that to authorize specific performance under a statute of frauds in all material respects identical to § 36-105, only the party to be charged need have signed the memorandum.

1978I feel the time has come for this court to reconsider and overrule our previous pronouncement in Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812 , 235 N. W. 450 (1931), in which this court announced the rule that an injured workman cannot recover for his wife’s services as a nurse which were furnished to him while he was cared for at home.

1978I feel the time has come for this court to reconsider and overrule our previous pronouncement in Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812 , 235 N. W. 450 (1931), in which this court announced the rule that an injured workman cannot recover for his wife’s services as a nurse which were furnished to him while he was cared for at home.

1964In the same case on rehearing, 113 F. 2d 111 , the plaintiff sets forth the following language from the opinion: “So long as the United States contends that contractor must do something more and is holding back an amount, large or small, to secure full performance, there is no ‘final settlement’ of the contract within statute limiting time for subcontractor’s suit on contractor’s bond given United States to one year after final settlement.” In addition to the above language it was said in the opinion: “It is urged that our language: ‘Not until the wall was rebuilt and the order passed to pay t

1963The same principle was announced in Hopkins v. Fogler, 60 Me. 266 ..

1962See, also, Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161 , 190 N. W. 208 ; Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707 , 192 N. W. 127 ; Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins Co., 112 Neb. 332 , 199 N. W. 498 ; Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661 , 222 N. W. 42 .

1962See, also, Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161 , 190 N. W. 208 ; Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707 , 192 N. W. 127 ; Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins Co., 112 Neb. 332 , 199 N. W. 498 ; Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661 , 222 N. W. 42 .

1962See, also, Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161 , 190 N. W. 208 ; Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707 , 192 N. W. 127 ; Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins Co., 112 Neb. 332 , 199 N. W. 498 ; Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661 , 222 N. W. 42 .

1962See, also, Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161 , 190 N. W. 208 ; Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707 , 192 N. W. 127 ; Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins Co., 112 Neb. 332 , 199 N. W. 498 ; Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661 , 222 N. W. 42 .

1962See, also, Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161 , 190 N. W. 208 ; Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707 , 192 N. W. 127 ; Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins Co., 112 Neb. 332 , 199 N. W. 498 ; Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661 , 222 N. W. 42 .

1962See, also, Frost v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 109 Neb. 161 , 190 N. W. 208 ; Johnson v. David Cole Creamery Co., 109 Neb. 707 , 192 N. W. 127 ; Schlesselman v. Travelers Ins Co., 112 Neb. 332 , 199 N. W. 498 ; Ashton v. Blue River Power Co., 117 Neb. 661 , 222 N. W. 42 .

1959In Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 775 , 98 N. W. 76 , this court announced the rule as follows: “As stated in our former opinion in this case, the rule without exception is, that property rights not growing out of the marriage relation can not be joined with an action for divorce.” See, also, Hunter v. Hunter, 88 Neb. 153 , 129 N. W. 422 ; Annotation, 93 A. L.

1959In Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 775 , 98 N. W. 76 , this court announced the rule as follows: “As stated in our former opinion in this case, the rule without exception is, that property rights not growing out of the marriage relation can not be joined with an action for divorce.” See, also, Hunter v. Hunter, 88 Neb. 153 , 129 N. W. 422 ; Annotation, 93 A. L.

1959In Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 775 , 98 N. W. 76 , this court announced the rule as follows: “As stated in our former opinion in this case, the rule without exception is, that property rights not growing out of the marriage relation can not be joined with an action for divorce.” See, also, Hunter v. Hunter, 88 Neb. 153 , 129 N. W. 422 ; Annotation, 93 A. L.

1959In Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 775 , 98 N. W. 76 , this court announced the rule as follows: “As stated in our former opinion in this case, the rule without exception is, that property rights not growing out of the marriage relation can not be joined with an action for divorce.” See, also, Hunter v. Hunter, 88 Neb. 153 , 129 N. W. 422 ; Annotation, 93 A. L.

