judge committed reversible error in Alabama

2012“Given the limited grounds for a mistrial presented to the trial judge and the corresponding narrow scope of our review and the steps the trial judge took to attempt to counteract the potential for the particular prejudice about which the Hospital expressed concern, including an admonitionary final charge to the jury, to which no objection was made, we cannot say that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying the Hospital’s motion for a mistrial on the juror-substitution issue.” Lloyd Noland, 906 So.2d at 166-68 .

2008Therefore, we rule that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to recuse himself, and we remand this case for a new trial.” Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d at 61-62 .

2008Therefore, we rule that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to recuse himself, and we remand this case for a new trial." Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d at 61-62 .

1995In Ex parte Tucker, 454 So.2d 552 (Ala.1984), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court, holding that the trial judge committed reversible error when he failed to grant the defendant’s challenge for cause of a potential juror whose brother was a material witness for the State.

1995On the authority of Ex parte Tucker, supra, we hold that the trial court erred in not granting Simpson’s challenge for cause of the venireman.

1995The standard for granting a motion for a new trial alleging perjured testimony in a capital case is set out in Ex parte Frazier , 562 So.2d 560 , 570 (Ala. 1989): "[T]he trial court must be reasonably well satisfied 1) that testimony given by a witness at trial was false; 2) that there is a significant chance that had the jury heard the truth, it would have reached a different result; and 3) that the movant is not relying on evidence of which he was aware at trial and which he consciously decided not to use to challenge the testimony of the perjured witness." (Emphasis added.) The court found

1990Goins v. State, 521 So.2d 97, 99 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); Briggs v. State, 375 So.2d 530 (Ala.Cr.App.1979).

1990Jury Charges The defendant claims that the trial judge committed reversible error in giving the following jury charge requested by the plaintiff: "I charge you, members of the jury, that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the Defendant James Kohn breached the contract he entered into with the Plaintiff Sherron Johnson by failing to construct the addition on her home in a workmanlike manner, and that the Plaintiff sustained injury by reason of the breach, then you should find for the Plaintiff and award to her such damages as are the proximate result of the breach, which wou

1990The record before us is incomplete, and the appellant’s brief is inadequate, but apparently the appellant is claiming that he had a statutory right to intervene in the wrongful death action filed by his wife as administratrix. 2 The record before us does not show that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying appellant’s request to intervene in the lawsuit; therefore, based on the authority of Dearmon v. Dearmon, 492 So.2d 1004 (Ala.1986), we affirm.

1986Diamond , supra, and cases cited therein; See Varner , supra; Sanders , supra. While the second remark made by the prosecutor may, in some circumstances, have been "improper", 1 we do not believe *Page 1149 the trial judge committed reversible error in overruling this objection.

1986Bass, supra; Williams, supra. II The appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by admitting the blood sample chart into evidence when the blood samples themselves had not been offered nor admitted into evidence.

1986Bass, supra; Williams, supra. II The appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error by admitting the blood sample chart into evidence when the blood samples themselves had not been offered nor admitted into evidence.

1986Diamond , supra, and cases cited therein; See Varner , supra; Sanders , supra. While the second remark made by the prosecutor may, in some circumstances, have been "improper", 1 we do not believe *Page 1149 the trial judge committed reversible error in overruling this objection.

1985Kuczenska v. State, 378 So.2d 1182 (Ala.Cr.App.1979). *784 VI The appellant next alleges that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing one of his requested charges to the jury.

