judge committed reversible error in South Carolina

1999On appeal, Wilson asserts the trial judge committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior drug transaction under Rule 404(b), SCRE, and State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406 , 118 S.E. 803 (1923).

1999On appeal, Wilson asserts the trial judge committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior drug transaction under Rule 404(b), SCRE, and State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406 , 118 S.E. 803 (1923).

2005The trial judge stated, “I specifically decline to permit that testimony.” In State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410 , 535 S.E.2d 431 (2000), our Supreme Court found the trial judge committed reversible error by excluding testimony of a past violent act that was closely related in time and occasion to the homicide in that case.

2005The trial judge stated, “I specifically decline to permit that testimony.” In State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410 , 535 S.E.2d 431 (2000), our Supreme Court found the trial judge committed reversible error by excluding testimony of a past violent act that was closely related in time and occasion to the homicide in that case.

2009State v. Hubner, 362 S.C. 572 , 608 S.E.2d 463 (Ct.App.2005).

2009State v. Hubner, 362 S.C. 572 , 608 S.E.2d 463 (Ct.App.2005).

2009Whether the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to conduct an in camera hearing pursuant to Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) and Rule 104(c), SCRE, on the reliability of Tyrone’s identification of appellant as the shooter, especially in light of the fact Tyrone had incorrectly identified appellant as a participant in an earlier incident shortly before the shooting, and his identification of appellant as the triggerman was the product of an inherently suggestive show-up conducted by the police after appellant was arrested. 2.

2009Whether the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to conduct an in camera hearing pursuant to Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S.Ct. 375 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) and Rule 104(c), SCRE, on the reliability of Tyrone’s identification of appellant as the shooter, especially in light of the fact Tyrone had incorrectly identified appellant as a participant in an earlier incident shortly before the shooting, and his identification of appellant as the triggerman was the product of an inherently suggestive show-up conducted by the police after appellant was arrested. 2.

2008After a thorough review of the record and counsel’s brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Miles’ appeal and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved.

2008After a thorough review of the record and counsel’s brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Miles’ appeal and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved.

2008After a thorough review of the record and counsel’s brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Williams , 305 S.C. 116 , 406 S.E.2d 357 (1991), we dismiss Miles’ appeal and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved.

2005I would hold the trial judge committed reversible error in allowing these three charges to be tried together over *381 appellant's objection, as they did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and required different proof. [2] Id.

2005I would hold the trial judge committed reversible error in allowing these three charges to be tried together over appellant’s objection, as they did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and required different proof. 2 Id.

2002In State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47 , 456 S.E.2d 357 (1995), the defendant objected to the admission of seventeen crime scene photos and ten autopsy slides during the penalty phase of his trial, contending they were highly prejudicial and designed only to arouse the jury’s passion.

2002In State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47 , 456 S.E.2d 357 (1995), the defendant objected to the admission of seventeen crime scene photos and ten autopsy slides during the penalty phase of his trial, contending they were highly prejudicial and designed only to arouse the jury’s passion.

2001However, we note that in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 328 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the United States Supreme Court remarked, “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.

2001However, we note that in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 328 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the United States Supreme Court remarked, “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.

1993The majority agrees and reverses Charping's murder conviction, relying on State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) and on State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), and finding that the State had conceded there was no knowing and voluntary waiver made on the record by Charping of the right given him by section 16-3-28.

1993The majority agrees and reverses Charping's murder conviction, relying on State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) and on State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), and finding that the State had conceded there was no knowing and voluntary waiver made on the record by Charping of the right given him by section 16-3-28.

1993The majority agrees and reverses Charping's murder conviction, relying on State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) and on State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), and finding that the State had conceded there was no knowing and voluntary waiver made on the record by Charping of the right given him by section 16-3-28.

1993The majority agrees and reverses Charping's murder conviction, relying on State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) and on State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), and finding that the State had conceded there was no knowing and voluntary waiver made on the record by Charping of the right given him by section 16-3-28.

1993The majority agrees and reverses Charping's murder conviction, relying on State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) and on State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), and finding that the State had conceded there was no knowing and voluntary waiver made on the record by Charping of the right given him by section 16-3-28.

1993The majority agrees and reverses Charping's murder conviction, relying on State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) and on State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), and finding that the State had conceded there was no knowing and voluntary waiver made on the record by Charping of the right given him by section 16-3-28.

1979State v. Gorey, supra. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

1969The defendant-appellant contends that evidence concerning the covenant should have been excluded from the consideration of the jury and credit given by the court, relying on the recent case of Powers v. Temple, 250 S. C. 149, 156 S. E. (2d) 759 .