announced rule in Indiana

2014Id.

2014Id.

1969In Bowling v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 663 , 230 N. E. 2d 439 , it is stated: “In denying the Petition for Rehearing in the case of Workman v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 68 , 21 N. E. 2d 712 , 23 N. E. 2d 419 , this Court announced a rule to guide us, as follows: *144 *. . . the rule is clearly laid down that, under an indictment in the usual form, which merely follows the language of the statute, a conviction will be sustained upon evidence that the accused actually committed the crime, or that he aided or abetted in its commission . . .’ (emphasis supplied)”.

1969In Bowling v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 663 , 230 N. E. 2d 439 , it is stated: “In denying the Petition for Rehearing in the case of Workman v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 68 , 21 N. E. 2d 712 , 23 N. E. 2d 419 , this Court announced a rule to guide us, as follows: *144 *. . . the rule is clearly laid down that, under an indictment in the usual form, which merely follows the language of the statute, a conviction will be sustained upon evidence that the accused actually committed the crime, or that he aided or abetted in its commission . . .’ (emphasis supplied)”.

1959The oral testimony of appellant was uncontradicted but, as we said in Wilson v. Indiana Gas & Water Co., Inc. (1955), 126 Ind. App. 302 , 130 N. E. 2d 498 , “though a particular item of evidence is not expressly or directly contradicted, this does not prevent the trier from taking into consideration all of the other evidence including circumstances and surroundings that might in any way affect the weight or credibility of such evidence and the trier may disregard oral evidence if considered unreasonable or inconsistent with facts and circumstances shown by other evidence in the case.” It follo

1959The oral testimony of appellant was uncontradicted but, as we said in Wilson v. Indiana Gas & Water Co., Inc. (1955), 126 Ind. App. 302 , 130 N. E. 2d 498 , “though a particular item of evidence is not expressly or directly contradicted, this does not prevent the trier from taking into consideration all of the other evidence including circumstances and surroundings that might in any way affect the weight or credibility of such evidence and the trier may disregard oral evidence if considered unreasonable or inconsistent with facts and circumstances shown by other evidence in the case.” It follo

1953Div. v. Ponder (1950), 121 Ind. App. 51 , 92 N. E. 2d 224 , the court announced the rule to be as follows: “Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative boards must be reasonable, and such boards cannot enlarge or vary, by the operation of such rules, the powers conferred upon them by the Legislature, or create a rule out of harmony with the statute.

1953Div. v. Ponder (1950), 121 Ind. App. 51 , 92 N. E. 2d 224 , the court announced the rule to be as follows: “Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative boards must be reasonable, and such boards cannot enlarge or vary, by the operation of such rules, the powers conferred upon them by the Legislature, or create a rule out of harmony with the statute.

2018This Court instructed the State may rebut that presumption only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 49 N.E.3d at 1019 .

2007Four years later in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the Supreme Court reiterated, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ).

2007Four years later in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the Supreme Court reiterated, “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ).

2007Finding this statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,, the Court announced the rule that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 .

2007Finding this statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,, the Court announced the rule that “[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 .

2004Section 1988 and the announced standard of the United States Supreme Court in Texas State Teachers v. Garland - Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782 , 109 S.Ct. 1486 , 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (19[8]9).

2004Section 1988 and the announced standard of the United States Supreme Court in Texas State Teachers v. Garland - Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782 , 109 S.Ct. 1486 , 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (19[8]9).

2004Id. at 341; Kellogg v. City of Gary, [ 562 N.E.2d 685 (Ind.1990).] A plaintiff may be considered a "prevailing party" if they [sic] succeed on any significant issue in litigation which orders some of the benefits the party sought in bringing the suit.

1986This court announced the principle that "it is the nature of the acts performed and not whether the officer is on or off duty, in or out of uniform, which determines whether the officer is engaged in the performance of his official duties." Tapp, supra, at 302 ; see also Robey v. State (1985), Ind.App., 484 N.E.2d 628 .

1969In Bowling v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 663 , 230 N. E. 2d 439 , it is stated: “In denying the Petition for Rehearing in the case of Workman v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 68 , 21 N. E. 2d 712 , 23 N. E. 2d 419 , this Court announced a rule to guide us, as follows: *144 *. . . the rule is clearly laid down that, under an indictment in the usual form, which merely follows the language of the statute, a conviction will be sustained upon evidence that the accused actually committed the crime, or that he aided or abetted in its commission . . .’ (emphasis supplied)”.

1969In Bowling v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 663 , 230 N. E. 2d 439 , it is stated: “In denying the Petition for Rehearing in the case of Workman v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 68 , 21 N. E. 2d 712 , 23 N. E. 2d 419 , this Court announced a rule to guide us, as follows: *144 *. . . the rule is clearly laid down that, under an indictment in the usual form, which merely follows the language of the statute, a conviction will be sustained upon evidence that the accused actually committed the crime, or that he aided or abetted in its commission . . .’ (emphasis supplied)”.

1953R. (1952), 123 Ind. App. 338 , 109 N. E. 2d 104 , in which the court announced the rule to be, “No error is presented with reference to the rejection of the testimony offered by appellant, for the reason that the objection and offer to prove are not set forth in the motion for new trial.” Specification numbers three and four of the motion for new trial question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decision and that the decision is contrary to law.

1953R. (1952), 123 Ind. App. 338 , 109 N. E. 2d 104 , in which the court announced the rule to be, “No error is presented with reference to the rejection of the testimony offered by appellant, for the reason that the objection and offer to prove are not set forth in the motion for new trial.” Specification numbers three and four of the motion for new trial question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decision and that the decision is contrary to law.