1953The defendant also relies on the case of Gohlinghorst v. Ruess, 146 Neb. 470 , 20 N. W. 2d 381 , wherein the court announced the rule pertaining to a motion for directed verdict and then stated: “But when other evidence of the plaintiff demonstrates to the extent that reasonable men cannot differ thereon, that such evidence is incapable of belief, the rule does not apply and a directed verdict may properly be granted.” We are not in accord with defendant’s contention as to the applicability of such cases to the instant case.

1953The defendant also relies on the case of Gohlinghorst v. Ruess, 146 Neb. 470 , 20 N. W. 2d 381 , wherein the court announced the rule pertaining to a motion for directed verdict and then stated: “But when other evidence of the plaintiff demonstrates to the extent that reasonable men cannot differ thereon, that such evidence is incapable of belief, the rule does not apply and a directed verdict may properly be granted.” We are not in accord with defendant’s contention as to the applicability of such cases to the instant case.

1951In Johnson v. Griepenstroh, 150 Neb. 126 , 33 N.W.2d 549 , the question was not raised, discussed, or considered, and is pure dictum insofar as the interpretation claimed for it by the majority opinion is concerned.

1951In Johnson v. Griepenstroh, 150 Neb. 126 , 33 N.W.2d 549 , the question was not raised, discussed, or considered, and is pure dictum insofar as the interpretation claimed for it by the majority opinion is concerned.

1945In the early case of Finch v. York County, 19 Neb. 50 , 26 N. W. 589 , this court announced this rule in the following language: “The power of the state to tax all property within its own limits must be conceded.

1945I am also of the opinion that no basis exists for adhering strictly to the announced rule in Armstrong v. Griffith, 94 Neb. 515 , 143 N. W. 461 , for the reason that it has become a rule of property.

1945I am also of the opinion that no basis exists for adhering strictly to the announced rule in Armstrong v. Griffith, 94 Neb. 515 , 143 N. W. 461 , for the reason that it has become a rule of property.

1941The majority opinion apparently attempts to limit the announced rule to such a deed, “when executed without consideration and without reference to, and not for the purpose of carrying out, any contract that specified the characteristics of the estate intended to be created.” This limitation is for the apparent purpose of avoiding the controlling effect of the decision of this court in Neneman v. Rickley, 110 Neb. 446 , 194 N. W. 447 .

1941The majority opinion apparently attempts to limit the announced rule to such a deed, “when executed without consideration and without reference to, and not for the purpose of carrying out, any contract that specified the characteristics of the estate intended to be created.” This limitation is for the apparent purpose of avoiding the controlling effect of the decision of this court in Neneman v. Rickley, 110 Neb. 446 , 194 N. W. 447 .

1941And in Comment “c” of such section appears the following: “If, however, the car is in good* condition, being operated in the open country on a through highway, and the actor has no reason to suppose that the driver is incompetent, it would be unduly burdensome to require the actor constantly to center his attention on the road and the driver, and the actor, therefore, would not be subject to liability if his attention is diverted to the surrounding scenery or if he talks to other occupants in the car, although he thereby deprives himself of an opportunity to exercise his control over the drive

1941And in Comment “c” of such section appears the following: “If, however, the car is in good* condition, being operated in the open country on a through highway, and the actor has no reason to suppose that the driver is incompetent, it would be unduly burdensome to require the actor constantly to center his attention on the road and the driver, and the actor, therefore, would not be subject to liability if his attention is diverted to the surrounding scenery or if he talks to other occupants in the car, although he thereby deprives himself of an opportunity to exercise his control over the drive

1939In Castek v. Tully, 127 Neb. 657 , 256 N. W. 506 , this court announced the rule, viz.: “The failure to have all the affected parties before the appellate court may alone be sufficient to prevent a determination of the issues raised by appeal.” And, likewise, this rule, in effect, was applied by this court, on its own motion, in Reilly v. Merten, 125 Neb. 558 , 251 N. W. 114 .

1939In Castek v. Tully, 127 Neb. 657 , 256 N. W. 506 , this court announced the rule, viz.: “The failure to have all the affected parties before the appellate court may alone be sufficient to prevent a determination of the issues raised by appeal.” And, likewise, this rule, in effect, was applied by this court, on its own motion, in Reilly v. Merten, 125 Neb. 558 , 251 N. W. 114 .