1984It is the best of my knowledge and belief that Richards Electric Company never installed a wood-burning heater at the home of Danny and Elaine Costello.” The plaintiffs argue that “the trial judge committed reversible error by finding that the plaintiff did not produce even a scintilla of evidence to support any of the allegations, thus preventing the case from being determined by a jury.” They cite Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983); Great Southwest Insurance Com pany v. Stone, 402 So.2d 899 (Ala.1982); Herston v. Whitesell, 374 So.2d 267 (Ala.1979); Birmingham Electric Co

1984It is the best of my knowledge and belief that Richards Electric Company never installed a wood-burning heater at the home of Danny and Elaine Costello.” The plaintiffs argue that “the trial judge committed reversible error by finding that the plaintiff did not produce even a scintilla of evidence to support any of the allegations, thus preventing the case from being determined by a jury.” They cite Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983); Great Southwest Insurance Com pany v. Stone, 402 So.2d 899 (Ala.1982); Herston v. Whitesell, 374 So.2d 267 (Ala.1979); Birmingham Electric Co

1984It is the best of my knowledge and belief that Richards Electric Company never installed a wood-burning heater at the home of Danny and Elaine Costello.” The plaintiffs argue that “the trial judge committed reversible error by finding that the plaintiff did not produce even a scintilla of evidence to support any of the allegations, thus preventing the case from being determined by a jury.” They cite Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983); Great Southwest Insurance Com pany v. Stone, 402 So.2d 899 (Ala.1982); Herston v. Whitesell, 374 So.2d 267 (Ala.1979); Birmingham Electric Co

1984It is the best of my knowledge and belief that Richards Electric Company never installed a wood-burning heater at the home of Danny and Elaine Costello.” The plaintiffs argue that “the trial judge committed reversible error by finding that the plaintiff did not produce even a scintilla of evidence to support any of the allegations, thus preventing the case from being determined by a jury.” They cite Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983); Great Southwest Insurance Com pany v. Stone, 402 So.2d 899 (Ala.1982); Herston v. Whitesell, 374 So.2d 267 (Ala.1979); Birmingham Electric Co

1984It is the best of my knowledge and belief that Richards Electric Company never installed a wood-burning heater at the home of Danny and Elaine Costello.” The plaintiffs argue that “the trial judge committed reversible error by finding that the plaintiff did not produce even a scintilla of evidence to support any of the allegations, thus preventing the case from being determined by a jury.” They cite Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983); Great Southwest Insurance Com pany v. Stone, 402 So.2d 899 (Ala.1982); Herston v. Whitesell, 374 So.2d 267 (Ala.1979); Birmingham Electric Co

1983Appellant cites Fulghum v. State , 291 Ala. 71 , 277 So.2d 886 (1973), for the proposition that an individual accused of the greater offense has a right to have the court charge on the lesser offenses included in the indictment when there is a reasonable theory from the evidence supporting his position.

1983Appellant cites Fulghum v. State , 291 Ala. 71 , 277 So.2d 886 (1973), for the proposition that an individual accused of the greater offense has a right to have the court charge on the lesser offenses included in the indictment when there is a reasonable theory from the evidence supporting his position.

1983The defendant maintains that Welch v. City of Birmingham , 389 So.2d 521 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980), is controlling authority for his assertion that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to sustain his challenges for cause.

1983Welch held that "employment of a juror by a party to litigation is in and of itself generally calculated to affect adversely the desirable balance one should have as a juror and for that reason a juror employed by a municipality is subject to challenge for cause in a case in which the municipality is a party." 389 So.2d at 523 .

1982In Howell v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 369 So.2d 297 (1978), it was held that where a specific objection to admission of evidence is made, all other grounds are waived.

1979In Clements v. State, 370 So.2d 723 (Ala.1979), we noted that an instruction on the elements of robbery must be given when a defendant is charged under § 13-11-2(a)(2), as was Ritter.

1979In Clements v. State , 370 So.2d 723 (Ala. 1979), we noted that an instruction on the elements of robbery must be given when a defendant is charged under § 13-11-2 (a)(2), as was Ritter.