1953In the case of Cox v. Timm (1914), 182 Ind. 7 , 105 N. E. 479 , the court announced the rule in the construction of conflicting statutes to be as follows: “And as this construction brings about provisions in the law which are in the particular under construction conflicting in effect, one of them (provision in the law) must give way to save the law from the objection of lack of uniform operation.

1953In the case of Cox v. Timm (1914), 182 Ind. 7 , 105 N. E. 479 , the court announced the rule in the construction of conflicting statutes to be as follows: “And as this construction brings about provisions in the law which are in the particular under construction conflicting in effect, one of them (provision in the law) must give way to save the law from the objection of lack of uniform operation.

1953Bank v. Brown (1916), 63 Ind. App. 391 , 114 N. E. 486 , this court announced the rule as follows: “From these authorities, it seems clear that the defense of laches is one which is not provable under the general denial, and which must be specially pleaded to be available as a matter of defense.

1953Bank v. Brown (1916), 63 Ind. App. 391 , 114 N. E. 486 , this court announced the rule as follows: “From these authorities, it seems clear that the defense of laches is one which is not provable under the general denial, and which must be specially pleaded to be available as a matter of defense.

1944The case is substantially like Lickey v. City of South Bend (1934), 206 Ind. 636 , 190 N. E. 858 , decision of which is based upon the announced rule that where no property rights are involved a court of equity lacks jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the provisions of a penal licensing ordinance.

1944The case is substantially like Lickey v. City of South Bend (1934), 206 Ind. 636 , 190 N. E. 858 , decision of which is based upon the announced rule that where no property rights are involved a court of equity lacks jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the provisions of a penal licensing ordinance.

1938In Rose v. Rose (1883), 93 Ind. 179, 183 , the Supreme Court, discussing the distinction between settlements made before and after marriage, *177 said: “The important distinction between settlements made before and those made after marriage is, that while the former have the contemplated marriage as a consideration to .support them, the latter are without any such consideration.

1938In Thompson v. Thompson (1892), 132 Ind. 288 , 31 N. E. 529 , the court announced the rule that husband and wife do not have the power to make valid contracts relating to alimony.

1938In Thompson v. Thompson (1892), 132 Ind. 288 , 31 N. E. 529 , the court announced the rule that husband and wife do not have the power to make valid contracts relating to alimony.

1938In City of Linton v. Jones (1921), 75 Ind. App. 320 , 130 N. E. 541 , this court announced the rule prevailing in such cases in the following language (p. 322) : “The general rule, as to the liability of cities for injuries caused by the presence of snow or ice on the sidewalks thereof, as gathered from the best reasoned decisions *647 seems to be, that while a city is not liable for injuries arising from a general slippery condition of a sidewalk made so from an accumulation of snow or ice through natural causes, nevertheless liability may exist where such snow or ice has been so changed in f

1938In City of Linton v. Jones (1921), 75 Ind. App. 320 , 130 N. E. 541 , this court announced the rule prevailing in such cases in the following language (p. 322) : “The general rule, as to the liability of cities for injuries caused by the presence of snow or ice on the sidewalks thereof, as gathered from the best reasoned decisions *647 seems to be, that while a city is not liable for injuries arising from a general slippery condition of a sidewalk made so from an accumulation of snow or ice through natural causes, nevertheless liability may exist where such snow or ice has been so changed in f

1928It would be a harsh rule if a person applying to an insurance agent, who is supposed to know the legal value of the language used in such policies, which he is drawing up every day, and who is supposed to know exactly what is desired, if that agent fails to do that which was intended, it would be harsh to say that the instrument shall not be reformed, and that chancery shall not give relief." For other leading cases on this subject see Zarecki v. Guarantee Realty Co. (1914), 82 N.J.

1928Co. (1885), 24 Fed. 625 , the court announced the rule to be that: "Where an instrument fails to represent what both parties intended to have it represent, and one party has drawn up *Page 397 the instrument, and the other party merely accepted it, and the fault was on the part of the party drawing up the instrument, it can be reformed.

1927The case of Hogston v. Bell (1916), 185 Ind. 536 , 112 N. E. 883 , relied on by appellant, when carefully read, is not helpful to him, for, though the court decided that the contract involved did not contemplate compensation for securing legislative action; and that it did not contemplate compensation contingent upon securing governmental action, the court announced the principle here involved as follows: “There can be no doubt that the law is well settled in this and in other jurisdictions that, while contracts for the payment of fixed fees for legitimate professional services rendered before

1927The case of Hogston v. Bell (1916), 185 Ind. 536 , 112 N. E. 883 , relied on by appellant, when carefully read, is not helpful to him, for, though the court decided that the contract involved did not contemplate compensation for securing legislative action; and that it did not contemplate compensation contingent upon securing governmental action, the court announced the principle here involved as follows: “There can be no doubt that the law is well settled in this and in other jurisdictions that, while contracts for the payment of fixed fees for legitimate professional services rendered before

1910In the case of Hench v. Eacock, supra, this court considered the ruling declared in Winchester Wagon Works, etc., Co. v. Carman, supra, and decided not to extend its application so as to relieve the party (second retailer) purchasing the property in bulk from thé terms of a conditional sale contract.

1905In Thomman's Appeal, supra, the court announced a rule applicable to the case at bar.

1877This case is cited with approval in The State v. Bush, 29 Ind. 110 , and O’Reiley v. The Kankakee Valley Draining Co., 32 Ind. 169 ; in which last case this court holds, that the right of eminent domain can only be exercised for a public purpose.

1877This case is cited with approval in The State v. Bush, 29 Ind. 110 , and O’Reiley v. The Kankakee Valley Draining Co., 32 Ind. 169 ; in which last case this court holds, that the right of eminent domain can only be exercised for a public purpose.