judge committed reversible error in New York

1987In contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony involved situations where the defendant’s guilt was based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, People v Clarke, 108 AD2d 819 ; People v Jones, 108 AD2d 824 ; People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1984We take note of the fact that, in contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of identification testimony involved evidence of a defendant’s guilt based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, e.g., People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Daniels, 88 AD2d 392 ; People v Bruno, 77 AD2d 922 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1987In contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony involved situations where the defendant’s guilt was based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, People v Clarke, 108 AD2d 819 ; People v Jones, 108 AD2d 824 ; People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1984We take note of the fact that, in contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of identification testimony involved evidence of a defendant’s guilt based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, e.g., People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Daniels, 88 AD2d 392 ; People v Bruno, 77 AD2d 922 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

2014II In People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]), defendant, convicted of capital murder, contended that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to turn over the pretrial statements of three prosecution witnesses for purposes of cross-examination.

2014II In People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]), defendant, convicted of capital murder, contended that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to turn over the pretrial statements of three prosecution witnesses for purposes of cross-examination.

2013By decision dated November 10, 2011, the Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, reversed Ippolito’s 40 check-related CPFI convictions and dismissed those counts of the indictment; 2 vacated the amount of restitution ordered and remitted for a hearing to determine the proper sum; and otherwise affirmed ( 89 AD3d 1369 [4th Dept 2011]).

1999However, these contentions are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Starling, 85 NY2d 509, 516 ).

1994Moreover, as the Appellate Division noted, since the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders' interest and bias were "exhaustive[ly]" ( 192 AD2d, at 554 ) explored on cross-examination, introduction of documentary evidence of the agreement was properly denied as being merely cumulative ( see , People v Chin , 67 N.Y.2d 22, 29 ). [2] Defendant's remaining argument is that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury.

1994Moreover, as the Appellate Division noted, since the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders’ interest and bias were "exhaustively]” ( 192 AD2d, at 554 ) explored on cross-examination, introduction of documentary evidence of the agreement was properly denied as being merely cumulative (see, People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22, 29 ). 2 Defendant’s remaining argument is that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury.

1994Moreover, as the Appellate Division noted, since the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders' interest and bias were "exhaustive[ly]" ( 192 AD2d, at 554 ) explored on cross-examination, introduction of documentary evidence of the agreement was properly denied as being merely cumulative ( see , People v Chin , 67 N.Y.2d 22, 29 ). [2] Defendant's remaining argument is that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury.

1994Moreover, as the Appellate Division noted, since the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders’ interest and bias were "exhaustively]” ( 192 AD2d, at 554 ) explored on cross-examination, introduction of documentary evidence of the agreement was properly denied as being merely cumulative (see, People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22, 29 ). 2 Defendant’s remaining argument is that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury.

1994Of the errors alluded to, the only one preserved was the refusal *659 of defendant's request to give an interested witness charge regarding Saunders' testimony, i.e., that his testimony "should be scrutinized carefully and a determination made as to whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony" ( People v Jackson , 74 N.Y.2d 787, 790 ; see , 1 CJI[NY] 7.24).

1994Of the errors alluded to, the only one preserved was the refusal of defendant’s request to give an interested witness charge regarding Saunders’ testimony, i.e., that his testimony "should be scrutinized carefully and a determination made as to whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony” (People v Jackson, 74 NY2d 787, 790 ; see, 1 CJI[NY] 7.24).

1991In the absence of violation of Judiciary Law § 14 or a showing that the court’s alleged bias affected the result in this jury trial, the issue of recusal was a matter left to the Trial Judge’s own conscience (see, People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 406 ; People v Bartolomeo, 126 AD2d 375, 391 , lv denied 70 NY2d 702 ; see also, People v Gallagher, 158 AD2d 469 , lv denied 76 NY2d 735 ).

1991In the absence of violation of Judiciary Law § 14 or a showing that the court’s alleged bias affected the result in this jury trial, the issue of recusal was a matter left to the Trial Judge’s own conscience (see, People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 406 ; People v Bartolomeo, 126 AD2d 375, 391 , lv denied 70 NY2d 702 ; see also, People v Gallagher, 158 AD2d 469 , lv denied 76 NY2d 735 ).

1987In contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony involved situations where the defendant’s guilt was based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, People v Clarke, 108 AD2d 819 ; People v Jones, 108 AD2d 824 ; People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1987In contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony involved situations where the defendant’s guilt was based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, People v Clarke, 108 AD2d 819 ; People v Jones, 108 AD2d 824 ; People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1984We take note of the fact that, in contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of identification testimony involved evidence of a defendant’s guilt based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, e.g., People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Daniels, 88 AD2d 392 ; People v Bruno, 77 AD2d 922 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1984We take note of the fact that, in contrast to the instant case, many of the cases in which this court has held that the Trial Judge committed reversible error by failing to deliver detailed instructions regarding the specific factors relevant to an evaluation of the accuracy of identification testimony involved evidence of a defendant’s guilt based exclusively upon eyewitness identification testimony countered by an alibi defense (see, e.g., People v Knowell, 94 AD2d 255 ; People v Daniels, 88 AD2d 392 ; People v Bruno, 77 AD2d 922 ; People v Gardner, 59 AD2d 913 ).

1982The Trial Judge committed reversible error by refusing to charge the jury that defendant could be found liable on the alternate theories of creation of a hazardous condition or the failure to warn of the existence, of certain potentially dangerous conditions (cf. Cook v Rezende, 32 NY2d 596 ; McCabe v Mackay, 253 NY 440 ).

1982The Trial Judge committed reversible error by refusing to charge the jury that defendant could be found liable on the alternate theories of creation of a hazardous condition or the failure to warn of the existence, of certain potentially dangerous conditions (cf. Cook v Rezende, 32 NY2d 596 ; McCabe v Mackay, 253 NY 440 ).

1982In affirming our unanimous affirmance of the judgment of conviction in Charleston, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the validity of the People’s observation ( 56 NY2d 886 ).

1978We hold that the Trial Judge committed reversible error when he failed to charge, as requested, that no inference unfavorable to defendant could be drawn from his decision not to take the stand (see CPL 300.10, subd 2; People v Britt, 43 NY2d 111 ).

1977Even assuming that error was committed below based upon the first two contentions, in light of the overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt, consisting in part of several admissions, by both word and deed, and a signed written confession, these two errors must be deemed harmless (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 ).

1957The cases of People v. Gonzalez ( 293 N. Y. 259 ) and People v. Gezzo ( 307 N. Y. 385 ), relied on by defendant in support of his proposition that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in neglecting to answer the third question, are factually distinguishable from the present case.

1957The cases of People v. Gonzalez ( 293 N. Y. 259 ) and People v. Gezzo ( 307 N. Y. 385 ), relied on by defendant in support of his proposition that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in neglecting to answer the third question, are factually distinguishable from the present case.

1940Buermeyer respecting the failure of said defendant to testify in his own behalf, under the rule recently laid down by the Court of Appeals in People v. Forte ( 277 N. Y. 440 ).