1977But, ‘in the absence of a tendency of the evidence to show that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the fatal encounter, that he was in imminent peril, or that he could not avoid the difficulty or retreat without increasing his peril, the defendant cannot prove the bad character of the deceased for turbulence, nor threats by him toward the defendant, nor of a prior difficulty with him, though of a serious nature.’ Farley v. State, 279 Ala. 98 , 182 So.2d 364 ; Sanders v. State, 242 Ala. 532 , 7 So.2d 483 .” We do not think under the facts and circumstances of this case that the tria

1977But, ‘in the absence of a tendency of the evidence to show that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the fatal encounter, that he was in imminent peril, or that he could not avoid the difficulty or retreat without increasing his peril, the defendant cannot prove the bad character of the deceased for turbulence, nor threats by him toward the defendant, nor of a prior difficulty with him, though of a serious nature.’ Farley v. State, 279 Ala. 98 , 182 So.2d 364 ; Sanders v. State, 242 Ala. 532 , 7 So.2d 483 .” We do not think under the facts and circumstances of this case that the tria

1977But, ‘in the absence of a tendency of the evidence to show that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the fatal encounter, that he was in imminent peril, or that he could not avoid the difficulty or retreat without increasing his peril, the defendant cannot prove the bad character of the deceased for turbulence, nor threats by him toward the defendant, nor of a prior difficulty with him, though of a serious nature.’ Farley v. State, 279 Ala. 98 , 182 So.2d 364 ; Sanders v. State, 242 Ala. 532 , 7 So.2d 483 .” We do not think under the facts and circumstances of this case that the tria

1977But, ‘in the absence of a tendency of the evidence to show that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the fatal encounter, that he was in imminent peril, or that he could not avoid the difficulty or retreat without increasing his peril, the defendant cannot prove the bad character of the deceased for turbulence, nor threats by him toward the defendant, nor of a prior difficulty with him, though of a serious nature.’ Farley v. State, 279 Ala. 98 , 182 So.2d 364 ; Sanders v. State, 242 Ala. 532 , 7 So.2d 483 .” We do not think under the facts and circumstances of this case that the tria

1972In reaching the conclusion that the trial court did not commit reversible error this court is not unaware of Griggs v. Barnes, 257 Ala. 21 , 57 So.2d 61 , but feels that the Griggs case must be read in light of the language contained in Clark v. Holland, 274 Ala. 597 , 150 So.2d 702 .

1972In reaching the conclusion that the trial court did not commit reversible error this court is not unaware of Griggs v. Barnes, 257 Ala. 21 , 57 So.2d 61 , but feels that the Griggs case must be read in light of the language contained in Clark v. Holland, 274 Ala. 597 , 150 So.2d 702 .

1972In reaching the conclusion that the trial court did not commit reversible error this court is not unaware of Griggs v. Barnes, 257 Ala. 21 , 57 So.2d 61 , but feels that the Griggs case must be read in light of the language contained in Clark v. Holland, 274 Ala. 597 , 150 So.2d 702 .

1972In reaching the conclusion that the trial court did not commit reversible error this court is not unaware of Griggs v. Barnes, 257 Ala. 21 , 57 So.2d 61 , but feels that the Griggs case must be read in light of the language contained in Clark v. Holland, 274 Ala. 597 , 150 So.2d 702 .

1970We, therefore, adhere to the court in Shelby County v. Baker, 269 Ala. 111 , 110 So.2d 896 , which stated as follows: “* * * However, such fragmentary record of the proceeding at that point does not sufficiently set out the statement of the attorney in its context or show just what preceded or followed the expression in order to command review. * * *” ( 269 Ala. at page 119 , 110 So.2d at page 904 ) In Assignment of Error No. 1: “Appellant also contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when he excluded the statement of the witness Thomas Maxwell ‘Her condition was, from my stand

1970We, therefore, adhere to the court in Shelby County v. Baker, 269 Ala. 111 , 110 So.2d 896 , which stated as follows: “* * * However, such fragmentary record of the proceeding at that point does not sufficiently set out the statement of the attorney in its context or show just what preceded or followed the expression in order to command review. * * *” ( 269 Ala. at page 119 , 110 So.2d at page 904 ) In Assignment of Error No. 1: “Appellant also contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when he excluded the statement of the witness Thomas Maxwell ‘Her condition was, from my stand