1939In Castek v. Tully, 127 Neb. 657 , 256 N. W. 506 , this court announced the rule, viz.: “The failure to have all the affected parties before the appellate court may alone be sufficient to prevent a determination of the issues raised by appeal.” And, likewise, this rule, in effect, was applied by this court, on its own motion, in Reilly v. Merten, 125 Neb. 558 , 251 N. W. 114 .

1939In Castek v. Tully, 127 Neb. 657 , 256 N. W. 506 , this court announced the rule, viz.: “The failure to have all the affected parties before the appellate court may alone be sufficient to prevent a determination of the issues raised by appeal.” And, likewise, this rule, in effect, was applied by this court, on its own motion, in Reilly v. Merten, 125 Neb. 558 , 251 N. W. 114 .

1938In First Trust Co. v. Stenger, 130 Neb. 750 , 266 N. W. 642 , this court announced the rule: “A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless necessary to proper disposition of pending case.” This holding was followed in Howarth v. Becker, 131 Neb. 233 , 267 N. W. 444 , and in State v. Ruback, ante, p. 335, 281 N. W. 607 .

1938In First Trust Co. v. Stenger, 130 Neb. 750 , 266 N. W. 642 , this court announced the rule: “A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless necessary to proper disposition of pending case.” This holding was followed in Howarth v. Becker, 131 Neb. 233 , 267 N. W. 444 , and in State v. Ruback, ante, p. 335, 281 N. W. 607 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938In First Trust Co. v. Stenger, 130 Neb. 750 , 266 N. W. 642 , this court announced the rule: “A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless necessary to proper disposition of pending case.” This holding was followed in Howarth v. Becker, 131 Neb. 233 , 267 N. W. 444 , and in State v. Ruback, ante, p. 335, 281 N. W. 607 .

1938In First Trust Co. v. Stenger, 130 Neb. 750 , 266 N. W. 642 , this court announced the rule: “A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless necessary to proper disposition of pending case.” This holding was followed in Howarth v. Becker, 131 Neb. 233 , 267 N. W. 444 , and in State v. Ruback, ante, p. 335, 281 N. W. 607 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938In First Trust Co. v. Stenger, 130 Neb. 750 , 266 N. W. 642 , this court announced the rule: “A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless necessary to proper disposition of pending case.” This holding was followed in Howarth v. Becker, 131 Neb. 233 , 267 N. W. 444 , and in State v. Ruback, ante, p. 335, 281 N. W. 607 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1938Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763 , 266 N. W. 577 ; Srajhans v. Mares, 130 Neb. 924 , 267 N. W. 82 ; First Trust Co. v. Airdale Ranch & Cattle Co., 131 Neb. 475 , 268 N. W. 362 ; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller, 132 Neb. 677 , 273 N. W. 14 .

1937This court announced this principle in the following form: “The legislature must be presumed to have had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject, so that in the construction of a statute we must consider the preexisting law and any other acts relating to the same subject.” Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93, 175 N. W. 531 .

1937This court announced this principle in the following form: “The legislature must be presumed to have had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject, so that in the construction of a statute we must consider the preexisting law and any other acts relating to the same subject.” Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93, 175 N. W. 531 .

1937That case was decided under the announced doctrine: “One who delivers goods to a dealer under a contract requiring the dealer to make weekly report of his receipts to the former was bound to require such reports and to report immediately such omissions to the sureties in order to recover from the sureties the amount due from the dealer.” Furst & Thomas v. Rowland, 188 Ark. 804 , 68 S. W. (2d) 451 .

1937That case was decided under the announced doctrine: “One who delivers goods to a dealer under a contract requiring the dealer to make weekly report of his receipts to the former was bound to require such reports and to report immediately such omissions to the sureties in order to recover from the sureties the amount due from the dealer.” Furst & Thomas v. Rowland, 188 Ark. 804 , 68 S. W. (2d) 451 .